OPINION

FUENTES, Senior Circuit Judge:

For over 22 years, Plaintiff Gilbert Hyatt has contested in administrative proceedings a California Franchise Tax Board ruling that he owed close to $7.4 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. This initial deficiency, compounding daily with 3% interest, grew to over $55 million at the time he filed his complaint in this case. The taxes were assessed on income he earned during the 1991 and 1992 tax years, during which Hyatt alleges he had moved from California to Nevada. Finally, while his administrative proceedings were still pending, Hyatt filed this suit in the district court, claiming that he had been unconstitutionally targeted and that so much time had passed in the administrative review of his tax claims that he can no longer receive due process. He asked the district court to enjoin California from collecting this tax bill.

Because we agree with the district court that the Tax Injunction Act bars it from "enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of [this] tax under State law where," as here, "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had" in the state court, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. California's Statutory Tax Framework

Under California law, a taxpayer seeking to "prevent or enjoin the assessment or collection of" a California residency-based income tax may not file suit in state court without first exhausting the administrative remedies set forth in the California Revenue and Taxation Code.1 In general, a California taxpayer must "pay now, litigate later."2 However, a taxpayer seeking to contest his tax bill solely on the basis that he was not a resident of California during the disputed period has two options. The taxpayer may either pay now and litigate later, or may bring his claim through a protest-then-pay process, which allows him to delay paying the disputed tax. There is a significant difference: a taxpayer who pays now and litigates later can bring his claims to state court within six months, which guarantees an expeditious route to the state courts on the taxpayer's liability. A taxpayer who disputes his residency through the protest-then-pay process, however, must wait until the administrative agencies render their decisions before filing a challenge in state court.

1. Postdeprivation "Pay-Then-Protest" Process

The "pay-then-protest" process3 requires the challenging taxpayer to make "payment of the tax," after which the taxpayer can file a refund claim with the Franchise Tax Board (the "Tax Board").4 If the Tax Board "fails to mail notice of action on [the] ... refund claim within six months after the claim [is] filed, the taxpayer may ... bring an action [in state court] against the [Tax Board] ... on the grounds set forth in the claim for the recovery of ... [the] overpayment."5 If the Tax Board acts on the challenger's refund claim and denies it, a taxpayer "claiming that the tax computed and assessed is void... may bring an action [in state court], upon the grounds set forth in that claim for refund ... for the recovery of the ... amount paid" plus interest.6 These grounds need not be included in the "four corners of the initial claim," but the Tax Board must have "actual notice" of them.7

2. Predeprivation "Protest-then-Pay" Process

The plaintiff in this case chose to challenge his tax assessment through the protest-then-pay process. A taxpayer who challenges an assessment through this process8 must "file with the [Tax Board] ... a written protest against the proposed deficiency assessment, specifying in the protest the grounds upon which it is based."9 If the protest is filed, the taxpayer may request that the Tax Board "reconsider the assessment of the deficiency."10 If the protest is denied, the taxpayer may "appeal[ ] in writing from the action of the [Tax Board] ... to [the California State Board of Equalization ("Appeals Board")]."11 "The [Appeals Board] ... shall hear and determine the appeal," and an unsuccessful taxpayer may "file[] a petition for rehearing."12 After rehearing before the Appeals Board, a taxpayer may seek review in a California state court.13

A taxpayer who initially challenges a residency-based income tax assessment through the protest-then-pay administrative process may elect to use the pay-then-protest process at any point by paying the disputed tax, thus guaranteeing a route to state court within six months.14

B. Factual History15

Hyatt alleges that in 1991, he moved from California to Nevada. Two years later, the Tax Board commenced an audit to determine whether Hyatt owed additional California state income taxes for the 1991 tax year. The Tax Board initiated a second audit in 1996 regarding the 1992 tax year. Ultimately, the Tax Board determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million for the 1991 tax year and $5.6 million for the 1992 tax year.

Without first paying his taxes, Hyatt challenged his tax bill on the grounds that he did not owe these taxes because he was a resident of Nevada during 1991 and 1992. His Tax Board protest lasted 11 years. Then, in 2008, Hyatt filed an administrative appeal of the Tax Board's determinations before the Appeals Board. That appeal has yet to be decided. Hyatt alleges that "the delays in completing the administrative process fall squarely and primarily at the feet of the [Tax Board]."

In April 2014, Hyatt brought this action in the district court against the members of the Tax Board and Appeals Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin the pending administrative tax review process. At the time he filed suit, his tax bill had ballooned to over $55 million. In his Complaint, Hyatt alleges violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and alleges that he "can no longer receive a full and fair adjudication on the merits due to the extreme passage of time and resulting loss of material evidence." He claims that during the long delay in the administrative process, "material witnesses have passed away, memories of witnesses have faded, and documents relevant and important to Hyatt are no longer available." Because of these events, he claims that he cannot properly challenge the Tax Board's allegations concerning his residency. Hyatt further states that during this administrative process, the Tax Board was out to "get" him and that the Tax Board singled him out for reasons not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.

