PREMO, J.—
Since 1978, article V of the City of Palo Alto's (hereafter, City) charter provided that impasses in negotiations regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for the City's police and firefighters would be submitted to binding interest arbitration. In 2011, the Palo Alto City Council (City Council) voted to place on the ballot for the upcoming election a measure that repealed this binding interest arbitration provision. Real party in interest the International Association of Firefighters, Local 1319, AFL-CIO (IAFF) filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging the City placed the measure before voters without consulting in good faith with the IAFF, as required by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.).
Pursuant to section 3509.5, the City requested this court issue a writ of extraordinary relief annulling PERB's decision and directing PERB to dismiss the unfair practice charge. We granted a writ of review. As we explain below, we find PERB's conclusion that IAFF sufficiently requested to meet and consult with the City is supported by substantial evidence and determine the constitutional issues raised by the City are meritless. Nonetheless, PERB's order directing the City Council to rescind its resolution violated the
In 1978, the city charter was amended to add article V, titled "Compulsory Arbitration for Fire and Police Department Employee Disputes." Section 4 of article V provided: "All disputes or controversies pertaining to wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment which remain unresolved after good faith negotiations between the city and either the fire or police department employee organization shall be submitted to a three-member board of arbitrators upon the declaration of an impasse by the city or by the recognized employee organization involved in the dispute. [¶] ... [¶] At the conclusion of the arbitration hearings, the arbitration board ... shall decide each issue by majority vote by selecting whichever last offer of settlement on that issue it finds most nearly conforms with those factors traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of public and private employment...."
On April 12, 2010, the city manager prepared a report to the City Council. The report indicated the City was facing a budget deficit of $8.3 million in 2011. The report also provided suggestions on how to balance the City's budget.
In May 2010, the Santa Clara County civil grand jury issued a report that analyzed the employment costs of cities within the county. In part, the report noted that in times of economic boom, cities had opted to attract qualified candidates with increased wages and pension benefits, which were largely guaranteed by union collective bargaining agreements. The report noted that binding interest arbitration had compounded the problem in the City of San Jose. Suggestions were provided on how cities could address the issues caused by increasing costs and included a discussion about binding arbitration. The report noted: "Binding arbitration is not open to the public and results in an adversarial process between the city and employee groups. Binding arbitration limits the ability of city leaders to craft solutions that work for the city's budget. The process has resulted in wage and benefit decisions that have been greater than the growth in basic revenue sources." The report recommended the City of San Jose prepare a ballot measure repealing the section of its city charter dealing with binding arbitration. No specific recommendations were made to the City to take similar action.
The City Council reviewed the report and discussed its findings. In particular, the City Council focused on the report's analysis of binding
On July 22, 2010, attorneys for the Palo Alto Police Managers Association (PMA) wrote a letter to the city manager. The PMA told the City that it was obligated to comply with the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA before taking any action on the proposed charter amendment to repeal article V, citing to People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591 [205 Cal.Rptr. 794, 685 P.2d 1145] (Seal Beach).
The following day, Tony Spitaleri, president of the IAFF, also wrote a letter to the city manager. Spitaleri joined in the PMA's assertion that the City was required to meet and confer with the IAFF and other recognized employee organizations under the MMBA. Spitaleri noted that in 2010, the City of Vallejo complied with the MMBA's meet and confer requirement before it placed a measure repealing binding arbitration on its ballot. At the conclusion of his letter, Spitaleri urged the city manager to "begin a dialogue with [the IAFF] and with other labor organizations which would be affected by any effort to remove or modify the Article V requirements."
On July 26, 2010, Russell Carlsen with the City's department of human resources responded to Spitaleri's letter. Carlsen advised Spitaleri that the City Council was going to consider the repeal of the binding arbitration provision in article V during its July 26, 2010 meeting and was intending on placing the measure on the ballot at its August 2, 2010 meeting. Carlsen then stated: "Interest arbitration provisions are a permissive, not mandatory, subject of bargaining (see DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 236, 255-57 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 93]; City of Fresno v. [People ex rel.] Fresno Firefighters, IAFF Local 753 (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 82, 96-97 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 603]). As such, meet and confer is not required. However, if you have questions or comments about the Council's proposal you may contact me or attend the Council meetings on July 26 and August 2."
That same day, Gary Baum, the city attorney, wrote to the City Council, addressing the meet and confer issue raised by the IAFF and the PMA. Baum opined that the City had no obligation to meet and confer with the labor organizations under the MMBA. Baum reasoned that the MMBA only required the City to meet and confer about matters within the scope of representation, such as employee wages, hours, and working conditions. Baum noted that the IAFF and the PMA relied on Seal Beach. Baum, however, concluded that Seal Beach was distinguishable.
After the City Council's meeting in August 2010, the City's policy and services committee began considering a measure to repeal the binding arbitration provision in article V. In May 2011, the City staff prepared a report with information about the proposal to repeal binding interest arbitration.
On May 3, 2011, Sandra Blanch, the City's interim human resources director, wrote a letter to Spitaleri informing him that the policy and services committee would begin discussing a potential measure repealing binding arbitration on May 10, 2011. The letter informed Spitaleri that if he wished to "meet and discuss regarding this issue," he should contact Marcie Scott at the City's human resources department.
That same day, Spitaleri wrote an e-mail to Scott. Spitaleri asked if Blanch's letter was "a request to meet and confer over possible changes to Article V prior to the Policy and Services Standing Committee meeting on May 10." Spitaleri did not receive a response to the e-mail. He later left Blanch a voicemail following up on whether her letter was a request to meet and confer. Spitaleri did not receive a response from Blanch. During the hearing on the IAFF's unfair practice charge, Scott testified that she did not receive the e-mail from Spitaleri, because her e-mail inbox had been full.
On May 10, 2011, the policy and services committee provided the City Council with a report reviewing the binding interest arbitration provision in the city charter. The report summarized the binding interest arbitration provision and binding interest arbitration decisions in the City, analyzing their impact. The report remarked that one of the primary criticisms of binding arbitration was that it delegated decisionmaking authority to an unelected third party who was not responsible or accountable to citizens. The report also included a table listing future election dates and deadlines for submitting proposed ballot language. The report concluded that if the committee determined that the interest arbitration provision did not meet the City and the
The policy and services committee held a meeting on the matter that day. During the meeting, City Attorney Molly Stump expressed her opinion that Seal Beach applied to the City Council's consideration of the ballot measure. Stump noted that a "meet and confer" did not require the parties to reach an agreement; rather, the parties were to make a good faith attempt to narrow their differences and exchange information. An attorney for the PMA spoke during the meeting. Spitaleri did not attend the meeting, but the IAFF's secretary attended. The policy and services committee did not reach a conclusion regarding binding interest arbitration and continued the matter to June 7, 2011, pending further research on how binding interest arbitration impacted other cities outside of Santa Clara County and California.
