STIPULATION AND ORDER SETTING HEARING DATE AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the Defendant, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. Attorney Hedberg believes that certain linguistic issues exist regarding Defendant Manuel Marzial's ability to understand the Spanish language used by the interpreters in this case so far;

2. Attorney Hedberg has enlisted the assistance of Court interpreter coordinator Yolanda Riley-Portal in order to find an interpreter who speaks the appropriate form of the Zapoteco language spoken by Defendant Manuel Marzial, and that the search has not produced a qualified interpreter;

3. Because the translator situation is at an impasse Attorney Hedberg desires to move the Court to either locate and appoint a qualified interpreter or dismiss the Indictment as to Defendant Marzial;

4. By this stipulation, the parties now move the Court to adopt the following briefing/hearing schedule:

5. Further, the parties agree to move the status conference currently set for June 15, 2017 at 9:30 am be vacated as to defendant Marzial and the briefing/hearing schedule set forth above be adopted and to exclude time between June 15, 2017, and July 27, 2017 at 9:30 am, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

6. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Attorney Hedberg believes that a cognizable issue regarding Defendant's comprehension of the proceedings in the matter at bar exists due to Defendant's inability to understand the Spanish language interpreter;

b. Attorney Hedberg desires to move the Court to either locate an appropriate interpreter of to dismiss the Indictment;

c. Attorney Hedberg believes that the litigation of the above-described issue is necessary in order to provide Defendant with effective assistance of counsel.

d. The government does not object to either the briefing schedule or continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by the litigation of the above described issue and continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 15, 2017, to July 27, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(1)(D) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED

ORDER

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, it is hereby ordered that the June 15, 2017 status be vacated as to Defendant Marzial, and that the following briefing/hearing schedule be adopted:

I find that the ends of justice warrant an exclusion of time and that the defendant's need for continuity of counsel and reasonable time for effective preparation exceeds the public interest in a trial within 70 days. THEREFORE IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that time be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) and Local Code T4 from the date of this order to July 27, 2017 at 9:30 am.

IT IS SO ORDERED.