NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

MOORE, J.

Plaintiff Alfred Guerin was injured while playing broomball at an ice rink owned by defendant Icepro, LLC (IcePro). He sued, alleging premises liability, and the trial court eventually granted summary judgment to IcePro pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c.1 Guerin argues that IcePro never met its initial burden sufficient to permit summary judgment, and even if it did, triable issues of material fact preclude such a ruling. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I

FACTS

In May 2007, Guerin and his daughter, along with her soccer team, met at IcePro's Westminster rink to play broomball. According to one of IcePro's owners, broomball "is a game very similar to hockey or soccer. The object of the game is to score more goals than the opposing team. The players use a stick with a molded broom-shaped head to maneuver a plastic ball up and down the ice trying to hit the ball into a goal. The game is intended to be played on ice, which makes the participants' footing unsure, making the game more challenging." The game is played without skates. The soccer team was not charged a fee for using the facility, and the game was played without a referee.

According to the complaint, "The parents and their daughters were there to play `Broomball', which was an activity provided by defendant at its facility. Plaintiff had never before played `Broomball'. Though USA Broomball regulations require commercially produced shoes with specially-designed soft rubber soles and helmets, none were provided to any of the participants including plaintiff. They were issued only brooms and a ball. As a result, plaintiff slipped on the ice and struck his head." IcePro asserted an affirmative defense of primary assumption of the risk, along with a number of other defenses, in its answer.

In due course, IcePro moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Guerin's action was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. After briefing and argument, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. Judgment was entered for IcePro, and Guerin now appeals.

II

DISCUSSION

"We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, `considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]'" (Lopez v. Baca (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)

Summary judgment is appropriate "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To prevail on the motion, a defendant must demonstrate the plaintiff's cause of action has no merit. This requirement can be satisfied by showing either one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o), (p); Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 494, 499-500.) If the defendant meets this requirement, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 72.)

Thus, IcePro had the initial burden to "show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (§ 437c, subd. (c).) It argues the trial court correctly concluded that primary assumption of risk is a complete defense to Guerin's claim.

As the California Supreme Court explained in Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482 (Shin): "Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others. [Citations.] The existence of a duty is not an immutable fact of nature, but rather an expression of policy considerations providing legal protection. [Citation.] . . . When a sports participant is injured, the considerations of policy and duty necessarily become intertwined with the question of whether the injured person can be said to have assumed the risk. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 488-489.)

"Under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, the defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms arising from ordinary, or simple negligence. [Citation.] In a sports context, the doctrine bars liability because the plaintiff is said to have assumed the particular risks inherent in a sport by choosing to participate. [Citation.]" (Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 489.) The court used baseball as an example: "In baseball, a batter is not supposed to carelessly throw the bat after getting a hit and starting to run to first base. However, the primary assumption of risk doctrine recognizes that vigorous bat deployment is an integral part of the sport and a risk players assume when they choose to participate. Especially in the heat of competition, and in an effort to get to first base quickly, a batter may be careless in freeing himself or herself from the bat's encumbrance. Thus, under the doctrine, a batter does not have a duty to another player to avoid carelessly throwing the bat after getting a hit." (Ibid.)

Thus, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is an exception to the general rule imposing an ordinary duty of care and completely bars liability for risks inherent in a sport. (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 308 (Knight); Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Avila).) "[T]he question whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm does not turn on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct, but rather on the nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport." (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In deciding whether a duty existed, the court must determine whether the injury resulted from a risk inherent in the activity, and if so, whether the defendant increased the risk inherent in the activity. (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 162.)

Thus, to establish the doctrine's applicability and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, IcePro was required to show that Guerin engaged in a sport or activity, that his injury resulted from a risk inherent to the activity, and IcePro did not increase the risk. We conclude that IcePro established each element in its motion for summary judgment.2

With respect to the first element, it is undisputed that broomball is a sport, or at least an activity, that is conducted on ice.3 With regard to the second, defendant admitted that a person may slip and fall when traversing ice. IcePro, therefore, had no duty to protect Guerin unless it increased the risk that he would fall on the ice. Although Guerin puts forth many alleged facts in an attempt to show that IcePro provided an "unsafe environment," including allowing broomball to be played at all, such facts are not the pertinent here, where the only question is whether IcePro increased the risk of slipping on the ice. IcePro had no duty to take actions that would make broomball safer, such as providing special equipment or instruction. (Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 47, 52.) Moreover, the rules and requirements of an official broomball organization are similarly irrelevant, because this was indisputably a social, not a league game.4

Guerin's only marginally relevant factual argument on this point concerns the surface and condition of the ice. Apparently, he believes the ice should have been resurfaced after an earlier hockey game, but IcePro had no such duty. No one who plays a game on ice is entitled to assume the ice is perfect, and variations in conditions are inherent in the activity. (See, e.g., Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 51-52.) Further, he does not establish a triable issue of fact that resurfacing the ice would have decreased the level or risk.

We also reject Guerin's assertion that IcePro may not be entitled to the protection of the assumption of risk doctrine because it was a facility operator as opposed to a participant in the sporting activity. Where the doctrine has been found to be applicable, it has applied to promoters and operators of sports activities, as well as participants. (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, 659-660.) The trial court correctly applied the doctrine to IcePro in this instance.

In sum, we conclude that IcePro sufficiently met its initial burden by demonstrating that it had a complete defense to Guerin's claim. Guerin, however, failed to raise any triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. IcePro is entitled to its costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.