CHERYL A. EIFERT, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Ford Motor Company to Produce Documents Listed in its Supplemental ASO (Automotive Safety Office) Privilege Log and for Sanctions. (ECF No. 536).
These cases involve alleged events of sudden unintended acceleration in certain Ford vehicles manufactured between 2002 and 2010. In particular, Plaintiffs claim that their vehicles were equipped with defective electronic throttle control ("ETC") systems, which were not fault tolerant, resulting in open throttle events during which the drivers of the vehicles lacked the ability to control the throttles. Plaintiffs assert that the mechanisms causing the throttles to open unexpectedly were numerous, included electromagnetic interference, resistive shorts, and other voltage and resistance fluctuations, and that these issues were known to Ford. Despite having knowledge of the potential for sudden unexpected acceleration, Ford nonetheless failed to properly design the ETC system to correct the events when they occurred, and further neglected to install fail-safes, such as a Brake Over Accelerator system, which would allow the drivers to physically prevent or mitigate sudden acceleration.
In the course of discovery, Plaintiffs requested that Ford produce documents, including studies, reports, analyses, and memoranda, related to alleged unintended acceleration in the class vehicles. (ECF No. 536-2 at 4, 28-29). Specifically at issue here, Plaintiffs requested that Ford produce the ASO reports and databases for any alleged unintended acceleration event in a Ford vehicle equipped with the ETC system. (Id. at 27-28). Plaintiffs also requested the production of documents related to any government correspondence or investigations concerning unintended accelerations in Ford vehicles equipped with the ETC system. (Id. at 33-34). On October 24, 2014, after producing non-privileged documents responsive to Plaintiffs' request, Ford provided Plaintiffs with a privilege log related to its 2010 ASO investigation into sudden unintended acceleration. (ECF No. 536-1 at 2-67; ECF No. 551 at 3). According to Ford, the ASO investigation was undertaken after the Wall Street Journal published an article in 2010 concerning complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in Ford vehicles. (ECF No. 551 at 2-3). The article was based on findings from vehicle owner questionnaires issued by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). (Id. at 2). At the time that the article was released, Ford asserts it was defending several lawsuits related to claims of unintended acceleration. (Id. at 2-3). According to Ford, in connection with those lawsuits and the article, Ford's Office of the General Counsel ("OGC") began an investigation of the vehicle owner questionnaires and Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation ("TREAD") Act submissions with the assistance of Ford's ASO. (Id. at 3).
On March 25, 2015, the parties met and conferred about the sufficiency of Ford's ASO privilege log. (ECF No. 536 at 2). According to Plaintiffs' counsel, they informed Ford's counsel that the ASO privilege log failed to adequately describe each document withheld by Ford. (Id.) Plaintiffs' counsel also questioned whether the "vast majority" of documents were indeed shielded from disclosure given their descriptions as "spreadsheets" or "charts," which Plaintiffs interpreted to mean that those documents contained only "raw data or factual information." (Id.) In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel expressed their belief that the documents may not be privileged because they were not authored by an attorney or anyone at Ford's OGC, and the documents were sent to both attorneys and non-attorneys. (Id. at 2-3). The following day, Ford's counsel sent an email confirming that Ford would review its privilege logs and determine whether additional information could be provided. (ECF No. 536-3 at 2). On April 6, 2015, Plaintiffs' counsel inquired about the status of Ford's counsel's privilege log review, and Ford's counsel replied the next day, confirming that Ford would supplement its privilege logs. (ECF No. 536-4 at 2; ECF No. 536-5 at 2). On April 15, 2015, the Court conducted a regularly scheduled telephonic discovery conference and addressed the privilege log issue. (ECF No. 536-6 at 3-4). Specifically, the undersigned noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires a privilege log to contain enough information so that the receiving party may determine whether to challenge the privilege. (Id. at 4).
On May 19, 2015, Ford produced a supplemental ASO privilege log to Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 536-7 at 3-68). Distinguishing the supplemental privilege log from the original privilege log is the addition of file names for the documents listed. (Id.) By way of example, the first two rows of the privilege log appear as such:
(Id. at 3). All 132 documents listed in the privilege log are described in one of two ways— the first is the description in the table above, and the second states that the document is a "[c]onfidential communication containing an analysis prepared by authorized agent consultant of Ford for and at the request of Ford's Office of the General Counsel to assist Ford's attorneys with pending and anticipated litigation." (Id. at 3-68).
