NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Parkhurst appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of defendant Capistrano Animal Rescue Effort (CARE) to his abuse of process cause of action and granted summary judgment on his cause of action for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated). He contends he stated a cause of action for abuse of process and was entitled to leave to amend, and that triable issues of material fact existed on his section 17200 claim. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

For several years, Parkhurst was actively involved with CARE, a non-profit public benefit "animal rescue organization," as was his wife, Katherine Hammersly, who was a member of the board of directors. In March 2006, Hammersly was removed from her position and sued CARE over its "operating procedures and illegal conduct." CARE cross-complained against Parkhurst and Hammersly and later prevailed on a summary judgment in the main action (which this court later affirmed). CARE subsequently dismissed the cross-complaint pursuant to a settlement with the insurance carrier to whom Parkhurst and Hammersly had tendered the claim.

A month after the cross-complaint was dismissed, Parkhurst filed the instant action. The abuse of process claim alleged CARE "abused the power of the [c]ourt by filing a cross-complaint against [Parkhurst] and having a summons issued thereon against [him] without proper justification and with the ulterior motive of bring pressure to bear on . . . Hammersly in her affirmative claims against CARE." Although the court sustained CARE's demurer to both causes of action, the ruling as to the abuse of process claim was without leave to amend because "[f]iling of a [c]ross-complaint in a prior action will not support this pleading[, which i]t does not appear . . . can be amended to state the C/A."

Parkhurst filed a first amended complaint asserting only the section 17200 cause of action, alleging he "contributed time and money to CARE" based on its "representations to him and the public that funds received would be used for the care of animals and . . . for the purpose of erecting a new facility to care for the animals and find an adoptive home for the animals." According to the complaint, the "representations were false because CARE never used nor intended to use said funds for the care of abandoned animals or for the construction of a new facility to accomplish that purpose. [¶] . . . By virtue of [Parkhurst's] contribution of funds and time to CARE, [he] and members of the public . . . have suffered damages as a result of CARE's unfair business practices . . . ."

The court granted CARE's motion for summary judgment, finding it "presented sufficient evidence . . . that [its] conduct in caring for the animals is not actionable under [section] 17200 and . . . [Parkhurst] . . . failed to establish a triable issue of material fact on . . . a 17200 claim or that the funds were not used for the adoption center/shelter."

DISCUSSION

1. Abuse of Process

"A claim for abuse of process arises when a party (1) for ulterior reasons (2) misuses the court's process for a purpose other than the purpose for which the process was designed. [Citation.]" (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 520.) Parkhurst contends he sufficiently stated these elements by alleging CARE filed and maintained the cross-complaint against him, knowing it was without merit and subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, for the improper purpose of putting pressure on Hammersly. We disagree.

"Although initiating a meritless claim for an improper purpose can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution, the mere initiation of a lawsuit, even for an improper purpose, does not support a claim for abuse of process. [Citation.] Similarly, although continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution [citation], the `mere . . . maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action' [citation]." (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) Because Parkhurst alleged no more than that CARE instituted and maintained a lawsuit for an improper purpose, his abuse of process claim fails as a matter of law regardless of whether some of CARE's cited authorities involve anti-SLAPP motions and not the sustaining of a demurrer as asserted by Parkhurst.

Parkhurst acknowledges "an abuse of process claim has distinct differences from . . . malicious prosecution," including the absence of a malice element, but does not seek leave to amend to assert that cause of action. Additionally, although he also asserts the demurrer should not have been sustained without leave to amend, he fails to make any argument demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the defect[s in his pleadings could] be cured by amendment . . . ." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Because "[t]he burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff," Parkhurst has forfeited any such claim. (Ibid.)

2. Section 17200

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) Summary judgment is proper when all papers filed in favor of or in opposition to the motion show there is no triable issue of material fact and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) When a defendant moves for summary judgment, its burden is to show the action has no merit, either by demonstrating one of the elements of the cause of action "cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Once this burden is met, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

The primary basis of CARE's motion for summary judgment was Parkhurst's lack of standing. For standing to bring an unfair competition claim as a private person, Parkhurst had to demonstrate he "suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition." (§ 17204.) The unfair competition must have caused the injury. (Durell v. Sharp Helathcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.) A plaintiff suffers actual injury only if he or she "(1) expended money due to the defendant's acts of unfair competition [citations]; [¶] (2) lost money or property [citation]; or [¶] (3) has been denied money to which he or she has a cognizable claim [citations]." (Hall v. Time Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 854-855.)

