JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
On February 28, 2018, the parties stipulated for an extension of time for Defendant to file a response to Plaintiff's opening brief. (Doc. 20) Defendant asserts that the request "is made in accordance with the Scheduling Order. . ., which permits a single thirty-day extension by the stipulation of the parties." (Id. at 1)
Notably, as the parties acknowledge, the Scheduling Order permits "a single thirty (30) day extension. . . by stipulation of the parties." (Doc. 6 at 4, emphasis added) Any additional request for modification of the schedule "must be made by written motion and will be granted only for good cause." (Id.) Previously, the parties stipulated for an extension of thirty-days for Plaintiff to file her opening brief. (Docs. 13, 14) As a result, any additional requests were be filed by written motion, with the support of good cause. (See Doc. 6 at 4) Accordingly, the Court construes the stipulation for an extension of time to be a motion by Defendant to amend the Scheduling Order.
In making the request to amend the schedule, Defendant fails to identify any reason to support the requested extension. (See Doc. 20) Consequently, the Court is unable to find that good cause exists to support the request. However, the request was filed only three days before the brief was due, and Plaintiff does not oppose modification of the briefing schedule. Accordingly, the Court
IT IS SO ORDERED.