On June 3, 2011, Scott sent Spitaleri an e-mail containing a link to an agenda and a packet of information detailing the policy and services committee's discussion regarding binding interest arbitration.
On June 7, 2011, the policy and services committee convened and discussed binding interest arbitration again. The committee was unable to reach a consensus on how to proceed. It then forwarded the matter to the City Council for a policy decision on whether to proceed with a ballot measure to either repeal or modify article V.
On June 16, 2011, Ron Watson, the president of the PMA, sent an e-mail to Scott reiterating the PMA's desire to meet and confer about the proposed measure to repeal or modify binding interest arbitration. Scott replied to Watson's e-mail and informed him that she was unaware of what steps the City Council would take, and once the City Council had determined its next steps she would contact Watson and they could discuss how to move forward. On June 18, 2011, Scott sent an e-mail to Watson and to Spitaleri with a link to the City Council's agenda for June 20, 2011. Binding interest arbitration was set to be discussed at that meeting.
The City Council held a special meeting on June 20, 2011. Scott advised the City Council that the policy and services committee was seeking direction on how to proceed and whether to pursue repeal or modification of the binding arbitration provision. The chair of the policy and services committee stated that the committee was evenly split on whether to modify or to repeal binding interest arbitration.
The City Council was split on the issue of repeal versus modification. Some council members spoke in favor of modifying binding arbitration in some way. Ultimately, the City Council voted to refer the matter back to the policy and services committee with directions for the committee to (1) draft language providing for significant modifications to the binding interest arbitration provision, (2) provide language repealing the interest arbitration provision, and (3) return with a recommendation on when the election should occur, should there be a need for one. The policy and services committee was to report back to the City Council by June 25, 2011.
On June 28, 2011, the policy and services committee held a meeting and again discussed binding interest arbitration. Following a discussion, the committee directed its staff to draft a ballot measure repealing the binding arbitration provision in article V, an alternative ballot measure modifying binding arbitration, and an ordinance requiring mandatory mediation. Although the IAFF did not present anything, the secretary of the IAFF attended the meeting. Spitaleri later explained that the IAFF was aware that interest arbitration was going to be discussed at the meeting. The IAFF, however, was told only that they could present their opinions to the committee by speaking at the meeting at the microphone. To Spitaleri, this did not mean the IAFF would have an opportunity to participate in a dialogue with the policy and services committee about interest arbitration, and it was not the type of discussion or participation that Spitaleri believed was required under the MMBA.
On July 11, 2011, Scott sent Spitaleri an e-mail notifying him that the policy and services committee was going to meet again the following day. Attached to the e-mail were several documents prepared by Stump, including a draft resolution repealing the binding interest arbitration provision in article V, a draft resolution modifying binding arbitration, and a draft ordinance requiring mediation.
On July 17, 2011, Scott sent Spitaleri an e-mail informing him that the full City Council would be considering binding interest arbitration at its meeting the following night. Attached to the e-mail were documents containing the agenda packet for the meeting.
The city attorney's office prepared a report dated July 18, 2011, which again opined that the City was not required to meet and confer with labor organizations, because interest arbitration was a permissive, not a mandatory, subject of bargaining. The city attorney's report indicated that staff provided fire and police organizations with the opportunity to informally discuss and comment on the proposal by alerting them of the dates of the policy and services committee meetings when interest arbitration was discussed. The report noted that the organizations did not submit any oral or written comments during the meetings.
On July 18, 2011, the City Council met and discussed binding interest arbitration. During the meeting, Spitaleri spoke and requested the City Council adhere to section 3507 and the MMBA and consult in good faith with representatives of recognized employee organizations before adopting procedures for the resolutions of disputes involving wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Mayor Espinosa asked Stump whether there was noncompliance with the MMBA, and Stump responded that there was a threat of noncompliance but that binding arbitration was not a matter that was within the mandatory scope of bargaining.
Following the public comment period, the City Council passed a motion to adopt a resolution calling a special election for November 8, 2011, to submit to the electorate a measure to repeal article V to eliminate the binding interest arbitration requirement. The City Council also approved a motion adding a section to the City's municipal code requiring nonbinding mediation for impasses in labor negotiations with all recognized employee organizations.
After the meeting, Spitaleri spoke with Darrell Murray, the City's chief labor negotiator, outside the City Council chambers. Spitaleri asked Murray
On July 28, 2011, the IAFF filed an unfair practice charge against the City with PERB. The IAFF alleged that the City had violated the MMBA when it failed to consult with labor organizations over the proposed ballot measure.
On August 1, 2011, Stump sent a letter to the IAFF. The letter stated that Stump had reviewed the IAFF's unfair practice charge, and the City had learned, for the first time from the unfair practice charge, that the IAFF was interested in meeting with the City regarding the proposed ordinance establishing mandatory mediation. At that time, the mediation ordinance had not been finally adopted by the City Council. To provide an additional opportunity for a dialogue with the union, the City staff had removed the mediation ordinance from the upcoming City Council meeting's agenda. Stump proposed several dates for meetings to discuss the mediation ordinance. The letter did not mention the IAFF's request to meet regarding the repeal of binding interest arbitration.
On November 8, 2011, the election took place and the ballot measure repealing the binding arbitration provision in article V was passed.
On September 7, 2011, PERB's general counsel filed a complaint alleging the City had engaged in unfair practices in violation of the MMBA. In part, the complaint alleged the City failed to consult in good faith with the IAFF regarding the ballot measure to repeal binding arbitration.
An evidentiary hearing took place before an ALJ. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a proposed decision in November 2011. The decision noted that section 3507 required that a public agency adopt reasonable rules regarding additional procedures for the resolution of disputes based on matters within the scope of representation after a "consultation in good faith."
Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ concluded that the City had provided the IAFF with written notice for an opportunity to meet within a reasonable period of time. The IAFF, however, had not requested to consult in good faith in a timely fashion. The ALJ opined that by mid-June 2011, Spitaleri should have been aware that the measure had to be approved by August 1, 2011, if it was to be on the November 8, 2011 ballot. On June 18, 2011, when Spitaleri asked the City Council to abide by the MMBA, the request was no longer timely.
