JON S. TIGAR, District Judge.
On April 11, 2014, Plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison ("PBSP") and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff now moves to compel further responses to his request for production of documents. (Docket No. 71.) Defendants oppose the motion. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to compel will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff claims that PBSP officials and staff have impeded his efforts to practice his Jewish religion. On June 6, 2015, the Court found that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") stated the following cognizable claims:
(1) kitchen staff employees Cooper, Plunkett, Reidel, Ireland, and Young; Supervising Correctional Cooks Gomez and Halls; Correctional Business Manager Lemos; Correctional Food Managers Sojka and Rias; Community Resource Manager Losacco; Warden Lewis; and Chief Deputy Warden Ducart violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, and violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 by denying his requests for a religious diet and other religious accommodations;
(2) CDCR Departmental Food Administrator Maurino violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion and his rights under RLUIPA based on her role in developing and administering new diet programs at CDCR institutions;
(3) kitchen staff employees Cooper, Plunkett, Reidel, Ireland, and Young; Supervising Correctional Cooks Gomez and Halls; Correctional Business Manager Lemos; Correctional Food Managers Sojka and Rias; Community Resource Manager Losacco; Warden Lewis; and Chief Deputy Warden Ducart violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide him food that he could eat consistent with his religious beliefs; and
(4) Correctional Captain Osborne, Correctional Administrator Bradbury, Facility Captain Walsh, and Correctional Counselors Webster and Markel's refusal to transfer Plaintiff to a new prison violated his First Amendment religious freedom, RLUIPA, and Eighth Amendment rights. See Docket No. 67 at 4-6.
On February 11, 2015, Plaintiff served a request for production of documents ("RFP")
On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to his RFP, see Docket No. 53, which the Court denied without prejudice for failing to certify that he had fulfilled the meet-and-confer requirements under Rule 37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Civil Local Rule 37-1(a), see Docket No. 58.
On April 30, 2015, Defendants reiterated to Plaintiff, via written letter, that their responses had been timely and complete. See Docket No. 71-2 at 20-21. On May 3, 2015, Plaintiff responded to Defendants' April 30, 2015 letter, again requesting further responses to his RFP. See Docket No. 71-2 at 29-31. Plaintiff has therefore fulfilled the meet-and-confer requirements under Rule 37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Civil Local Rule 37-1(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) and L.R. 37-1(a).
Overall, Defendants have produced 399 pages of responsive documents. See Docket No. 73 at 3. Defendants state that these documents include information on Kosher meal vendors, Kosher menus, nutritional information for Kosher meals, the statewide procedure for Kosher meals, the prison's local operating procedure related to religious programs, Plaintiff's prison grievances, and the prison's response to these grievances. See id.
A party may obtain discovery "regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). "Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). "Relevancy, for the purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries." Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Document Request No. 1 requests:
See Docket No. 71 at 1. Defendants have produced all grievances from Plaintiff that concern the claims he has raised in this action, totaling 164 pages of documents. See Docket No. 71-2 at 10. Defendants refuse to produce any further documents on two grounds.
First, Defendants claim that California laws prohibit them from releasing information from the central files of other inmates. Specifically, section 3370(b) of the California Code of Regulations, title 15, prohibits inmates from having access to another [inmate]'s case records file. . . or component thereof" except "by means of a valid authorization, subpoena, or court order." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3370(b). The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Operations Manual ("DOM") prohibits the dissemination of an inmate's records to other inmates without "prior written, voluntary, and timely consent of the individual to whom the record pertain[.]" DOM § 13030.14.
Second, Defendants claim that the request is unmanageable and "impossibly" burdensome because it is not limited to Pelican Bay inmates, and because the manner in which inmate grievances are kept mean that grievances cannot easily be searched by subject matter.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' objections are meritless because the existence of other inmate complaints regarding their Kosher diet could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants could redact identifying information from the complaints; the likely benefit outweighs any burden to Defendants; and such information could reveal more culpable parties. See Docket No. 71-2 at 30.
