HERLIHY, Judge.
Plaintiff Diana Miller has moved to compel defendant (State of Delaware), Department of Public Safety and Homeland Security, to produce various Delaware State Police ("DSP") records. Most of the documents she seeks, but not all, are DSP Internal Affairs ("IA") records. The Department opposes production on the basis of certain statutory provisions.
To place this discovery dispute into context, some factual background is needed. Miller has sued the Department claiming (1) gender discrimination; (2) sexual harassment; and (3) retaliation. She has not joined any member of the DSP as a defendant, though she names several officers as the alleged perpetrators.
In her complaint, however, she makes allegations of improper sexual conduct primarily against two officers. She alleges improper sexual advances by a DSP Lieutenant Paul Taylor.
On April 27th the Court heard oral argument on Miller's motion to compel the production of a number of documents including records relative to the IA proceeding. The Court denied Miller's motion without prejudice but directed the parties to exchange further, more detailed, discussion concerning the items Miller seeks and why, and the Department's reasons for resisting production.
That exchange to some degree has narrowed the focus Miller's requests and why the Department opposes them. The only way to address what remains in dispute is to serially review each request. Before doing that, however, the Court must examine the primary reason for which the Department opposes Miller's motion, which are provisions in the Law-Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights ("LEBOR").
There are few authorities interpreting and applying these provisions, but what exists, nevertheless, is helpful. In the Court's view, the closest precedent to this case is Bailey v. City of Wilmington.
The court in Bailey held since the arrest/crime report sought did not contain anyone's criminal record history, it had to be produced. The court, however, held that Bailey was not entitled to records of the OPS proceeding. The court based its ruling on this provision in the LEBOR statute:
Since Capt. Beirien was not a named party, even though there was an implication of misconduct on his part in Bailey's complaint, Bailey was not entitled to the OPS records. Bailey and this case are analogous. Much of what Miller seeks relates to Capt. Laird and some to Lt. Taylor. Many paragraphs in her complaint, as noted, are allegations concerning alleged misconduct by Capt. Laird. As was the case in Bailey neither Capt. Laird nor Lt. Taylor is a named party.
In another case, the United States District Court acknowledged the confidentiality provision of LEBOR, namely, 11 Del. C. §9200(c)(12) which reads:
Section 9200(c)(12) was raised in Bailey, but there was an issue of its applicability because it was added later to § 9200 and some of Capt. Beirien's alleged conduct may have pre-dated the addition. The court declined to get into the retroactivity issue of § 9200(c)(12) and relied instead on subsection (d).
The Court notes that the confidentiality provisions such as are found in LEBOR, especially as to IA records, is not unique protection in Delaware law. For example, physician peer review records are exempt from discovery, even in a law suit against the physician who had been subject to such peer review.
With this statutory background and limited precedent, the Court will rule on each of Miller's requests. Based on the exchange of the parties following the April 27th presentation of Miller's motion to compel, what she seeks appears to be winnowed "somewhat."
The Court concurs with the Department's position. Title 11, § 9200(c)(12) and (d) prohibit release of the documents which Miller seeks. Further, Capt. Laird is not a named party to her current action. The Department has provided certain information, namely that the Miller proceeding was Capt. Laird's only IA matter in his twenty-nine years of service, etc.
Based on that limited information and the statute, the Court denies Miller's motion on these items.
Miller no longer seeks Ballard's records. She claims the others have some kind of knowledge of Capt. Laird's conduct toward her. The Department responds that it has repeatedly told Miller that no such electronic communications exist. It further notes that of these persons only Sgt. Quickel has been deposed and Miller never asked him about any such possible communications.
Based on the Department's representations and Miller's lackadaisical approach to discovery in this case, the Court sees no basis for granting the request.
In paragraph 79 of her complaint, Miller, without naming a name or names, alleges various senior DSP officers were engaged in improper sexual affairs and that other senior officers condoned such conduct. Miller now argues in her submissions on the motion to compel that this officer was not only condoning sexual liaisons between DSP commanders, but also having such a relationship himself. She seeks to restrict her review of Major Downes' records only to those relating to Capt. Laird, but she makes no connection to her case.
The Department invokes the statutory shield. In an affidavit supplied with its response, it indicates that an IA investigation in 2008-09 involving Major Downes did not involve any inappropriate sexual relationship. Further it says the actual charge was found to be unsubstantiated and the IA investigation was unrelated to any charges of inappropriate sexual relationships
Miller has deposed Major Downes. He denied knowing of any inappropriate relationship involving Capt. Laird and female employees at Troop 2.
