STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 6, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 10, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between March 6, 2014, and April 10, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 1265 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with her client and discuss the possible resolutions prior to entering a change of plea or deciding to set a trial date. Unfortunately, the defendant was arrested for state court charges on February 10, 2014, in Tennessee and has remained in custody since. Counsel for defendant has not been able to consult with her client about this federal case due to the defendant's in-custody status. According to the Greeneville, Tennessee Federal Court, the defendant was ordered to be transported to the Eastern District of California on February 28, 2014. Counsel for the defendant learned from the US Marshal's that it may take 3-4 weeks for the defendant to arrive in California. Upon the defendant's arrival, counsel and the defendant need time to discuss the ongoing investigation and the sentencing guidelines.

c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 6, 2014 to April 10, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.