On June 9, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel and for sanctions. (ECF No. 536). Plaintiffs contend that the supplemental ASO privilege log is deficient because Ford has failed to describe the documents listed in sufficient detail for Plaintiffs to determine whether the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product protection applies. (Id. at 6-16). Plaintiffs argue that the addition of file names to the ASO privilege log does nothing to clarify whether the listed documents are indeed privileged. (Id. at 9). In support of their position, Plaintiffs point out that David Ott, a former member of Ford's ASO and the author or recipient of many of the listed documents, testified that he was unable to identify the particular documents based on their file names. (ECF No. 536-8 at 4-5). Mr. Ott also testified that, after the 2010 Wall Street Journal article was released, he worked with a team to analyze Ford's data related to unintended acceleration and he believed this work was part of the normal course of Ford's business. (ECF No. 569-1 at 5). In addition, when asked if there was anyone at Ford that had been tasked with determining the cause of any alleged sudden unintended acceleration events, Mr. Ott stated that he was "not involved in litigation matters that the company [Ford] may be involved in." (Id. at 16).
With respect to attorney-client privilege, Plaintiffs assert that the types of documents withheld by Ford, such as charts or spreadsheets, likely contain "mere recitations or summaries of raw factual data," which Plaintiffs posit are not protected from disclosure. (ECF No. 536 at 11). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that it is not clear that the purpose behind the creation of each withheld documents was to obtain legal advice, as the documents were not authored by an attorney and were sent to both attorneys and non-attorneys. (Id. at 14). As to Ford's claim of work-product protection, Plaintiffs notes that the privilege log offers no information that "the withheld documents contain the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney." (Id. at 15). In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that the privilege log fails to identify any specific litigation for which the documents were prepared. (Id. at 16). Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel the production of the documents listed in the supplemental ASO privilege log and argue that an award of expenses and sanctions is warranted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) and 37(b)(2). (Id. at 16-18).
In response, Ford asserts that the documents listed on the ASO privilege log were prepared in anticipation of litigation or in relation to ongoing litigation. (ECF No. 551 at 8). Ford claims that its in-house attorneys "engaged Ford's ASO and an outside consultant to conduct a review of and analyze" the vehicle owner questionnaires and TREAD Act submissions. (Id. at 9). Consequently, Ford argues that this analysis contained in the withheld documents is immune from disclosure as opinion work-product.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that:
While the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings should be the focus of discovery, broader discovery is permitted when justified by the particular needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), advisory committee notes (2000). In general, information is relevant, and thus discoverable, if it `"bears on, or ... reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Although `the pleadings are the starting point from which relevancy and discovery are determined ... [r]elevancy is not limited by the exact issues identified in the pleadings, the merits of the case, or the admissibility of discovered information.'" Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 193, 199 (N.D.W.Va. 2000) (internal citations omitted). In many cases, "the general subject matter of the litigation governs the scope of relevant information for discovery purposes." Id. The party resisting discovery, not the party seeking discovery, bears the burden of persuasion. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 243-44 (M.D.N.C. 2010)(citing Wagner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. 418, 424-25 (N.D.W.Va. 2006)).
In this case, Ford has withheld documents based on claims of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Procedurally, when a party withholds information from discovery on the basis of attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection, the party is required to: (1) "expressly make the claim;" and (2) "describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim."
Here, the problem with Ford's privilege log lies in its unsatisfactory document descriptions. Undeniably, the sufficiency of a privilege log's document description may be context driven; nevertheless, "vague and uninformative document descriptions do not satisfy" the standard for privilege log adequacy. See In re McDonald, No. 13-10661, 2014 WL 4365362, at *4 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2014) (collecting cases). This is true for the simple reason that "when a party refuses to produce documents during discovery on the basis that they are privileged or protected, it has a duty to particularize that claim." Victor Stanley, Inc., 250 F.R.D. at 254. "The focus is on the specific descriptive portion of the log, and not on conclusory invocations of the privilege or work-product rule, since the burden of the party withholding documents cannot be `discharged by mere conclusory or ipse dixit assertions.'" Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust, No. 1B, 230 F.R.D. 398, 406 n. 14 (D. Md. 2205) (quoting Golden Trade S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 1992 WL 367070, *5, 1992 Dist. LEXIS 17739 *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Having stated the rule and the purpose of the privilege log, the undersigned concedes that courts have not been entirely consistent about the level of detail that is necessary to comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A). For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a privilege log was insufficient where the log contained a general claim of attorney-client privilege accompanied by the listed documents' dates, authors, recipients, and "cursory" descriptions, such as "Fax Re: DOL Findings," "Fax: Whistleblower article," or "Letter Re: Customer Orders with comment Re: Five Star Products." United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1996). Similarly, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Philip Morris, Inc., the Third Circuit determined that a privilege log was inadequate where the description of the documents included "various daily log entries," "interoffice emails," or various miscellaneous "notes/correspondence." 29 F. App'x 880, 882 (3d Cir. 2002); see also In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., 190 F.R.D. 527, 530 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding that description of documents in log was not "even marginally specific" where document descriptions such as "Explanation re: Primestar Relationship," "NLC Employee Stock Options," and "Filing with SEC," were used). In contrast, other federal courts have found privilege logs to be sufficiently detailed where the logs contained the privilege asserted for each document along with the document date, author, recipient, type, and a description such as "[e]mail string containing confidential communications with outside counsel and in-house counsel regarding employee benefits and labor issues in [named] transactions," or "[m]emo made at direction of counsel and sent to counsel for the purpose of seeing [sic] legal advice regarding medical procedure." Spilker v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-76-H, 2015 WL 1643258, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 2015); Vaughan v. Celanese Americas Corp., No. 3:06CV104-W, 2006 WL 3592538, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2006.
