MEMORANDUM ORDER

J. THOMAS RAY, Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Franklin A. Edwards, is a former patrol officer with the Arkansas Highway Police ("AHP"). As a member of the AHP, he was considered to be an employee of the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department ("ASHTD").1

In his Complaint (docket entry #1), Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, ASHTD, refused his request for a job transfer in retaliation for him: (1) complaining about an allegedly "racially divisive" comment made by another officer; and (2) filing a prior lawsuit in federal court about that incident. This retaliation claim is the only cause of action Plaintiff has asserted in this case.2

Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 (Docket entry #12). Before addressing the merits of that Motion, it is important to understand how the retaliation claim in this case is intertwined with the claims Plaintiff asserted in Edwards I, his earlier Title VII lawsuit.

In January of 2008, Plaintiff was hired as a patrol officer with the AHP. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶1. He was assigned to the Crittenden County Area Weigh Station in "District Five," and told that he must establish a residence in that area. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶1.

In June of 2008, Plaintiff requested a hardship transfer to the Newport area, which is part of "District Two." Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶2. He is from Newport, and wanted to be near his terminally-ill mother. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶2. The request was denied. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶2.

On October 20, 2008, Plaintiff renewed his request for a hardship transfer. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶3. This request was approved and he was temporarily assigned to a patrol unit in Newport. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶3. He was advised that, at the conclusion of his hardship transfer, he would be reassigned to his former position in District Five. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶3.

On April 3, 2009, Plaintiff was notified that, effective May 7, 2009, his temporary hardship transfer would end and he would be reassigned to the Weigh Station in Crittenden County, where he would again be under the supervision of Captain Jeff Holmes. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶4.

Some time between May and August of 2009, Plaintiff was among a group of officers discussing an AHP position available in northwest Arkansas. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶5. According to Plaintiff, George Blair, a black AHP officer, stated: "I don't want to move up north, there are too many white people up there. I want to stay down here in Crittenden around my own kind." Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶5.

In October of 2009, Plaintiff requested a shift change because he and Officer Blair were now working the same shift. For the first time, Plaintiff asserted that Officer Blair's earlier comment about not wanting to work in northwest Arkansas was a "racial comment."4 Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶6, docket entry#1 at 5. Plaintiff was transferred to another weigh station while his complaint was investigated. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶7. AHP investigators concluded that Plaintiff's allegation could not be substantiated. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶8.

Plaintiff was upset because the AHP investigators revealed his identity, as the complaining party, to Officer Blair. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶9. Plaintiff claimed to be aware of another case where a white AHP officer had been accused of making racial remarks. According to Plaintiff, the white AHP officer asked the AHP investigators for the name of the complaining party, but they refused to provide the name. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶10.

On November 10, 2009, Plaintiff filed a grievance about the way the investigation of his complaint was conducted and how his identity was revealed to Officer Blair. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶11. He also requested that he be transferred from District Five to one of the positions available in District Two, near Newport.5 On November 16, 2009, his grievance was denied and he initiated an administrative appeal.6

On December 2, 2009, AHP Sgt. Darren Smith wrote a memo to AHP Captain Holmes stating that he had verbally reprimanded Plaintiff for possessing his loaded "secondary weapon" during a PPCT ("pressure point control tactics") training class that day.7

On January 28, 2010, the AHP Grievance Review Panel issued its decision denying Plaintiff's administrative appeal of his November 10, 2009 grievance.8 It determined that appropriate action had been taken in the investigation of Plaintiff's complaint about Officer Blair. Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶13. It also noted that Plaintiff's supervisors had offered him the "opportunity to change to a different shift, to change to a different weigh station in the same District but under a new group of supervisors, or to change to a different weigh station in an entirely different District."9 Plaintiff declined all of those options.

On March 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against Defendant.10 Dft's Stmt. of Facts at ¶14. On March 15, 2010, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter.11

On April 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Edwards I.12 He alleged that:

At some point in the summer or fall of 2010, Plaintiff applied for an advertised vacancy or vacancies that had become available for a patrol unit in District Two. The record is unclear as to the exact number of District Two vacancies that were open, and how many Plaintiff applied for.15 All of those positions were filled by other applicants.

