[PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.

The defendants, Clifford Bercovich and Howard Webber, came before the Court for a status hearing on September 27, 2016. At that hearing, the case was scheduled for trial on January 9, 2017.

The parties agree, and the Court finds, that the time between September 27, 2016, and January 9, 2017, is properly excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3161(h)(7)(A); (h)(7)(B)(i) and (h)(7)(B)(iv). The parties represent and this Court found that this delay is necessary to allow counsel for the Defendants to effectively review discovery documents and for effective preparation for trial. The parties agree that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

For the foregoing reasons, and as agreed by the parties, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the period between September 27, 2016 and January 9, 2017, is properly excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3161(h)(7)(A); (h)(7)(B)(i) and (h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court finds that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, including the review of discovery, and for continuity of counsel. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.