JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant BP West Coast Products, LLC's ("BP") Motion for Leave to File Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Leave Request"). (ECF No. 654.) Although the deadline for filing dispositive motions was set for April 15, 2016, (ECF Nos. 318, 486), BP requests leave to file a post-deadline Motion for Partial Summary Judgment "directed to one discrete issue: unpaid motor fuel[,]" (Mot. 1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a party to bring a motion for summary judgment "at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). However, Rule 56 also allows the deadline by which a party may bring a motion for summary judgment to be extended or shortened by "local rule or . . . court order[] . . . ." Id. "[S]o long as no prejudice results, the policies underlying [Rule] 56 favor extending the time in which summary judgment motions may be made when material facts are undisputed, and one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tungjunyatham v. Johanns, No. 1:06-CV-01764-SMS, 2010 WL 1797264, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2010) (citing Util. Control Corp. v. Prince William Constr. Co., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1977)).
In support of BP's Leave Request, BP notes that: (1) it did, in fact, file motions for summary judgment prior to the dispositive motion deadline, (id. at 3); (2) that resolution of the remaining unpaid motor fuel claims will likely "eliminate the need for trial against" six Defendants and Counter-Claimants and thus narrow the issues such that those remaining can all be disposed of in one trial, (id.); (3) Defendants and Counter-Claimants have adequate notice of BP's leave request and potential summary judgment filing, (id. at 3-4); and (4) BP's request is not the product of negligence, carelessness, or mistake[,]" but instead is designed "to expedite finality of claims in the most efficient form—briefing rather than a jury trial[,]" (id. at 3). Additionally, resolving the claims for unpaid motor fuel will likely implicate limited factual and legal issues, all of which have been narrowed by discovery. (See id. at 2-3.) Finally, litigation is unable to proceed for at least the next three months due to the Lacey Defendants' Counsel's recent accident. (See ECF Nos. 659, 660.)
Given the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the Court