On February 22, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in Edwards I.

In his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff brought up Sgt. Smith's December 2, 2009 "verbal reprimand" memo, which was based on Plaintiff possessing his loaded "secondary weapon" during a PPCT ("pressure point control tactics") training class.16 Plaintiff disputed the events described in Sgt. Smith's memo. Plaintiff also claimed that the memo was placed in his personnel file and that Captain Holmes "disclosed the [memo's] contents and the allegations in it to Captain Anderson where there was a discussion of whether [Plaintiff] would be granted a transfer to a car in his home town of Newport or to a patrol car in White County making him closer to his family in Newport."17

In its Reply Brief in Edwards I, Defendant addressed this contention as follows:

Edwards I, docket entry #18 at p.1-2.

On April 1, 2011, United States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. entered an Order directing Plaintiff "to supplement the record by filing a copy of the August 2010 EEOC charge no later than 8 April 2011. Edwards should also indicate whether he has received a right-to-sue letter on that charge." Edwards I, docket entry #19.

On April 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed his August 26, 2010 EEOC Charge of Discrimination and his April 8, 2011 right-to-sue letter. Edwards I, docket entry #20. In his August 26, 2010 Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff alleged that:

Edwards I, docket entry #20-1.

On April 22, 2011, Judge Marshall entered an Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Edwards I, docket entry #22. As to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, Judge Marshall found that his allegations "simply fall short — in quality and quantity — of the abuse required to create a fact issue about racial hostility in the workplace." Edwards I, docket entry #22 at 4.

Judge Marshall also took up three retaliation claims asserted by Plaintiff. First, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant retaliated against him by refusing to transfer him to a patrol unit in Newport after he filed his November 10, 2009 grievance about the investigation of his complaint regarding Officer Blair. Judge Marshall noted that Defendant's failure to transfer Plaintiff could not form the basis of his retaliation claim because "failing to transfer an employee does not constitute an adverse employment action." Edwards I, docket entry #22 at 4 (citing LePique v. Howe, 217 F.3d 1012, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2000)).

Second, Plaintiff claimed that a sergeant retaliated against him by starting an investigation into whether he was violating the AHP domicile policy. Judge Marshall rejected this argument because "[i]nternal investigations `are not adverse employment actions when they do not result in any change in form or condition to the employee's employment." Edwards I, docket entry #22 at 5 (quoting Altonen v. City of Minneapolis, 487 F.3d 554, 560 (8th Cir. 2007)).

Finally, Judge Marshall addressed Plaintiff's claim that Defendant retaliated against him by verbally reprimanding him for carrying a firearm during the PPCT training class:

Edwards I, docket entry #22 at 5-7. Plaintiff did not appeal Judge Marshall's Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

On June 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint initiating this action. (Docket entry #1). In his Complaint, he alleges that in July of 2010, he applied for four openings in "District 2." (Docket entry #1 at ¶¶8-9). According to Plaintiff, those vacancies were filled with individuals having less "law enforcement experience" than him. (Docket entry #1 at ¶11). Plaintiff claims that Defendant "used false reasons to deny [him] a transfer in that at least a reason and part of the motivating reason was the false report by Sergeant Darren Smith that the Plaintiff had a weapon on him during training contrary to the rules, when, in fact, the Plaintiff did not have a weapon on him during the actual hand-to-hand training as alleged by Sergeant Darren Smith." (Docket entry #1 at ¶18). Plaintiff further alleges that Sgt. Smith "placed the false allegation of misconduct" in his personnel file: (1) because he "had made a complaint of racial discrimination about another black Highway Policeman who was a friend of Sergeant Darren Smith;" and (2) to punish Plaintiff for filing the Edwards I lawsuit against Defendant. (Docket entry #1 at ¶¶15-16).