Both the City and the IAFF filed exceptions to the ALJ's proposed decision. On August 6, 2014, PERB issued its final decision on the matter. PERB's decision adopted the ALJ's conclusion that section 3507 and the consultation process set forth therein was akin to the meet and confer process set forth under section 3505. PERB held that under section 3507, a public agency must: "(1) provide reasonable written notice to each employee organization affected by the rule or regulation proposed for adoption or modification by the agency; and (2) afford each such organization a reasonable opportunity to meet and discuss the rule or regulation prior to the agency's adoption." (Fn. omitted.) Additionally, PERB concluded that "section 3507 imposes on a public agency and on recognized employee organizations, several mutual obligations in the conduct of consultation, which are to: (1) meet and confer regarding consultation subjects promptly upon the request by either party; (2) continue meeting and conferring for a reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely information, opinions and proposals; and (3) endeavor to reach an agreement."
PERB then concluded, contrary to the ALJ, that the IAFF did not waive its right under the MMBA to consult in good faith with the City. PERB determined that the IAFF had requested to discuss the issue with the City as early as July 2010. This request was acknowledged but denied. Again, in June 2011, the City acknowledged the IAFF's desire to discuss the issue with the City, but the City confined the discussion to participation in public meetings. And on July 18, 2011, the IAFF again requested to meet with the City, but the City acted unilaterally and refused to meet with the IAFF on the issue. Citing these facts, PERB concluded that the IAFF had not waived its right to meet and consult under the MMBA.
The City, along with amicus curiae from the League of California Cities (League), takes issue with PERB's decision. First, the City claims that PERB's legal determination that the City was required to consult in good faith over the ballot measure repealing binding interest arbitration undermined well-established law. Second, the City argues that PERB erred when it concluded that the IAFF had not waived its right to consultation. Lastly, the City argues that PERB lacked authority to order the City Council to rescind its action placing the measure repealing article V on the ballot, and the decision is an impermissible advisory opinion since it cannot change the results of the election. PERB and the IAFF reject these arguments and insist that PERB's decision was sound.
Before we address the merits of the City's claims, we first discuss the appropriate standard of review that must be applied to this case.
Noting the deference afforded to PERB over matters within its expertise, the City argues PERB should not be given deference over its interpretation of the election law or constitutional law issues raised by this case. However, it is "settled precedent that PERB may construe employee relations laws considering constitutional precedent" (San Diego Municipal Employees Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458; see Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 575, 583 [262 Cal.Rptr. 46, 778 P.2d 174]), and PERB's construction of statutes such as sections 3505 and 3507 fall squarely within its expertise.
Nonetheless, we agree with the City that "`[i]t is, however, "the duty of this court, when ... a question of law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute ... even though this requires the overthrow of an earlier erroneous administrative construction."'" (Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 587.) Thus, if PERB's interpretation is clearly erroneous, we will not follow it.
A different standard of review applies to PERB's determinations of fact. As the City notes, PERB did not accept all of the ALJ's conclusions of fact. In situations where parties file exceptions to an ALJ's proposed decision, PERB reviews the record de novo "and is empowered to reweigh the evidence and draw its own factual conclusions." (California Teachers Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1086 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 530].) PERB is not bound by the ALJ's determination of the weight to be accorded to each piece of evidence. "`[PERB], not the hearing officer, is the ultimate fact finder, entitled to draw inferences from the available evidence.'" (Id. at p. 1087.)
PERB's determination on factual issues is upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (California State Employees' Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 923, 932-933 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 488] (California State).) "`Under the substantial evidence standard, when a labor board chooses between two conflicting views, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of [PERB].'" (Id. at p. 933.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence; if there is a plausible basis for PERB's factual decisions "`"we are not concerned that contrary findings may seem to us equally reasonable, or even more so."'" (Ibid.)
First, we must examine whether PERB's decision that the City was required to consult with labor organizations under the MMBA is sound. In order to determine whether the City was required to consult, we first examine whether binding arbitration is within the scope of representation of the MMBA. And if so, what actions the City must have taken in order to be in compliance with the MMBA.
In its decision, PERB concluded that although binding arbitration is a permissive, not mandatory, subject of bargaining under sections 3504 and 3505, the duty to consult in good faith under section 3507 is distinct both conceptually and by its own terms. Therefore, binding arbitration is properly considered a mandatory subject of consultation under section 3507.
The City and the League argue that PERB's conclusion goes against long-standing precedent finding that binding arbitration is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. In DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 236 (DiQuisto) this court held that "interest arbitration is not a mandatory subject of contract negotiations" but is a "permissive subject about which the parties properly may meet and confer." (Id. at p. 257.) DiQuisto, however, is not directly on point. DiQuisto contemplated binding arbitration in the context of the duty to "meet and confer" under section 3505 and did not address the duty to consult in good faith under section 3507.
This is because there are distinctions between sections 3504, 3505, and 3507, both in their language and in their purposes. Section 3504 defines "scope of representation" as including "all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." Section 3505 requires employers to "meet and confer" with employee organizations "regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
Section 3507, however, states that employers "may adopt reasonable rules and regulation after consultation in good faith" (§ 3507, subd. (a)) with labor organizations for the administration of employer-employee relations under the MMBA, including "[a]dditional procedures for the resolution of disputes involving wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" (id., subd. (a)(5)) and "[a]ny other matters that are necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter" (id., subd. (a)(9)).
In sum, PERB articulated in its decision that the matters that are mandatory subjects for consultation under section 3507 are distinct from the mandatory subjects of meeting and conferring under sections 3504 and 3505. PERB's interpretation of the MMBA is within its legislatively designated field of expertise, so we must defer to its analysis unless it is clearly erroneous. In this case, we do not believe PERB's interpretation of section 3507 is clearly erroneous.
Section 3505 provides in pertinent part: "The governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing body, shall meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee organizations...." Section 3505 describes that "`[m]eet and confer in good faith' means that a public agency, or such representatives as it may designate, and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall
Section 3507 does not specifically describe the "consultation in good faith" process that is contemplated by the statute. PERB, along with the ALJ, concluded that the "consultation in good faith" mandated by section 3507 is very much like the "meet and confer" process mandated under section 3505.
Again, we defer to PERB's analysis on this point. As PERB noted in its decision, multiple appellate court decisions have reached the very same conclusion. (Independent Union of Pub. Service Employees v. County of Sacramento (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 482, 488 [195 Cal.Rptr. 206] ["In a related context, it has been held that `"consultation in good faith"' is the equivalent of `"meet and confer in good faith"'"]; Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802, 821 [165 Cal.Rptr. 908] (Vernon); International Assn. of Fire Fighters Union v. City of Pleasanton (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 959, 976 [129 Cal.Rptr. 68] ["We perceive no basis for distinguishing between the term `consultation in good faith,' as used in section 3507, and the `meet and confer in good faith' process defined in section 3505."].)