Miller has not shown why the Court should compel the Department to release any further records. Certainly any records encompassed within the statutory bar cannot be compelled.
Miller claims all three individuals had knowledge of Capt. Laird's relationship with her. She claims any such notes would be probative. The Department responds that it has no such notes. Miller has supplied no evidence — testimony or otherwise — that such notes exist. The Court sees nothing to compel. As to this request, therefore, Miller's motion is denied.
Miller states that both troopers were interviewed about her relationships with other DSP Troopers. The Department invokes § 9200(d) as a bar to production of any records of such interviews. For the reasons cited earlier, that these officers are not parties to this action, and any records fall within the statutory bar Miller's motion on this request is denied.
Miller's contention here is that, Schneiderwent acknowledged a relationship with Capt. Laird and she wants to know of any consequences to him stemming from it. Prouse, Miller says, has been the subject of DSP scuttlebutt concerning a relationship with Capt. Laird though she denied such when Miller deposed her.
The Department's response is that there are no such documents in Capt. Laird's personnel file or in the IA file. Further, there is no documentation of any complaints against him by any (other) DSP female employee.
The reason offered for this request is that Sgt. Quickel had some kind of relationship with Miller. She says she spoke to him about Capt. Laird's alleged conduct toward her. She claims portions of an IA investigation, apparently about Sgt. Quickel, were leaked to Capt. Laird. She now limits this request to those portions of this investigation to anything involving Capt. Laird's conduct with female subordinates and any reference to her and Capt. Laird. The Department invokes § 9200(d). The Court finds that invocation appropriate and cannot, therefore, grant this part of Miller's motion.
Miller's assertion here is that Haass had issues with how Capt. Laird treated her (Haass) and made many comments to her about his treatment of Miller. Sgt. Nefosky, she claims was best friends with Lt. Mark Daniels (who appears to have been part of the IA investigation of Capt. Laird) and worked with him to develop unfavorable information on Miller.
Here, too, the Department interposes § 9200(d) as a bar to the request. It, however, previously produced Haass' HR statement. Presumably that statement is all that there is in Haass' file; if not, the Department shall deliver to Miller any other HR statements Haass gave. Nefrosky, it says, was never interviewed by HR or IA in regard to Miller's complaint against Capt. Laird.
The Court sees no basis to compel anything more. Neither of these individuals are defendants in this case and § 9200(d) applies.
Miller lists specific dates of interviews of all of these individuals. She says all were interviewed at Troop 2 and that the subject matter concerned her and Capt. Laird.
The Department indicates that it has given to Miller the HR interviews of Coupe, Smith, Haass, Simpson and Austin. This was done despite § 9200(d). The Court views the Department's action as a waiver of one bar under that section. If, therefore, there are any more documents reflecting such interviews, the Department is obligated to give them to Miller, including any notes.
Miller argues that the Department should have long ago produced these tapes or at least, have prepared a privilege log concerning them. On that latter point, Miller is correct.
The Department raises LEBOR again. But it also reports that it has produced "the single investigation regarding the allegations made by Ms. Miller. . . ."
Miller has agreed to limit this request to Capt. Laird's treatment of his female subordinates, particularly Miller. Even with that limitation, the Department raises the LEBOR bar. It is applicable. In addition, the Department says there are no such IA interview tapes.
Miller refers back to paragraphs 4-11 of her complaint as her primary reason for seeking any such tapes. She also states, that when deposed, she observed a document in front of Lt. Taylor which she believes reflects the existence of such tapes.
The Court is unclear about the Department's response. Based on Miller's complaint in this matter, it appears she never made a complaint within DSP about any conduct by Lt. Taylor involving her. In her April 30th letter to the Court, Miller says, "As this was recorded . . ."
If Miller so complained, she is entitled to a copy. If she did not, at this point, it appears LEBOR bars production of other records. If the parties wish to clarify this particular issue, they may do so. Otherwise, the Court sees nothing to be produced except as noted.
Here again, the parties are not on the same page. The Department reports it informed Miller on four occasions that no such communications exist. It also notes Miller has not deposed either person.
Miller, in her May 10th letter to the Court, indicates that in March, the Department produced a document which purports to be Coupe's communication to DSP HR about Miller. The Court cannot say whether that is so and/or whether it constitutes a waiver of any privilege the Department invokes.
On this basis, the Court cannot grant or deny Miller's motion to compel.
There remains one potential complicating issue. It is that some of the persons named appear to be or were DSP civilian employees. They would not, therefore, be law enforcement persons within the meaning of LEBOR.
Accordingly, the parties are to notify me of their positions on this issue by July 30, 2010.
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff Diana Miller's motion to compel is