Filed: Jul. 28, 2017
Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 1, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 29, 2017, and to exclude time
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 1, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 29, 2017, and to exclude time b..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 1, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 29, 2017, and to exclude time between August 1, 2017, and August 29, 2017, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Although defense counsel has been working diligently to review the evidence in this case, conduct follow up investigation and legal research, and discuss potential resolutions with his client, he requires additional time to do so. Since the last status conference, counsel for the defendant has been out of the office the majority of the two-week time period between July 17 and July 28, 2017 for work-related training, work-related travel to the district's Fresno office, and some personal leave. Consequently, defense counsel was unable to meet with the defendant during this time period and would like additional time meet with his client, review the evidence, and conduct any additional investigation that may be necessary before deciding how to proceed in this matter.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 1, 2017 to August 29, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