The City recognizes that appellate courts have consistently held that the duty to meet and consult under section 3507 and the duty to meet and confer under section 3505 are comparable. The City, however, argues these cases should not be followed, because they fail to analyze the impact of the
PERB's decision also conforms to its prior precedent. The City argues that in San Dieguito Union High School Dist. (1977) PERB Dec. No. 22E [1 PERC ¶ 369] (San Dieguito), PERB analyzed the employer's duty to consult under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) (§ 3540 et seq.) and interpreted this duty differently. We disagree.
The City misreads PERB's decision in San Dieguito, which found the duty to consult under the EERA was equivalent to the duty to "`meet and confer'" as used under the now-repealed Winton Act.
Furthermore, San Dieguito focused on distinguishing the duty to consult under the EERA and the duty to negotiate. (San Dieguito, supra, PERB Dec. No. 22E at pp. 10-11.) "Meeting and negotiating," as defined under section 3540.1, subdivision (h), "means meeting, conferring, negotiating, and discussing by the exclusive representative and the public school employer in a good faith effort to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation and the execution, if requested by either party, of a written document incorporating any agreements reached, which document shall, when accepted by the exclusive representative and the public school employer, become binding upon both parties...." As noted in San Dieguito, unlike the duty to meet and negotiate, the duty to consult "means that a school employer must consider the exclusive representative's proposals, but a school employer is not bound to attempt in good faith to reach a negotiated written agreement." (San Dieguito, supra, at pp. 10-11.)
Finding that the duty to consult in good faith under section 3507 is similar to the duty to meet and confer under section 3505 does not deviate from PERB's precedent in San Dieguito. In fact, San Dieguito supports PERB's determination in this case. Like the definition of "consultation" contemplated in San Dieguito, the duty to meet and confer under section 3505 requires public agencies to meet with employee organizations to exchange information, opinions, and proposals. And PERB's decision did not state that under section 3507, the parties must, in good faith, reach an agreement that will become binding. Under PERB's decision, if the parties have consulted in good faith and attempted — but failed — to reach an agreement, the requirements of section 3507 would be satisfied.
In its reply brief, the City makes a strained argument that there ought to be a distinction between the meet and confer process contemplated in section 3505 and the good faith consultation process contemplated in section 3507, because under section 3505.7, if a meet and confer process fails to produce an agreement, a public agency that is not required to proceed to interest arbitration may, after a public hearing regarding the impasse, implement its last, best, and final offer.
This argument ignores PERB's decision, which, as we noted earlier, states that the process mandated by section 3507 is "very much like" the process
Lastly, we are also not convinced by the City's argument that a different definition should apply, because under PERB's current interpretation if the parties reach an impasse on whether to proceed with the ballot measure repealing binding arbitration, the impasse would be submitted to binding arbitration. This hypothetical scenario is not before this court and was not before PERB.
Next, we find that PERB's interpretation of section 3507 does not violate the charter city home rule provisions of the California Constitution and the constitutional authority of the City Council to propose charter amendments to City voters.
Article XI, section 5, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution provides that city voters have the "plenary authority" to provide in their city charters "the manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several municipal officers and employees whose compensation is paid by the city shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, and for the number of deputies, clerks and other employees that each shall have, and for the compensation, method of appointment, qualifications, tenure of office and removal of such deputies, clerks and other employees."
The California Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of requirements to meet and confer with labor organizations in chartered counties and cities. In Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55 [151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249], the court considered the constitutionality of the MMBA's requirement to meet and confer regarding layoff rules. There, the commission asserted that the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA irreconcilably conflicted with its charter requirement that it hold a public hearing before amending its rules, and that its unique status as an independent administrator of the merit system would be threatened if it was required to bargain. (Los Angeles County Civil Service Com., at p. 65.) The court held that the "meet-and-confer requirement can coexist with the charter-mandated hearing" (ibid.), and the commission's fear that its neutral status would be compromised was unfounded. The court concluded that it saw "no constitutional barrier to requiring the county here to meet and confer with employee representatives before amending civil service rules that govern layoff procedures." (Id. at p. 67.)
The California Supreme Court also considered and rejected a similar argument in Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d 591. In Seal Beach, the court held
The City argues that Seal Beach should not apply, because the state's interest in a local agency's rules governing the procedural matters listed in section 3507 is minimal. The City also insists that the intrusive nature of interest arbitration weighs against requiring the City to engage in the onerous task of engaging in a process comparable to meeting and conferring as described by section 3505 prior to submitting the ballot measure to voters.
In regard to the City's first argument, it appears that the City conflates the procedures by which a public employee labor issue is resolved and the actual substance of the issue. The state's interest in the procedures by which certain employer-employee related rules and regulations under section 3507 are enacted is comparable to the state's interest in the procedures by which labor
The lack of any conflict between section 3507 and the City Council's power to propose charter amendments also undermines the City's argument that interest arbitration raises particular constitutional concerns because of its intrusive, unique nature. To support this argument, the City relies on County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 66 P.3d 718]. County of Riverside noted there is a distinction between regulating labor relations and depriving the county of its authority to set employee salaries. (Id. at pp. 287-288.) It then concluded that a recently enacted bill requiring counties and other local agencies to submit to binding arbitration economic issues that arise during negotiations with unions representing firefighters or law enforcement officers violated provisions of the California Constitution, because it deprived the county of its authority to provide for the compensation of its employees and delegated to the private body the power to interfere with county financial affairs and to perform a municipal function. (County of Riverside, at p. 282.)
The League argues that we should consider the undue burdens that may be placed on cities if PERB's decision is upheld.
First, since this issue was raised only by the League in its amicus curiae brief and not in appellant's opening brief, we decline to consider it. (Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161, fn. 6.)
Furthermore, even if we considered the issue on its merits, we would find that it fails. Certainly, the process by which a city council decides to place a
The portions of the Elections Code and Government Code that pertain to the procedures through which cities may amend their charters do not provide for a particularly expedient process. Undoubtedly, adhering to a requirement that cities must also consult in good faith with recognized employee organizations under section 3507 adds an additional hurdle. It does not, however, render it impossible for cities to propose charter amendments that raise issues that are subjected to the duty to consult in good faith under the MMBA. And it does not justify ignoring the requirements of the MMBA.