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies among courts, Ford's privilege log does not comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) because it fails to provide any concrete facts about the nature or subject matter of the withheld documents, which would allow an individual reviewing the log to assess the appropriateness of the privilege claim. Ford uses the same two document descriptions throughout the entire log, and those descriptions are essentially synonymous. More importantly, the descriptions are nothing more than conclusory statements as to the privileged nature of the documents. Contrary to Ford's position, more factual detail certainly could have been provided to describe the withheld documents without disclosing privileged information, as is evidenced by Ford's responsive brief wherein Ford explains the ASO investigation and ongoing litigation occurring at the time that the documents were created.
Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, many of the withheld documents were created by non-attorneys within Ford's ASO, and then sent to attorneys within Ford's OGC. Mr. Ott testified to his belief that he and his team were assigned to perform the 2010 investigation into unintended acceleration as part of the normal course of Ford's business. (ECF No. 569-1 at 5); see Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that materials prepared in ordinary course of business "are not documents prepared in anticipation of litigation"); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-cv-06529, 2015 WL 1650428, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. Apr. 14, 2015) (recognizing that, under both West Virginia and Michigan law, not all communications between attorney and client are privileged, only those made for purpose of obtaining legal advice); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd, 306 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that simply because an attorney is involved in a communication does not make the communication privileged, nor does a single email of a legal nature "privilege the entire email thread."). Obviously then, reasonable questions exist as to Ford's claims of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection in light of the plain facial inadequacy of the privilege log and Mr. Ott's testimony. Ford should have recognized these issues and answered them with a more detailed privilege log or some type of extrinsic evidence further explaining the basis for withholding the listed ASO documents before Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel. Even now, Mr. Logel's affidavit does not entirely quell Plaintiffs' reasonable skepticism as to the nondisclosure of some of the listed documents; particularly, in light of Mr. Ott's testimony. Therefore, after having reviewed the May 2015 supplemental ASO privilege log, the Court
"When a party provides an inadequate or untimely privilege log, the Court may choose between four remedies: (1) give the party another chance to submit a more detailed log; (2) deem the inadequate log a waiver of the privilege; (3) inspect in camera all of the withheld documents; and (4) inspect in camera a sample of the withheld documents." Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Keit, Inc., 2015 WL 1470971, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2015) (citing NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 307 (D.D.C. 2009). In this case, Plaintiffs urge the Court to find that Ford has forfeited its claim of privilege as to all of the ASO documents on the log. Certainly, that sanction has been used in this circuit. See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 577 (D.Md. 2010) ("Absent consent of the adverse party, or a Court order, a privilege log (or other communication of sufficient information for the parties to be able to determine whether the privilege applies) must accompany a written response to a Rule 34 document production request, and a failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of any claims of privilege."). However, privilege waiver is not automatic. See Smith v. James C. Hormel Sch. of Va. Inst. of Autism, No. 3:08cv00030, 2010 WL 3702528, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2010). "Given the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege and the seriousness of privilege waiver, courts generally find waiver only in cases involving unjustified delay, inexcusable conduct and bad faith." Id. at *5 (collecting cases); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Carpenter Reclamation, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 235, 247-48 (S.D.W.Va. 2014) (recognizing same).
Having concluded that Ford's privilege log does not meet the dictates of Rule 26(b)(5)(A), the undersigned must consider whether the "extreme sanction of waiver" is appropriate in this case. See Westfield Ins. Co., 301 F.R.D. at 248. As noted above, federal courts have typically found waiver appropriate where unjustified delay, inexcusable conduct, or bad faith are present. Id. at 247. While Ford should have realized its document descriptions were inadequate, the undersigned finds that the current circumstances do not justify application of the harshest remedy. Accordingly, the Court
Finally, Plaintiffs request sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), citing to Westfield Ins. Co., 301 F.R.D. at 247 and Rule 26 Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments, which state: "[A] party must notify other parties if it is withholding materials otherwise subject to disclosure ... because it is asserting a claim of privilege or work product protection. To withhold materials without such notice is contrary to the rule, subjects the party to sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2), and may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or protection." In this Court's view, an award of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions for failing to comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) is most appropriate when (1) documents have been withheld without any notice or privilege log; (2) a party has been ordered by the court to correct an inadequate privilege log and fails to comply with the order; or (3) the circumstances surrounding the production of an insufficient privilege log are particularly troubling or egregious and thus merit an award of sanctions beyond the reasonable fees and costs allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The undersigned does not find the presence of any of those scenarios. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable expenses pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A).
Therefore, it is hereby
In summary, the Court
The Clerk is directed to file a copy of this Order in all three actions and provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.