The Court finds that Defendants have adequately responded to RFP No. 1. Defendants' objections are sustained. Section 3370(b) of the California Code of Regulations, title 15, and Section 13030.14 of the DOM prohibit the release of this information. There is no exception for release of this information in redacted form. Moreover, the documents are not relevant to the claims in the instant litigation, namely whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights. The documents sought concern whether CDCR employees have violated the First Amendment and RLUIPA rights of other California prisoners. After considering the needs of the case and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues, the Court finds that the burden of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 1.
Document Request No. 2 requests:
(Docket No. 71 at 2.) Defendants have produced no documents in response to this request. Defendants object that the documents seek information protected by the official information privilege; and that the request for "prior records" is vague. (Docket No. 72 at 4-5.) Plaintiff responds that the responsive documents can be redacted to hide personal information; that evidence that "repeated complaints about unsanitary-wholesome food have been made and that defendants did not act on such information" is relevant to establish supervisory liability; and that "[e]vidence of prior incidents by prison personnel . . . is relevant to `motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.'" (Docket No. 71-2 at 30-31.)
"Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information." Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). The privilege is "broad enough to cover all disparate kinds of data and communications that can be involved in these types of" civil rights cases against governmental actors. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 659 (N.D. Cal 1987). Government personnel files are among the types of official information to which the privilege may be applied. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033. "To determine whether the information sought is privileged, courts must weigh the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential disadvantages. If the latter is great, the privilege bars discovery." Id. at 1033-34. The party opposing disclosure must make a substantial threshold showing by submitting a declaration or affidavit from a responsible person "stat[ing] with specificity the rationale of the claimed privilege." Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Northern Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975). In order for the Court to determine whether the official information privilege applies, a defendant must provide with the objection a declaration or affidavit containing (1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected the material in issue and has in fact maintained its confidentiality, (2) a statement that the official has personally reviewed the material in question, (3) a specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests that would be threatened by disclosure of the material to the plaintiff, (4) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy interests, and (5) a projection of how much harm would be done to the threatened interests if the disclosure were made. Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670.
Defendants make a sufficient showing that the confidential documents and confidential information sought regarding cell searches are covered by the official information privilege with the declaration of S. Soderlund, the litigation coordinator at Pelican Bay. See Docket No.71-2 at 15-17. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to: (1) show how the requested information is relevant to the litigation or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; (2) identify his interests that would be harmed if the material were not disclosed; and (3) show how that harm would occur and how extensive it would be. Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 671.
Plaintiff has not met his burden. He does not identify his interests that will be harmed if the materials are not disclosed and does not explain how that harm will occur or how extensive it will be. He also fails to show that the information is relevant. A showing that a supervisor acted, or failed to act, in a manner that violated an inmate's constitutional rights demonstrates supervisory liability. See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). Complaints against Defendants that are unrelated to Plaintiff's exercise of his religious rights would not be relevant to a finding of supervisory liability or to any finding of culpability. Plaintiff cites an employment discrimination case for the proposition that prior incidents are relevant to motive or intent. However, that proposition is specific to racial discrimination cases. See, e.g., Sussel v. Wynne, No. CIV 05-00444 ACK/KSC, 2006 WL 5940802, *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 12, 2006). Moreover, any prior complaints have limited probative value in determining Defendants' intent in choosing Kosher menus and serving Kosher meals. Prior complaints would, at most, be relevant to Defendants' credibility if they claim that any failures to serve Plaintiff Kosher meals were mistakes.
To the extent that materials in Defendants' personnel files might be relevant to Defendants' credibility or be relevant for impeachment purposes, such documents are not necessary at this point in the litigation. On a motion to dismiss, a reviewing court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). On a summary motion, a reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Defendants' credibility is not currently at issue. If this case goes to trial, Plaintiff may seek materials from Defendants' personnel files in more narrowly tailored discovery requests. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 2.