As noted in Seal Beach, a city's power to amend its charter can be subjected to legislative regulation. (Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 598.) When discussing the requirement of a meet and confer imposed by section 3505 on a city's ability to propose charter amendments, the Seal Beach court described section 3505's burden on the city's democratic functions as "minimal." (Seal Beach, supra, at p. 599.) As previously noted, complying with the MMBA's requirements does not conflict with a city council's power to propose charter amendments. (See Seal Beach, at p. 601.) Therefore, the League's arguments pertaining to the alleged disruption in the political process caused by PERB's decision have no merit.
The City and the League argue PERB's conclusion that cities are required to consult over binding arbitration should not be retroactively applied, because it is a sea change in the law the City could not have anticipated and would unfairly disenfranchise the City's voters.
The City argues that PERB's decision effectively overturns numerous federal and state court decisions and PERB's own precedent. However, the precedents and rules that are cited by the City concern whether binding arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining under section 3505, not consultation under section 3507. (See DiQuisto, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 236.) PERB's decision that binding arbitration is subject to the good faith consultation requirement of section 3507 does not represent a change in the law. There was no previously settled rule that binding arbitration is not a mandatory subject of consultation under section 3507.
The City also cites to cases where courts have been reluctant to invalidate votes of the electorate based on procedural irregularities. (See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 242-244 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] [finding that although initiative measure's title and summary were technically imprecise, they substantially complied with the law]; Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638 [180 Cal.Rptr. 297, 639 P.2d 939].) PERB's decision, however, specifically clarified that its remedial authority did not extend to invalidating the results of the municipal election. That remedy lies exclusively with the courts in an action in quo warranto.
Based on the foregoing, we see no reason why PERB's decision should not be applied to the City under these circumstances.
In its decision, PERB held that absent a valid defense, a party subject to the MMBA's requirement to consult in good faith must defer action on matters subject to the consultation duty until the duty has been exhausted. Accordingly, the decision went on to consider — and reject — several possible defenses to the City's actions. The City argues that PERB should resolve, not find, issues; therefore, its additional analysis into these possible defenses, which were not briefed by either the City or the IAFF, was erroneous and
Additionally, even if we considered the argument we would find it has no merit. In J. R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 874 [238 Cal.Rptr. 87], the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) concluded that the employer violated the law when it refused to rehire members of a crew that were laid off, even though the original complaint charged the employer with violating the law by laying off the crew in the first instance. (Id. at pp. 886-887.) The appellate court held that the employer was not advised that failing to rehire members was the activity it needed to defend itself against, and the lack of notice violated the principles of procedural due process and required the ALRB's findings to be set aside. (Id. at p. 888.)
In contrast to J. R. Norton, the unfair practice complaint here charged the City with violating section 3507 when it failed to consult in good faith with the IAFF over the proposed resolution. The issue — whether the City violated section 3507 — was plainly presented to the City. The City chose to focus on arguing that section 3507 did not require it to meet with the IAFF, and even if it did, the IAFF waived its right to consult. However, if a valid defense existed for the City Council's failure to comply with section 3507 before it voted to place on the ballot the measure to repeal article V of its city charter, then the City did not violate the MMBA and the unfair practice charge would be unfounded. Therefore, the issue of whether any valid defense existed for the City's acts was encompassed within the broader issue of whether the City violated the MMBA. It was necessary for PERB to address the possible defenses in order to correctly decide if the City violated the MMBA. And it was not, like the new issue contemplated in J. R. Norton, an issue that the City lacked notice of.
In its decision, PERB concluded the IAFF did not waive its right to meet and consult with the City. This factual determination deviated from the finding made by the ALJ. We find that based on a review of the record, PERB's conclusion regarding waiver is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it must be upheld.
The City focuses its attention on the IAFF's lack of action in the weeks before the July 18, 2011 meeting. The City points out that between June 20 and July 18, 2011, the IAFF did not formally request to consult with the City over the proposed ballot measure.
This argument ignores the IAFF's previous attempts to request a consultation with the City over the proposed changes to article V. In July 2010, the IAFF specifically stated — in writing — that it wished to consult with the City and asked the City to comply with the requirements of the MMBA. The City claims the ballot measure contemplated in 2010 was never adopted by the City Council, and there is no authority for the proposition that the request to bargain remains valid for an indefinite period of time. Yet, the City itself does not provide any support for its claim that a request for bargaining has, in essence, an expiration date.
The City's argument that this earlier request to bargain somehow expired also assumes the City Council's consideration of whether to repeal or amend the binding arbitration provision in article V in 2010 and in 2011 were two separate processes. There is ample evidence to the contrary. In August 2010, the City Council decided to direct its staff to return in the fall with ideas and a timeline for considering changes to binding arbitration after engaging in further study and outreach. In May 2011, City staff prepared a report with information about the proposal to repeal the interest arbitration measure. And in July 2011, the city attorney prepared a report on binding arbitration, referencing the City Council and committee deliberations that began in August 2010 when the City Council considered placing the measure on the November 2010 ballot. In sum, it appears that the City began considering modifying or repealing the binding arbitration provision in article V in 2010 and its consideration of the possible changes continued through 2011.
Additionally, during a City Council meeting in June 2011, a City council member declared to the other members that he understood that the IAFF desired to negotiate with the City over binding arbitration. That same council
Citing to San Diego Adult Educators v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1124 [273 Cal.Rptr. 53], the City notes that "[w]hen a union official with authority to act has actual notice of the intended change, together with adequate time to decide whether to demand negotiation before a final decision is made, the union will be deemed to have received adequate notice." (Id. at p. 1136.) As a parallel, the City therefore argues that the council member's statement during the June 2011 hearing that he understood that the IAFF desired to negotiate was insufficient, because he was not the City's authorized labor negotiator. Absent evidence showing how the council member came to this understanding, the City argues it cannot be determined whether the entire City Council was aware of the IAFF's desire to negotiate. The City also characterizes the council member's statement as hearsay, because he did not testify during the PERB hearing.
We find that even if we were to disregard the evidence that the council member stated during the City Council meeting that the IAFF wished to bargain, there was still substantial evidence supporting PERB's conclusion that the City Council was notified of the IAFF's desire to negotiate. As we noted before, the IAFF made it clear to the City as early as 2010 that it desired to meet with the City to discuss the binding arbitration provision. And the request was reiterated again by the IAFF in July 2011 during the City Council meeting. The City continually failed to address the IAFF's requests, and indeed several times rejected the notion that a meeting with the IAFF was required under the MMBA over repealing binding arbitration.