By way of relief, Plaintiff requests: (1) compensatory damages for mental anguish and "the expense of travel on his days off to see his son;" (2) the removal of "any negative information from the Plaintiff's personnel file . . . that was placed in it because of the retaliation;" and (3) that Defendant be ordered to "stop all retaliation against him by African American supervisors." (Docket entry #1 at ¶¶ 20-21).

On February 14, 2012, Defendant filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry #12) and a Brief in Support (docket entry #13).18 For unexplained reasons, it did not file its Statement of Material Facts (docket entry #14) until March 1, 2012.

To date, Plaintiff has failed to file any responsive pleadings to Defendant's summary judgment papers, and the time for doing so has long expired.19

In its motion papers, Defendant argues that: (1) there is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity; and (2) there is no evidence that it took an adverse employment action against him. Thus, it argues that, as a matter of law, it is entitled to summary judgment.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Defendant's second argument has merit. Accordingly, its Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.

II. Discussion

"Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose discriminatory practices." Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). "The burden shifting McDonnell Douglas analytical framework applies [to retaliation claims] beginning with the three elements of a prima facie case of retaliation, whether: (1)the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct, including opposition to an action prohibited by Title VII; (2) []he was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a "causal nexus between the protected conduct and the adverse action." Id. (quoting Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (8th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff has asserted one claim in this lawsuit — the only claim that survived summary judgment in Edwards I — that Defendant issued him a "false" and "retaliatory" reprimand on December 2, 2009, which was later used by Captain Anderson as the basis for his decision not to select Plaintiff to fill one of the three positions open in District Two.

As to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action:

(Docket entry #13 at 5).20

As noted by Judge Marshall in Edwards I, "[a] reprimand is an adverse employment action only when the employer uses it as a basis for changing the terms or conditions of the employee's job for the worse." Edwards I, docket entry #22 at 5 (quoting Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir. 2007)). In this case, Captain Anderson unquestionably was responsible for recommending who should fill the three vacancies in District Two, where he was the District Commander.

In his February 18, 2011 Affidavit, Captain Anderson unequivocally states that: (1) he had seven vacancies in District Two in 2010; (2) Plaintiff applied for three of those vacancies; (3) before making his recommendation about filling the vacancies, he "met with Major Paul Claunch and the District Commanders who had officers from their respective districts applying for these positions;" (4) Captain Jeff Holmes, the District Five Commander (where Plaintiff was currently working), "brought to his [Captain Anderson's] attention that [Plaintiff] had reported late for duty on several different occasions resulting in Written Reprimand;" "pointed out that [Plaintiff] had been spoken to concerning his judgment in issuing a speeding citation while on duty at a AHP Station;" and "also said [Plaintiff] did not appear to get along well with other officers and felt he required close supervision;" and (5) "[t]his input [from Captain Holmes], as well as input from the other District Commanders concerning all the officers who had applied for the various unit positions, was the basis for the recommendations I made concerning the filling of the new and vacant unit positions in AHP District Two." (Docket entry #13-2).

Captain Anderson makes it clear that the December 2, 2009 reprimand incident was not a part of the information he received or used in making his recommendations about filling the District Two vacancies. Thus, the December 2, 2009 reprimand was not used "as a basis for changing the terms or conditions of [his] job for the worse."21

Where the nonmoving party elects not to respond to the moving party's motion for summary judgment, "[i]t [is] not the District Court's responsibility to sift through the record to see if, perhaps, there was an issue of fact." See Satcher v. University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Contrary to [appellant's] argument, failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument"); Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party's arguments").

Finally, in Edwards I, Judge Marshall held that Defendant's failure to transfer Plaintiff to a patrol unit in Newport following his complaint about Officer Blair was not an "adverse employment action" under the second prong of McDonnell Douglas. Plaintiff did not appeal that ruling. The Court fails to see how allegedly using the December 2, 2009 reprimand to deny Plaintiff a transfer (which Judge Marshall has already held was not an adverse employment action) could still be actionable as a "basis for changing the terms or conditions of [his] job for the worse."

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry #12) is GRANTED.