ORDER
W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief District Judge.
On September 28, 2015, the Magistrate Judge filed a Recommendation (Doc. # 92), and on November 2, 2015, the Magistrate Judge filed a Supplemental Recommendation in response to the objection filed by Defendants Heath Taylor and Bob Atkin (incorrectly designated in the governing complaint as "Adkins"). On November 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation and Supplemental Recommendation. (Doc. # 98.) The court has conducted an independent and de novo review of those portions of the Recommendations to which Plaintiffs object. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Plaintiffs present no arguments that cure the deficiencies of fact and law that the Magistrate Judge elaborated upon in the Recommendation, as later supplemented.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Objection (Doc. # 98) is OVERRULED.
2. The Recommendation (Doc. # 92) and the Supplemental Recommendation (Doc. # 97) are ADOPTED.
3. Defendants' Objection (Doc. # 96) is moot.
4. Defendant Ken Davis's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 60) is GRANTED and all claims against Ken Davis are DISMISSED;
5. Defendant Russell County Department of Human Resources' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 63) is GRANTED and all claims against Russell County Department of Human Resources are DISMISSED;
6. Defendant Lizzie Thomas's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 66) is GRANTED and all claims against Lizzie Thomas are DISMISSED;
7. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Doc. # 68), filed by Defendants Heath Taylor and Bob Atkin, is GRANTED and all claims against Defendants Heath Taylor and Bob Atkin are DISMISSED.
8. The Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 90) is DENIED as to the claims under Count One (excessive force/corporal punishment), Count Five (failure to protect), and Count Twelve (denial of procedural due process) against Defendant Russell County Board of Education and against Defendants Keith Mitchell, Kenneth Barnes, Jerry Wayne Carpenter, Dillie Elliot, Larry Laney, Eugenia Upshaw, Joseph Williams, Tommy Pugh, Shawn Taylor, and Mike Green in their individual capacities (Doc. # 90).
9. Defendant Shawn Taylor's Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 90) Counts Two and Three (Assault and Battery) is DENIED.
10. The Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 90) is otherwise GRANTED as to the claims against Defendant Russell County Board of Education and the remaining individual-capacity claims against Defendants Keith Mitchell, Kenneth Barnes, Jerry Wayne Carpenter, Dillie Elliot, Larry Laney, Eugenia Upshaw, Joseph Williams, Tommy Pugh, Charles Johnson, Shawn Taylor, Mike Green, Vantreise Davis, Barry Kirby, Vivian Relf, Ricky Martin, and Jacqueline Grant.
11. The Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 90) the official-capacity claims against Defendants Keith Mitchell, Kenneth Barnes, Jerry Wayne Carpenter, Dillie Elliot, Larry Laney, Eugenia Upshaw, Joseph Williams, Tommy Pugh, Shawn Taylor, and Mike Green is GRANTED.
12. Plaintiffs Edward J. Terry, Sr., and Dymphia M. Terry are DISMISSED as Plaintiffs in this action.
13. Defendants Ken Davis, Russell County Department of Human Resources, Lizzie Thomas, Vivian Relf, Ricky Martin, Jacqueline Grant, Heath Taylor, and Bob Atkin are DISMISSED as Defendants in this action.
14. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 70) is DENIED as moot.
15. This action is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff Edward J. Terry, Jr.'s remaining claims against the Russell County Board of Education and the remaining individual-capacity claims against the Russell County Board members (i.e., Keith Mitchell, Kenneth Barnes, Jerry Wayne Carpenter, Dillie Elliott, Larry Laney, Eugenia Upshaw, Joseph Williams, Tommy Pugh, and Charles Johnson), Shawn Taylor, Mike Green, Vantreise Davis, and Barry Kirby.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