A labor organization can waive its right to bargain if it fails to make a timely request. In Stockton Police Officers' Assn. v. City of Stockton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 62 [253 Cal.Rptr. 183] (Stockton Police Officers' Assn.), the police union was found to have waived its right to meet and confer under section 3505 over the City of Stockton's decision to change to a different type of psychological counseling service. There, the City of Stockton advised the police union about the city's desire to move to a different type of counseling service and solicited input from the police union through a letter, requesting a response by a specified date. Several months later, the City of Stockton approved the contract for counseling services. (Stockton Police Officers' Assn., supra, at p. 64.) Several months after that, the police union formally requested a meet and confer session concerning the new contract. (Id. at p. 65.) The police union argued that it had not received the city's letter until after the requested response date. (Id. at p. 66.) Nonetheless, the union acknowledged that it had received the letter before the city council held a hearing on the matter, before the new contract was approved. (Ibid.) The appellate court found that this late request was untimely. (Id. at p. 67.)
Based on its actions, the IAFF did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to negotiate over binding arbitration. Unlike the situation contemplated in Stockton Police Officers' Assn., the IAFF made at least two clear requests to negotiate with the City about binding arbitration before the measure was passed, once in 2010 and again during the meeting on June 18, 2011. This does not unequivocally reflect that the IAFF chose to waive its rights. Nor was the later request, made on June 18, 2011, so untimely as to render it a waiver. The final time the IAFF expressly requested to meet, there was still nearly three weeks before the City's August 12, 2011 deadline to submit the measure to the registrar's office. Each time the IAFF requested and made known its desire to negotiate, the City did not respond and continued to deny that there was any obligation under the MMBA to bargain. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support PERB's determination that there was no waiver.
In its opening brief, the City also notes that the IAFF was regularly meeting with the City to bargain over other matters during the same time period. During these meetings, the IAFF did not request to bargain over the charter amendment. As pointed out by the IAFF, requesting to bargain over binding arbitration during these meetings would have been inappropriate. The scope of those bargaining sessions, which were sought under section 3505, was limited to certain matters that had been declared to be at an impasse in February 2011 after certain negotiations with the IAFF. And as we previously
Lastly, the City maintains that Spitaleri testified during the PERB hearing that he deliberately waited until the City Council made a decision regarding binding arbitration before he requested to bargain. The City cites to a statement made by Spitaleri during the PERB hearing in response to a question about why he did not make suggestions or proposals to the City regarding the language of the proposed ballot measure. After reviewing the transcript of the PERB hearing, we believe the City misconstrues Spitaleri's statement. In response to the posed question, Spitaleri stated: "Because the actual language, if I remember right, was not adopted. It was still in the making. And we didn't know what they were going to do." In context, Spitaleri was explaining that he did not offer proposals to the City at the time, because he was unsure of what course of action the City was going to take. Spitaleri's statement did not indicate that he engaged in gamesmanship with the City to avoid requesting to bargain until the City had decided what steps it was going to take.
The City and the League opine that PERB's decision goes against decades of established law and articulates a new rule that an employer bears the burden to seek out a labor organization to negotiate if the employer is aware of the labor organization's desire to bargain. The League argues that the labor organization must make an affirmative request. We do not believe PERB's decision goes against the established rule that a labor organization must make an affirmative request to consult.
In its decision, PERB cited to Newman-Crows, supra, PERB Dec. No. 223E, for the principle that the party seeking to meet and confer must initiate the process by making a request to meet. The request need not be stated in particular terms, but it must place the responding party on notice regarding which subjects are sought to be discussed.
In its decision, PERB followed Schreiber's reasoning and determined it was the employer's awareness of a labor organization's desire to bargain that was crucial. Additionally, the words chosen by the labor organization are not important, so long as it is effectively conveyed to the responding party that the organization desires to negotiate.
We do not find that PERB's interpretation regarding the requirements underlying a request to negotiate is clearly erroneous. In fact, it appears that PERB's decision is in accord with its prior decisions. PERB's decision does not shift the burden to the responding party to initiate a negotiation. Rather, PERB is merely reiterating that the labor organization — here the IAFF — must in some way effectively convey to the responding party (the City in this case) that it desires to negotiate. Additionally, the particular language that is required in order to request a negotiation is not vital. The decision still makes clear that the labor organization bears the duty of effecting such communication to the public agency.
Next, the City argues PERB erred when it held that "[w]here an employer believes that the subject over which an employee organization desires to meet and confer exceeds the employer's duty to meet and confer, or an employer is otherwise in doubt as to its meet and confer obligation, the employer must seek clarification." The City argues that PERB mischaracterized its prior decisions when coming to this conclusion, and the statement by PERB requires the City to seek clarification from labor organizations on subjects that it believes clearly fall outside the purview of the scope of the duty to meet and confer under the MMBA. We disagree with the City that PERB's statement on this point is erroneous.
"[O]ne of the issues we consider on review is whether PERB followed its own precedents in reaching its decision." (California Teachers Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)
PERB also cited to Rio Hondo Community College Dist. (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2313E, page 13 (Rio Hondo), and PERB concluded that "[i]f the employer refuses to bargain without seeking clarification of the union's negotiability rationale, it fails to meet and negotiate in good faith." In Rio Hondo, the union sent a school district a letter requesting to bargain over effects of a decision to install cameras on discipline and evaluation procedures. (Id. at p. 8.) The district responded that it would not negotiate, and the record did not show that the district made any attempt at seeking clarification from the union about how the subject fell within the scope of representation. The district argued that its refusal to negotiate was lawful, because the letter did not identify negotiable areas of impact and failed to identify the effects of installing the cameras except for the use of evaluating it for disciplining employees, which was nonnegotiable. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) PERB rejected this argument.
The other decisions cited by PERB are similar. (Kern Community College Dist. (1983) PERB Dec. No. 337E, p. 6 [7 PERC ¶ 14229] ["if the District was unsure as to the object of the Association's requests, the duty to bargain in good faith behooved it as a minimum to seek clarification of the Association's
Based on the foregoing, we do not believe PERB failed to follow its own precedents when coming to its conclusion here. As in Rio Hondo, where the district believed the union sought to negotiate over a non-negotiable subject, here the City had a duty, as explained in Healdsburg and the other cases cited above, to voice reasons for why it believed binding arbitration was outside the scope of representation. As articulated in Healdsburg, the objecting party need not "wrestle to a fall with every ambiguity, or search out every negotiable or objectionable word or phrase." (Healdsburg, supra, PERB Dec. No. 375E at p. 10.) And as stated in Rio Hondo, the employer may ultimately refuse to negotiate following clarification. It may also avoid clarification entirely, except it does so at its own peril if its refusal is later deemed to be a violation of the MMBA. (Rio Hondo, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2313E at p. 12.)
