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Nwaonumah v. Spearman, 15-cv-04196-WHO (PR). (2018)

Court: District Court, N.D. California Number: infdco20180514742 Visitors: 16
Filed: May 11, 2018
Latest Update: May 11, 2018
Summary: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILLIAM H. ORRICK , District Judge . INTRODUCTION Petitioner David Nwaonumah seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a 2013 prison disciplinary decision that resulted in a 30 day forfeiture of credits. Due process requires that a prison disciplinary decision meet the "some evidence" standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 , 455 (1985). Because the prison's decision meets this low bar, the petition is DENIED. BACK
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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner David Nwaonumah seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from a 2013 prison disciplinary decision that resulted in a 30 day forfeiture of credits. Due process requires that a prison disciplinary decision meet the "some evidence" standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Because the prison's decision meets this low bar, the petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Nwaonumah's jailors at Soledad State Prison found him guilty on a charge of refusing to follow a direct order to move from a lower bunk to the top bunk. (Pet. at 5.) According to the prison's record of the disciplinary hearing, prison guard C. Betancourt testified that on November 6, 2013, he noticed that Nwaonumah was occupying the lower bunk in his cell. (Ans., Dkt. No. 31 (Rules Violation Report) at 26.) Because the lower bunk had been assigned to petitioner's cellmate pursuant to a medical chrono, Betancourt asked Nwaonumah why he wasn't using the upper bunk. (Id.) Petitioner said he didn't want to move "because he had talked to a nurse about getting a lower bunk chrono." (Id.) Betancourt then ordered petitioner to move his property to the upper bunk. (Id.) Nwaonumah refused, and Betancourt again ordered petitioner to comply. (Id.) Nwaonumah again refused, saying, "Hell no, I'm not moving." (Id.) Betancourt later looked into whether petitioner had any lower bunk chronos, but he found none on file. (Id.) Petitioner was charged with refusing a direct order to move.

At the hearing, Nwaonumah testified that he too had a lower bunk chrono and that he had told Betancourt so. (Id.) He further testified that he did not show the chrono to Betancourt, nor did Betancourt ask to see it. (Id.)

Nwaonumah was found guilty of refusing a direct order to move and was assessed a 30-day forfeiture of credits. The hearing officer believed Betancourt's testimony and rejected petitioner's assertion that he had a lower bunk chrono. "Years of experience have demonstrated that if an inmate has documentation in his possession to support their belief or claims they always attempt to show it to staff to solidify their position." (Id. at 28.)

Nwaonumah sought but was denied relief on state judicial review.

In his federal habeas petition, Nwaonumah claims that the preponderance standard, rather than under the "some evidence" standard, should apply.

DISCUSSION

The "some evidence" standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) poses a light evidentiary burden. See also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-1288 (9th Cir. 2003). "[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-457 (upholding the revocation of good time credits, even though the evidence "might be characterized as meager," because "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.").

Habeas relief is not warranted because there was some evidence in the record to support the prison's decision that petitioner was guilty of refusing to follow orders. Betancourt testified that Nwaonumah twice refused his instructions to move to the upper bunk. This certainly meets the some evidentiary standard required by due process.

Nwaonumah counters that Hill's some evidence standard has been replaced with the preponderance standard, as set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), a Supreme Court decision that was issued after Hill. (Trav., Dkt. No. 33 at 3.) Conner said nothing about Hill or the evidentiary standard that should be used in prison disciplinary decisions or by federal habeas courts. "Preponderance" does not appear in the text. Rather, Conner discussed when a prison regulation or action creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.1 Nothing in the opinion supports Nwaonumah's contention that Conner displaced Hill or that it in any way altered the evidentiary standard.

The petition will be denied.

CONCLUSION

The state court's adjudication of Nwaonumah's claims did not result in decisions that were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Further, the state court's findings did not result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not "find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Nwaonumah may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. The plaintiff, Conner, a Hawaii state prisoner, was found guilty of violating prison rules and was sentenced to a term of solitary confinement ("disciplinary segregation"). Conner, 515 U.S. at 475. He filed suit on grounds that (i) he had a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation; and (ii) the state had not provided him with a hearing consonant with the due process protections he was owed (e.g., the opportunity to call witnesses) because of that liberty interest. Id. at 476. The Court rejected his claim, noting that not every punitive state action "encroaches upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 484. Only those actions that cause an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," id. at 484, or necessarily affect the length of an inmate's sentence, create such an interest, id. at 487. Conner's segregation, the Court held, did not qualify under this standard. Id. at 485. It was not "a dramatic departure from the basic conditions" of his sentence, id., nor did it "inevitably affect the duration" of his incarceration, id. at 487.
Source:  Leagle

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