C. The Tax Injunction Act

The Tax Injunction Act provides that: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."16 This provision "restricts the power of federal district courts to prevent collection or enforcement of state taxes."17 The Supreme Court has "interpreted and applied the Tax Injunction Act as a `jurisdictional rule' and a `broad jurisdictional barrier.'"18

The Tax Injunction Act was passed as "only one of several statutes reflecting congressional hostility to federal injunctions issued against state officials in the aftermath of [the Supreme] Court's decision in Ex parte Young."19 It "has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations."20 It prevents federal courts from intruding into state tax collection, "an area which deserves the utmost comity to state law and procedure."21 This is because "[t]he power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist."22 Thus, "[g]iven the systemic importance of the federal balance, and given the basic principle that statutory language is to be enforced according to its terms, federal courts must guard against interpretations of the Tax Injunction Act which might defeat its purpose and text."23

Under the Tax Injunction Act, a litigant cannot challenge the administration of state tax law in federal court if the state court provides "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" for the taxpayer's claims. This "narrow exception"24 requires only that a state court remedy "meet `certain minimal procedural criteria.'"25 Specifically, a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy must provide a taxpayer with "a full hearing and judicial determination at which [he] may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax."26

For a remedy to be "plain," "the procedures available in state court must be certain."27 A remedy is "efficient" "unless it imposes an `unusual hardship... requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy.'"28 A remedy is "speedy" "if it does not entail a significantly greater delay than a corresponding federal procedure."29 To satisfy these requirements, a remedy "need not necessarily be the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts."30

II. DISCUSSION

"A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo."31

Hyatt appeals the district court's decision that, because California's pay-then-protest process continued to provide a plain, speedy and efficient remedy for Plaintiff even though he had decided to pursue the protest-then-pay process, the Tax Injunction Act stripped the court of jurisdiction to hear this suit.

Hyatt's appeal raises three principal arguments for review:32 (1) a plain, speedy and efficient remedy is not available because Hyatt cannot be required to pursue the pay-then-protest process per California Revenue & Taxation Code § 19382 to have his constitutional claims heard; (2) the protest-then-pay method has not offered Hyatt a speedy remedy and the pay-then-protest remedy will not, and (3) Hyatt does not have a plain remedy, because it is uncertain whether he could bring his constitutional claims as part of either process.33

At the outset, we note that the U.S. Supreme Court and our court have held that, "[t]o the extent they are available, California's refund procedures constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy."34 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has, on several occasions, approved of pay-then-protest remedies as plain, speedy, and efficient.35 The issue then, is whether the unique circumstances of this case have prevented a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy from being available here.

A. Does The Pay-Then-Protest Process Provide a Sufficient Remedy Where Hyatt Chose to Use the Protest-then-Pay Process?

Hyatt objects to the district court's determination that the pay-then-protest process can provide him with "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" even though he has pursued a protest-then-pay process for the past 22 years. Citing Reich v. Collins,36 and Newsweek v. Florida Department of Revenue,37 Hyatt argues that requiring him to pay his large accrued tax bill and switch remedies in order to pursue his constitutional claims would be a "bait and switch" in violation of his due process rights.38

Hyatt's reliance on Reich and Newsweek is misplaced. In Reich, a taxpayer sued for a refund under Georgia's tax refund statute, but the Georgia courts held that the statutes were not applicable and thus the taxpayer had no way to seek a refund of his disputed tax.39 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that, while a state is entitled to provide either a protest-then-pay remedy, or a pay-then-protest remedy, or both, it may not "reconfigure its scheme, unfairly, in midcourse — to `bait and switch.'"40 Specifically, the Court held that a state violated federal due process when it offered a statutory pay-then-protest remedy, and then removed that remedy after a taxpayer had paid his disputed taxes, so that he no longer had any means to challenge his tax bill.41 In Newsweek, where the magazine Newsweek was given no opportunity to seek a refund for a state tax it had already paid that was later found invalid, the Court reiterated this holding.42

In this case, Hyatt had, and still has, a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy available: he can pursue the pay-then-protest process. Unlike in Reich and Newsweek, the state did not "bait and switch" Hyatt.43 Hyatt chose to pursue the protest-then-pay process knowing that it only permitted him to challenge his residency in California during 1991 and 1992. Hyatt now seeks to add additional claims nullifying the tax, but he would have to pay his outstanding tax bill to do so. Of course, if Hyatt pursues this path and is successful, he will be refunded the entire amount of his tax bill, including the taxes that have accrued during the period he has pursued the protest-then-pay process.

