GONZALO P. CURIEL, District Judge.
Before the Court are two requests to seal portions of the parties' briefings in support of their motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 9 and 24. No oppositions have been filed. Upon review of the moving papers, the information to be sealed, the applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Court
There is a presumptive right of public access to court records based upon the common law and the first amendment. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, access may be denied to protect sensitive confidential information. Courts are more likely to protect information covered by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but are not limited by items listed in protective orders. See KL Group v. Case, Kay, & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 917-19 (9th Cir. 1987) (letter to client from attorney); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365-67 (D. Nev. 1993) (confidential settlement agreement).
"Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point." Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). "In order to overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record must articulate justifications for sealing that outweigh the historical right of access and the public policies favoring disclosure." Id. at 1178-79.
The presumption of access is "based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice." United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir.1995); see also Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court—D. Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir.1986) (explaining that the presumption of public access "promot[es] the public's understanding of the judicial process and of significant public events"). Accordingly, "[a] party seeking to seal a judicial record then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the `compelling reasons' standard." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Under this stringent standard, a court may seal records only when it finds "a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture." Id. at 1179. The court must then "conscientiously balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret." Id. (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). What constitutes a "compelling reason" is "best left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. In the past, courts have found that compelling reasons for sealing information exist "when such `court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,' such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598).
Previously, some courts applied a "compelling reason" or "good cause" standard for sealing depending on whether the pending motion was dispositive or non-dispositive. E.g., Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (parties seeking to seal documents in a dispositive motion must provide "compelling reasons" to support a sealing whereas for non-dispositive motions the parties must show a lesser "particularized showing" under the "good cause" standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)); Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (when a party attaches a sealed discovery document to a nondispositive motion, the usual presumption of the public's right of access is rebutted).
Other courts rejected this binary approach. In re Midland National Life Insurance Company Annuity Sales Practices Litigation, 686 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.2012), is one such case that rejected the literal dispositive/nondispositive label. In that case, an intervenor moved to unseal documents attached to a Daubert motion. Id. at 1118. The district court, like the district court here, concluded that the documents should remain under seal because "the Daubert motion was non-dispositive," as it "would not have been a determination on the merits of any claim or defense." Id. at 1119. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's focus on whether the motion was literally "dispositive": "That the records are connected to a Daubert motion does not, on its own, conclusively resolve the issue." Id. As the motion, in effect, "pertain[ed] to central issues bearing on defendant's summary judgment motion," we treated that motion as dispositive. Id. Similarly, the court in Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2016) observed that it would not allow the technically nondispositive nature of a Daubert motion to cloud the reality that it was able to significantly affect the disposition of the issues in the case.
The Court is convinced that good cause exists to seal the unredacted portions of these motions and exhibits that include documents previosly sealed by the Texas Court in the Tarrant County 231st Judicial District's March 22, 2017 Order. Upon review, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of the information that the parties seek to seal constitute prior domestic proceedings that concern child support and domestic relations matters. Moreover, the parties have articulated compelling reasons to seal these documents on the basis that they contain sensitive personal information. This is further evidenced by the fact that the Texas state court has already required that these documents be kept under seal. This Court finds no reason to come to a different conclusion. And finally, the parties seek to seal only limited redacted portions of the Exhibits and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their Motions to Dismiss.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the requests to seal are narrowly tailored and sufficiently particularized such that they do not impede upon the public's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and the factual basis for the parties' claims. As such and in the light of the aforementioned compelling reasons justifying sealing, the Court