We note that in this particular case, PERB concluded the City was required to meet and consult with the union over the ballot measure repealing binding arbitration. Therefore, it was not the City's failure to seek clarification that rendered the City's acts unlawful. Rather, the basis of PERB's decision was the City's failure to meet and consult over a matter that fell within the scope of representation under the MMBA.
In its decision, PERB explained that it did not believe it had the remedial authority to order the results of the municipal election to be overturned. That remedy lies exclusively with the courts. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 698 [quo warranto writ is the exclusive method for appellants to attack amendments to the city charter based on city's failure to comply with the MMBA].) PERB, however, directed the City Council to rescind its July 18, 2011 resolution referring to
The City argues that PERB lacks the authority to direct the City Council to rescind its prior resolution. As we explain below, we agree. However, we find that PERB does possess the requisite authority to invalidate a resolution that violates the MMBA.
PERB and the IAFF opine that PERB's order directing the City Council to rescind its July 18, 2011 resolution is not beyond its authority. Rather, PERB argues that this order is within the purview of its broad remedial authorities and merely restores the parties to the status quo before the resolution was passed in violation of the procedures set forth in the MMBA. The City disagrees; it argues that directing the City Council to rescind its prior resolution, a legislative act, is in itself a legislative act that PERB cannot compel. We agree with the City.
PERB argues that given its broad discretion to fashion remedies, it has the authority to order the City Council to rescind its resolution referring the ballot measure to the voters. PERB cites to Vernon, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 802. In Vernon, the appellate court held that an anti-carwash rule implemented by the City of Vernon was adopted in violation of the MMBA. The appellate court noted that "California courts have adopted the private sector view that unilateral action constitutes a per se violation of the MMBA, and must therefore be set aside until the `meet and confer in good faith' duty has been met by the employer." (Vernon, at p. 824.) The appellate court then affirmed, in part, a peremptory writ requiring that the City set aside and rescind certain actions, because they were the "result of unilateral actions undertaken by the City" that were void for procedural violations of the MMBA. (Vernon, at p. 824.) In its discussion, the court held that "[T]he rule, being unilaterally adopted by the City without prior notice to or meeting and conferring with the Union, was void in its entirety for procedural violation of Government Code section 3505." (Id. at p. 828.)
Vernon, however, did not discuss the separation of powers doctrine. And although the Vernon court affirmed in part the issuance of the writ requiring the City set aside and rescind certain actions, the court also stated in its discussion that it was holding that the actions taken by the City were void due to the procedural violations of the MMBA. (Vernon, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 824.) Vernon was silent on the differences between rescinding and invalidating (voiding) a legislative action. We believe there is a difference between the two. Ordering a legislative body to enact or rescind legislation is a different remedy than declaring that a legislative act is void or invalid.
PERB and the IAFF argue that El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff's Assn. v. County of El Dorado (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 950, 962 [198 Cal.Rptr.3d 502] (El Dorado) is instructive. In El Dorado, the county created a new classification for employees providing court perimeter security and placed the new classification in a general bargaining unit. At the same time, the county deleted several positions from the law-enforcement bargaining unit. (Id. at p. 953.) The El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff's Association petitioned for a writ of mandate with the trial court, arguing that the county violated its duty to meet and confer. The association also argued that the county violated its local rules when it deleted positions in the law-enforcement bargaining unit without giving notice to and consulting with the association. (Id. at p. 960.)
The El Dorado court then turned to examine the appropriate remedy. The association argued that the court must invalidate the resolutions, which would have the effect of directing the county to restore the deleted positions. (El Dorado, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) The county argued that the court could not order such a remedy, because it would either violate the separation of powers doctrine or interfere with the county's management rights. (Ibid.) The separation of powers argument was premised on the fact that restoring the deleted positions would affect the county budget. The El Dorado court rejected the county's separation of powers argument. (Id. at p. 963.) It held that the "commonsense, legally supportable remedy is to invalidate the action that violated the local rule — deletion of the law enforcement bargaining unit positions — and direct the County to proceed according to law." (Ibid.)
In its decision, El Dorado distinguished itself from County of Butte v. Superior Court (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 693 [222 Cal.Rptr. 429]. In County of Butte, a county board of supervisors reduced the sheriff's budget, eliminating many deputy positions. In order to halt the proposed staffing reductions, the sheriff sued the county. (Id. at pp. 695-696.) In part, the sheriff prayed for the trial court to issue a writ directing the board to rescind the layoff notices and provide the necessary funding to the employees in the sheriff's department. (Id. at p. 696.) County of Butte noted that the county's adoption of the budget was a legislative function and under the separation of powers doctrine, a court is without power to interfere in that process. (Id. at p. 698.) The El Dorado court concluded that unlike the situation contemplated in County of Butte, it was "not attempting to dictate legislation but instead [was] merely enforcing the manner in which the County [was] permitted (by its own rules, in this instance) to legislate." (El Dorado, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 963.) The El Dorado court distinguished its decision as being "concerned with whether the County proceeds according to law," not with making "legislative determinations for the county." (Ibid.)
We disagree with PERB to the extent it argues that El Dorado can be interpreted to hold that a quasi-judicial agency like PERB has the power to order a legislative body to rescind a legislative act or affirmatively pass legislative acts. Such a principle is in direct contradiction to the separation of powers doctrine. (Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 551, fn. 9 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935] ["[B]y virtue of the separation of powers doctrine courts lack the power to order the Legislature to pass a prescribed legislative act"]; Sklar v. Franchise Tax Board (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 616, 624 [230 Cal.Rptr. 42] ["`[m]andamus will not lie to compel a legislative
San Leandro Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Leandro (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 553, 558 [127 Cal.Rptr. 856], also relied on by PERB, is not instructive. In San Leandro, several labor organizations and employees sought a writ of mandate compelling the city council to enact an ordinance granting them certain benefits. (Id. at p. 555.) The appellate court concluded the city council's acts had violated the MMBA. It noted that "[a]lthough the judgment calls for the city council to adopt certain legislation, it does not direct the city council to exercise its discretion in any particular manner. The judgment and writ must be understood as leaving it open to the city council to eliminate the discrimination by any lawful means. The city council remains free to extend or eliminate the management incentive program, but it may not discriminate among its employees for exercising their rights under the [MMBA]. It was proper to compel by means of a writ of mandate action to correct the existing unlawful practice." (San Leandro, at p. 558.)
San Leandro relied on Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328 [124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609] (Glendale).