To establish standing, Parkhurst alleged in his first amended complaint that he "specifically contributed time and money to CARE because CARE's other directors and officers made representations to him and the public that funds received would be used for the care of animals and would be used for the purpose of erecting a new facility to care for the animals and find an adoptive home for the animals." These were the only representations alleged in the complaint and based on them, Parkhurst "contributed from his own funds to CARE's causes and funding drives." The representations were allegedly "false because CARE never used nor intended to use [the] funds for the care of abandoned animals or for the construction of a new facility to accomplish that purpose."

On this issue, CARE set out statements of undisputed fact that it "has rescued and placed over 1,000 animals" since it was incorporated and spent over $100,000 on animal care from November 2004 through December 2005. Although it entered a lease with the city and spent over "$25,000 on reports, fees, improvements and other preliminary construction costs for the [l]ease [s]ite," the city terminated the lease in June 2009." These facts were supported by the declaration of Matt Gaffney, CARE's then-president. Based on this evidence, CARE met its burden to show it used its funds to care for abandoned animals and that it intended to develop a facility but the city terminated its lease before it could do so. (See Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591 [no cognizable injury where the plaintiffs received "bargained for insurance at the bargained for price"]; see also Hall v. Time, Inc., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 [no injury where book received in exchange for money].)

To defeat summary judgment, Parkhurst was required to "make an independent showing by a proper declaration or by reference to a deposition or another discovery product that there is sufficient proof of the matters alleged to raise a triable question of fact if the moving party's evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to entitle the party to judgment. [Citations.]" (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11.) Where the opposition is merely supported by assertions that are "conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation," it is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. (Id. at p. 11.)

Here, Parkhurst disputed the claim CARE had rescued and placed over 1,000 animals by stating in his declaration that from "[f]all 2004 through [w]inter 2007, CARE's specific mission statement as published on its membership forms states that [it] `provides shelter and medical veterinary care to stray, abandoned and owner-relinquished San Juan Capistrano animals.'" Additionally, although his "decision to contribute financial and personal resources to CARE was based on [his] reliance on the specifically-stated purpose to rescue San Juan Capistrano dogs," "[f]rom 2002 through 2006, CARE knowingly accepted [and expended funds specifically solicited for animals from the city on] [a substantial number of] cats from outside the [c]ity's jurisdiction" that "required medical attention, food, supplies and spay/neuter services" and "the actual total number of the [c]ity's cats that were impounded by the County of Orange is substantially lower than CARE's numbers." But none of these assertions controvert the stated facts.

To contravene CARE's facts that it spent over $100,000 in animal care and over $25,000 on reports, fees, improvements, and other costs for the location before the city terminated the lease, Parkhurst declared he was "personally aware of acts of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty by several directors of CARE," including [g]ross mishandling of the financial accounts . . ."; "improper diversion of funds to an individual serving on the board of directors without proper authority"; "non-segregation of funds solicited for . . . the building fund[, which] instead were commingled with general funds and used for other purposes"; [and t]he unauthorized pledge of all of CARE's liquid assets to the [c]ity . . . ." The trial court sustained CARE's evidentiary objections to this entire portion of Parkhurst's declaration.

Parkhurst further attested that "[s]ince its inception, CARE has represented to the public its intent to construct an adoption facility in the [c]ity . . . [and] published advertising and solicited donations for this specifically stated purpose." But again, this does not dispute CARE's stated facts. Moreover, the court sustained objections to Parkhurst's claim that "[i]t was represented at [two fund-raising] events that all funds would be dedicated to the construction of an adoption facility."

Parkhurst's opening brief does not address the issue of standing but claims triable issues existed as to the applicable statute of limitations and whether CARE's business practices were actionable, unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent. We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground "the parties ha[ve] an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court" (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(2)), and do so here based on Parkhurst's lack of standing. The other issues are thus immaterial and we do not consider them.

3. Evidentiary Errors

As one of his issues, Parkhurst lists "whether the trial court erred in sustaining evidentiary objections as to [his] evidence in opposing the motion for summary judgment." But he has forfeited the claim by failing to set forth any reasoned argument or supporting authority. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, J.

IKOLA, J.