STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM JANUARY 17, 2013 TO FEBRUARY 7, 2013 FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A))

HOWARD R. LLOYD, Magistrate Judge.

On January 17, 2013, the parties appeared for a hearing before this Court. At that hearing, the government and defense requested an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act based upon continuity of counsel as well as each defense counsel's need to effectively prepare by reviewing discovery materials provided by the government. At that time, the Court set the matter for a hearing before Judge Lloyd on February 7, 2013.

The parties stipulate that the time between January 17, 2013 and February 7, 2013 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161, and agree that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Finally, the parties agree that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public, and the defendant in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).

ORDER

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, and for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the time between January 17, 2013 and February 7, 2013 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161. The court finds that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. The court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.