Document Request No. 3 requests:
(Docket No. 71 at 2.) Defendants state that they have already produced responsive documents, specifically 188 pages of nutritional information for Elements Foods and Kosher foods. Of these 188 pages, 28 pages were filed with the Court as part of Defendant CDCR Departmental Food Administrator L. Maurino's declaration in support of Defendants' summary judgment motion. See Docket No. 42-1 at 26-52. The Maurino declaration establishes that the CDCR's standard Kosher menu is based on a three-week cycle that is repeated throughout the year. See Docket No. 42 at ¶ 18. Defendants provided the standard three-week Kosher menu for fiscal years 2012-2013 and 2013-2014, which were the fiscal years that Elements Foods was contracted to provide Kosher meals. See id. at ¶ 18 and Exhs. C and D. The menus list the specific items provided at each meal and the portion size of each item. See id., Exhs. C and D. Defendants also provided a copy of a one-page chart that lists the overall caloric and nutritional composition of Elements Foods Kosher meals. See id., Exh. A. However, there is nothing in the record that shows the nutritional information per item. This type of information was provided for the Kosher meals prepared by the Bateman Facility, see id., Ex. G, and Plaintiff is entitled to this type of information for the meals provided by Elements Foods. Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 3 is therefore GRANTED. Defendants are ordered to produce any and all documents that specify the specific nutritional information of each item in the meals prepared by Elements Foods. If this information has already been produced, e.g. included in 160 pages of nutritional information produced to Plaintiff but not filed with the Court, or if no such documents are available, Defendants should inform Plaintiff accordingly and identify, by Bates number, the documents that contain the information.
In addition, Plaintiff requests that Defendants "state if [the documents already produced] are an accurate representation of the food products in question, specifically, nutritional components-value which [Plaintiff] was receiving during relevant time frames, and if so, whether this information form[ed] the basis for CDCR standardized Kosher food program at all institutions included PBSP." See Docket No. 71-2 at 38. If Plaintiff has questions about the documents produced, he may direct these questions to Defendants by propounding interrogatories. By producing responsive documents, Defendants have met their discovery obligations for this RFP. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (party may respond to RFPs by filing objections, setting a time for inspection of documents, or by producing copies of documents).
Document Request No. 4 requests:
(Docket No. 71 at 2.) Defendants state that they have already produced Kosher menus, information regarding CDCR's Kosher meal vendors, the statewide procedure for Kosher meals, and the prison's local operating procedures related to religious programs. Plaintiff appears to find Defendants' production insufficient for two reasons. First, Plaintiff claims that this request seeks relevant evidence because "it concerns Defendants knowledge and identities of those directly involve (sic)." See Docket No. 71-2 at 39. Second, Plaintiff states that Defendants have failed to provide verification that the documents produced were in effect at the relevant times. See id. Similar to RFP No. 4, by producing responsive documents, Defendants have met their discovery obligations for this RFP. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (party may respond to RFPs by filing objections, setting a time for inspection of documents, or by producing copies of documents). Defendants are not required to provide verifications or explanations to accompany responsive documents. Furthermore, Plaintiff may use interrogatories or a more narrowly tailored RFP to ascertain when the documents already produced were in effect. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 4.
Document Request No. 5 requests:
(Docket No. 71 at 2.) Defendants argue that this request does not seek documents relevant to the allegations in the FAC. Plaintiff argues that "considering that defendant Losacco is responsible in making religious accomadations (sic), coordinating religious activity, this request is within its boundaries, for plaintiff claims that PBSP jewish religious program is constitutionally inadequate which places a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious freedoms." See Docket No. 71-2 at 39.
The Court agrees with Defendants that RFP 5 requests documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Because Plaintiff has access to Jewish religious texts in the prison chapel and library, it appears that Plaintiff is arguing that he is entitled to a personal copy of Jewish religious texts. See FAC ¶¶ 127, 135-138, and 166; and Docket No. 41 ("Losacco Decl.") ¶ 11. The relevant issue is therefore whether Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff with personal copies of Jewish religious texts burdened Plaintiff's practice of his religion without either (1) justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, see Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008), or (2) without furthering a compelling governmental interest; and without choosing the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). In other words, if Defendants prohibited Losacco from seeking donations of religious texts, this could arguably lead to admissible evidence, assuming that the lack of individual religious texts burdened an inmate's practice of his religion. However, Losacco's efforts to accommodate Plaintiff's request is not relevant to whether Plaintiff's practice of his religion has been burdened or to whether PBSP's "Jewish religious program" is adequate. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 5.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
This order terminates Docket No. 71.