On a petition for review to the California Supreme Court, one of the arguments advanced by the Glendale defendants was that mandamus could not lie to enforce the memorandum of understanding. (Glendale, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 343.) The defendants argued that the adoption of a salary ordinance was a legislative act, and a mandamus could not compel a legislative action. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that it was conceived based on the mistaken assumption that the trial court's judgment had mandated the city to enact a new salary ordinance. (Id. at p. 344.) Rather, the city's approval of the memorandum of understanding was itself the legislative act that fixed employee salaries. Therefore, the writ did not require the enactment of a new ordinance fixing salaries — which would be a legislative act. Instead, the writ "directed the non-legislative and ministerial acts of computing and paying the salaries as fixed by the memorandum and judgment. The use of mandamus in the present case thus falls within the established principle that mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty or to correct an abuse of discretion." (Ibid., fns. omitted.)
We believe San Leandro misread Glendale. As described above, Glendale did not hold that a writ of mandate can compel a legislative body to enact legislation. San Leandro's conclusion that such mandamus could lie is therefore suspect, and we respectfully disagree with its holding. Additionally, it is important to note that the writ of mandate contemplated in Glendale did not — as specifically stated by the Glendale court — force legislative action. Rather, Glendale expressly stated that it was upholding the appellate court's judgment, because it considered the calculation of salaries in accordance with the memorandum of understanding to be a ministerial act, not a legislative one.
We note that multiple other courts have, in the past, declared legislatively passed ordinances or acts to be void due to procedural defects. (El Dorado, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 963 [invalidating county's act that violated local rule]; Vernon, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 802 [rule that was unilaterally adopted
Lastly, PERB's reliance on its prior decisions ordering cities and city councils to rescind rules found to be in conflict with the MMBA is also unavailing. For example, in its supplemental brief, PERB cites to County of Imperial (2007) PERB Dec. No. 1916M [31 PERC ¶ 120], where it considered the validity of a county's employer-employee relations policy that was adopted as a local rule by the county's board of supervisors. There, PERB held that the provision was contradictory to and prohibited under the MMBA. (County of Imperial, at p. 22.) It then ordered the county and its governing board and representatives to rescind the rule. (Id. at p. 23.) The fact that PERB has, in its prior decisions, ordered governing bodies to undertake what appears to be legislative action, does not validate its current order. County of Imperial did not consider the applicability of the separation of powers doctrine. And as noted, we have concluded that ordering rescission of a legislative act is in itself a legislative act. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits this remedy.
We disagree and find Pulskamp to be instructive. In Pulskamp, the mayor of Los Angeles inadvertently signed an ordinance passed by the city council authorizing a special election to amend the Los Angeles city charter. (Pulskamp, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) The mayor discovered his error and vetoed the legislation. Despite the veto, the city clerk announced that he intended to place the proposed amendment on the ballot for the upcoming election. The mayor, along with a taxpayer, sought a writ of mandate with the superior court seeking to stop the city clerk from placing the referendum on the ballot. (Id. at pp. 856-857.) The trial court denied the petition, and the referendum was passed by voters. (Id. at p. 857.)
At the time the IAFF filed its unfair practice complaint with PERB, an action in quo warranto was not yet available. The election had not occurred and the charter had not yet been amended. The IAFF could not have filed an action in superior court. Furthermore, under section 3509, subdivision (b), the initial determination of whether an unfair practice charge under the MMBA is justified is within PERB's exclusive jurisdiction. The IAFF properly filed its unfair practice complaint against the City with PERB.
Additionally, a declaration that the City Council's resolution is void effectively returns the parties to the status quo ante. (Bowles v. Antonetti, supra, 241 Cal.App.2d at pp. 286-287; see also El Dorado, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 963; Vernon, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 802.) It has the affirmative effect of "undoing" the invalid act without impermissibly infringing on legislative powers.
During oral argument, the City framed its claim that PERB's remedy is ineffective, rendering its decision advisory, as a jurisdictional issue. Arguing that PERB's remedy of rescission has no practical effect, the City maintained
Furthermore, Coachella Valley is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Coachella Valley, the Supreme Court considered whether the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies barred a complaint filed in superior court challenging PERB's jurisdiction. (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1077.) The complaint was filed in the superior court after PERB filed an unfair practice charge, and the main argument in the complaint was that PERB lacked jurisdiction to issue the unfair practice charge, because the applicable limitations period for MMBA unfair practice charges was six months. The Supreme Court noted that "exhaustion of administrative remedies may be excused when a party claims that `the agency lacks authority, statutory or otherwise, to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties.'" (Coachella Valley, at pp. 1081-1082.)
In sum, Coachella Valley does not stand for the proposition that PERB is necessarily divested of its initial exclusive jurisdiction if it is unable to order a certain remedy, such as the invalidation of a charter amendment. Rather, Coachella Valley discussed whether the parties in that particular situation were required to exhaust their administrative remedies by going through PERB before filing a complaint with the superior court. Here, the parties have essentially completed the process of exhausting administrative remedies with PERB. Having exhausted administrative remedies, the City now seeks to use Coachella Valley as a means to invalidate PERB's decision by arguing PERB was divested of its jurisdiction in the interim. Coachella Valley did not discuss this issue, and cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 916 P.2d 476].)
The City's argument on this point also circles back to its claim that PERB's ordered remedies are ineffective. In its briefs and during oral argument, the City has maintained that PERB lacks authority to invalidate the ballot measure, and that authority lies exclusively with the courts by a quo warranto writ. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 698.) Specifically, during oral argument the City pointed to footnote 7 in Oakland, which states: "Appellants attempt to separate the resolution proposing the amendments being placed on the ballot from the enactment of the amendments themselves. Since the resolution was indisputably the first step in the `purported enactment of ... the amendment[s],' i.e., inextricably part and parcel of the procedural regularity of the process of enactment, we view any attempted distinction along these lines as bootless." (Id. at p. 692, fn. 7.)
Here, however, it is clearly within PERB's initial jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations of the MMBA. (City of San Jose v. International Assn. of
Additionally, although we have determined that PERB could not direct the City Council to rescind its resolution, we have also found it would be within PERB's powers to declare the resolution, passed in violation of section 3507, to be void. PERB did not order this remedy in its decision. "The initial determination as to whether the charge of unfair practice is justified and, if so, the appropriate remedy necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the board...." (§ 3509, subd. (b).) We therefore remand the matter to PERB so that it may determine whether this remedy should be ordered.
The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) decision is annulled. On remand, PERB is directed to strike its order directing the Palo Alto City Council to rescind its action of July 18, 2011. The matter is remanded to PERB to order any other appropriate relief consistent with the views expressed within this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
Rushing, P. J., and Grover, J., concurred.
