MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUDDOCK, Judge.

Adolph Rivers pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault.1 At sentencing, the judge imposed a condition of probation requiring him to reside in a community with an adult probation office. Rivers now appeals this condition, arguing that it unnecessarily infringes several of his constitutional rights.

We conclude that the superior court applied the correct level of scrutiny to this probation condition and that the record supports imposition of the condition.

Background facts and proceedings

In July of 2012, Rivers snuck into a home in the community of Quinhagak. He slipped into bed with a sleeping woman and touched her genitals. The woman awoke and chased Rivers from her home. Based on this incident, the State indicted Rivers for second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, and first-degree burglary.2

The State submitted a notice of its intent to offer evidence at trial of prior bad acts by Rivers. The State alleged that in July 2003, Rivers entered the home of a different woman in Quinhagak and also touched her sexually before she awoke and he fled. The State further alleged that Rivers behaved similarly in 2004 toward another woman in Quinhagak.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rivers pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault, and the State dismissed the other charges. As part of the plea agreement, Rivers conceded aggravator AS 12.55.155(c)(18)(B) for having previously engaged in similar conduct.

The presentence report contended that Rivers required close supervision due to "his history of threatening and evading officers" and his criminal record. Rivers had sixteen prior criminal convictions, all misdemeanors. These included multiple assault and harassment convictions. His misdemeanor probation had been revoked on four occasions. The Alaska Public Safety Information Network identified Rivers as an officer safety risk, due to threatening comments and behaviors toward troopers. In a presentence worksheet, Rivers blamed his criminal conduct on alcohol abuse.

The presentence report recommended that the court impose a special condition of probation that restricted Rivers's choice of community in which to reside: "The defendant's residence shall be subject to the approval of his probation officer, and if deemed appropriate, shall be limited to communities with an adult probation office."

Rivers opposed this condition of probation. He argued that the condition violated his constitutional rights to travel and to live in his home community of Quinhagak. He also contended that the condition amounted to an unlawful delegation of authority to the probation officer. Rivers predicted that he would likely be ordered to complete an eighteen-month sex offender treatment program in Bethel upon his release from custody. He proposed that when he finished this program, his probation officer could evaluate his status at that point, and determine whether to ask the court to limit his residential options.

Superior Court Judge Charles W. Ray Jr. imposed the condition, slightly modifying it: "The defendant shall reside in a community with an adult probation office, unless the probation officer deems it appropriate and useful to the defendant's rehabilitation to reside in a community without an adult probation office." The judge reasoned that Rivers required extensive supervision, due to his alcohol and personal behavioral issues. The court also concluded that Rivers had "emotional and psychological issues" that could only be addressed with close supervision.

Rivers now appeals the special condition of probation.

Did the trial court err in imposing the special condition of probation?

Probation conditions that limit where a probationer can live are subject to special scrutiny, and trial courts must affirmatively consider and have good reason for rejecting less restrictive alternatives.3 This Court has vacated similar conditions where the trial court failed to apply the proper level of scrutiny to these conditions and the record did not appear to otherwise support such residential restrictions.4 But we have affirmed similar restrictions in cases where the record demonstrated that the court applied the proper level of scrutiny and where imposition of the conditions was justified by the circumstances of the defendant.5

Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court applied the proper legal standard and engaged in the fact-finding required to support imposition of this type of residential restriction. Specifically, the court found that Rivers would likely require extensive supervision based on his history of probation violations, his lengthy criminal history, his "emotional and psychological issues," and his substance abuse treatment needs. The court also modified the residential restriction to clarify that the probation officer's decision regarding any restriction on Rivers's community of residence must be based on Rivers's rehabilitation needs.6

We note that, at sentencing, the parties agreed that Rivers would be required to reside in Bethel until he finishes his sex offender treatment. After completing this treatment, Rivers will still remain subject to the condition requiring him to live in a community with an adult probation office. But the condition as modified makes clear that Rivers may seek permission to return to Quinhagak or to live in another community without an adult probation office, based on his circumstances and rehabilitation needs at the time. Rivers may also seek judicial review of the probation officer's decision not to allow him to live in a community without a probation officer, should the probation officer act unreasonably in withholding that permission.7

Thus, given the record in this case, we find no merit to Rivers's challenge to the special probation condition.

Conclusion

We AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.