Hyatt further argues that he cannot be forced to use the pay-then-protest remedy to pursue his constitutional claims, because he would need to forego his statutory right to, if successful, recover the attorney's fees that he has spent challenging his tax bill already.44 It is not clear that Hyatt would, in fact, be forced to forgo his attorney's fees, but even if Hyatt must abandon some of his claims to attorney's fees by pursuing the pay-then-protest process, this does not mean that the state has deprived him of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.45

B. Does Hyatt Have A Speedy Remedy?

Hyatt notes that the Appeals Board has not completed his administrative appeal, pending since 2008, and that, as of the filing of this appeal, briefing before the Appeals Board was not completed and no hearing date was set.46 Hyatt alleges in his complaint that Defendants are responsible for this delay. Thus, Hyatt argues, he does not have access to a speedy remedy, and federal jurisdiction must lie.

It would certainly be troubling if the administrative protest-then-pay process had been delayed for so long due to the fault of Defendants.47 However, we need not decide whether Hyatt's protest-then-pay process has been speedy to date, and thus we need not consider whether Hyatt or Defendants caused this significant delay.48 Even if the protest-then-pay process has not provided Hyatt with a speedy remedy, at any time during this process, Hyatt could, and Hyatt still can, get to state court within six months if he brings an action through the pay-then-protest process and the Appeals Board does not render a final determination sooner. The California Tax Code provides that,

In our view, the pay-then-protest remedy now provides Hyatt a speedy remedy, even if the protest-then-pay remedy has not.

C. Does Hyatt Have Access to A Plain Remedy for His Constitutional Claims?

Finally, Hyatt argues that it is unclear whether he would be able to raise his constitutional claims in a pay-then-protest proceeding, for two reasons.50 First, he says that Section 19832 authorizes a taxpayer to "claim[] that the tax computed and assessed is void" and to file a claim for "recovery of the whole or any part of the amount paid."51 Hyatt argues that it is unclear whether a California court will find that his constitutional claims contend that "the tax computed and assessed is void" and thus can be heard in state court. Second, Hyatt argues that he may be barred from bringing these claims because they were not "the grounds set forth in the claim for refund."52 Therefore, he argues, his remedy is not "plain" and this suit should not be barred.

First, as Hyatt's own complaint makes clear, he does seek to void a tax. In his complaint, Hyatt seeks to "enjoin Defendants... from continuing the investigation and administrative proceedings against Hyatt that seek to assess California state income taxes, or adjudicate the assessment and collection of California state income taxes, against Hyatt for the 1991 and 1992 tax years."53 He also seeks to "enjoin Defendants from continuing to assess or threaten to assess, or collect or threaten to collect, taxes, penalties and interest from Hyatt for the 1991 and 1992 tax years."54 The district court correctly concluded that "[i]t is evident that Hyatt seeks to void the tax or taxes assessed against him."55 Moreover, California courts have found that constitutional claims can qualify as claims seeking to void a tax.56 It is thus clear that California allows such claims to be brought in the pay-then-protest process. Hyatt's argument thus fails to show that the pay-then-protest process will not provide a plain remedy.

Hyatt's second argument, that he will not be able to add constitutional claims that arose after the filing of his protest to a state court case, presents a much closer question. As Hyatt understands the state statutes, "if [he] pays the tax while his [Appeals Board] appeal is pending ... [his] prior `protests' ..., for the 1991 and 1992 tax years, ... will be deemed to be his refund claim."57 A problem arises because

Under our reading of the statutes, if Hyatt pays and then protests, the California state courts will likely allow Hyatt to add these constitutional claims to a state court suit challenging the tax. The state court may find that these are not the sorts of claims that a taxpayer must include in his initial protest or refund because they refer to conduct during the ongoing Tax Board and Appeals Board review, rather than the grounds on which the taxpayer contested the tax initially. Thus, the legislative purpose served by applying the administrative exhaustion requirement would not apply to these claims. Moreover, even if the California courts do apply the exhaustion requirement to these claims, they may find that the Tax Board was "on notice" of these claims, given the long history of litigation between these parties, where Hyatt may have previously raised these issues.59 The Appeals Board may also permit Hyatt to amend his petition to add these additional grounds.60 At oral argument counsel for the Tax Board and the Appeals Board both represented that the constitutional challenges raised here could be raised in state court.61

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the strong principles of comity that guide our interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act, we decline to enjoin the tax proceedings in this case. We hold that "narrow exception"62 to the Tax Act's jurisdictional bar cannot be expanded to allow this suit, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.63

AFFIRMED.