MEMORANDUM RULING

ROBERT G. JAMES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court in this longstanding school desegregation case is a Motion to Dismiss as Moot for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, filed by Defendant St. Mary Parish School Board ("Board") [Doc. No. 17], and a Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs, filed by counsel for "Private Plaintiffs." [Doc. No. 26]. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, and the Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs is GRANTED.1

I.

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 1965, five African-American students attending public schools in St. Mary Parish filed suit for injunctive relief against the School Board of St. Mary Parish ("the Board") and B. Edward Boudreaux, Superintendent of the public schools of St. Mary Parish (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging Defendants were maintaining racially segregated schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Doc. No. 17-4 at 2, 4]. The suit was brought as a class action:

Id. at 3. At the time the suit was filed, a prior version of Rule 23 governing class actions (the 1938 rule) was in effect. Unlike the current version of Rule 23, the former rule did not require that courts issue an order certifying an action as a class action. Compare former Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 94-95, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (West 2019).

On September 22, 1965, Defendants answered suit and admitted that "prior to the filing of this suit bi-racial schools did exist in St. Mary Parish and ... have existed as such for many years." Id. at 11. Defendants further stated they had passed a resolution on September 16, 1965, which they asserted "effectively removes defendant, School Board, from the category of operating a discriminatory bi-racial school system."3 Id. Defendants' prayer for relief asked the Court to approve the resolution "as providing a proper mode of desegregation of the public schools of St. Mary Parish" and to summarily dismiss the Complaint. Id. at 11-12. Alternatively, Defendants asked "that this Court assume jurisdiction to supervise the development and implementation of an orderly plan of desegregation of the public schools of St. Mary Parish in such a manner as to cause an orderly transition from a bi-racial to a unitary, non-racial system." Id. at 12. Defendants raised no objection to the propriety of the suit proceeding as a class action; rather, the foregoing demonstrates Defendants implicitly agreed a class action was the appropriate procedural vehicle.

Two weeks after its Answer, the Board sent a letter to the Court stating they would "stipulate, or admit, that the plaintiffs are residents of St. Mary Parish, Louisiana, and are members of a class so numerous that it would be impractical to bring them all into court as plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs are, therefore, under the law entitled to bring this suit as a class action." Id. at 19. On October 11, 1965, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and issued a Decree stating in pertinent part as follows:

Id. at 20-22, 24.

The following year, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion impliedly overruling the Decree issued by this Court. United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.1966), on reh'g, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.1967); see also Doc. 17-4 at 29. On May 2, 1967, in conformity with the Fifth Circuit opinion in Jefferson County, the Court issued a superseding Decree. [Doc. 17-4 at 31-46]. The Decree was drafted by the Fifth Circuit and ordered to be entered by the district courts on remand in the consolidated cases in Jefferson Cty.4 This second Decree imposed "additional detailed duties" on the Defendants, including the desegregation of teaching personnel and the submission of bi-annual reports. [Doc. 17-4 at 30, 31-46]. Two years later, the Fifth Circuit found the "freedom of choice" desegregation plans ordered in Jefferson and in effect in the Western District of Louisiana, including the plan in effect in St. Mary Parish, were ineffective and remanded "in order that a new plan may be put into effect in each school district." Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1969). On August 4, 1969, the Court issued its third and last Decree, further refining the desegregation duties of Defendants and maintaining the requirement of bi-annual reporting. [Doc. No. 1-13 at 1-4].

The following month, the United States filed a Motion for Appointment and Designation as Amicus Curiae. [Doc. No. 1-15]. The United States filed its motion due to the filing of a suit in state court (the "Swope" case), whereby certain white citizens of St. Mary Parish sought to enjoin Defendants from implementing the desegregation plan ordered by this Court.5 [Doc. No. 29 at 6; Doc. No. 1-15 at 3-4]. The United States, relying upon 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All-Writs Statute) and supporting jurisprudence, moved "to appear and participate in this action to aid this Court to do all that reasonably and lawfully can be done to protect and effectuate its order of August 4, 1969." [Doc No. 1-15 at 4]. The Court granted the motion the same day, thereby authorizing the United States "to appear and participate in this action... as amicus curiae, with the right as such to submit pleadings, evidence, arguments and briefs, to move for injunctive and other necessary and proper relief, and to initiate such further proceedings that may be necessary and appropriate." [Doc. 1-15 at 6].6 The Court simultaneously issued a separate Order granting the United States' Petition for Removal and Consolidation of the Swope case with the instant case. [Doc. No. 1-16 at 12-13]. On February 27, 1970, the Court granted the United States' motion to dismiss the Swope portion of the consolidated proceedings with full prejudice. [Doc. No. 1-30]. After dismissal of the Swope matter, the United States' participation in this suit ceased until 2018. [Doc. No. 8].

Over the next four and a half years, the Court issued a series of orders establishing various remedial measures Defendants were required to undertake to desegregate their schools. In April of 1975, the Court issued the following Order:

[Doc. No. 1-67]. No objections were ever filed. Thereafter, the record reflects a series of reports submitted by Defendants from 1975 through 1983, as well as a Joint Motion by Defendants and Plaintiffs to reconfigure certain schools, which was granted by the Court in 1981. [Doc. Nos. 1-68 through 1-79]. However, no subsequent order is found in the record declaring the St. Mary Parish public school system unitary, placing the matter on the inactive docket, dissolving the desegregation Decree, or dismissing the case.

For the next thirty years, no further activity is reflected in the record. Then, on May 15, 2012, the undersigned issued an Order stating as follows:

[Doc. No. 2]. A judgment issued the same day dismissing this matter with prejudice. [Doc. No. 3]. Two days later however, the Court vacated its Judgment, stating "upon further review, the Court finds that additional facts are necessary to address the unitary status of the school system." [Doc. No. 4]. On May 21, 2012, the undersigned reassigned this matter to a judge in the Lafayette Division. [Doc. No. 5]. Four years later, the case was again reassigned to a judge in the Alexandria Division. [Doc. No. 6]. Beginning in early 2018, new counsel moved to enroll on behalf of all parties.7 [Doc. Nos. 7-10, 15; see also Doc. Nos. 19-20]. On March 25, 2019, the Board filed the present Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 17], and on May 29, 2019, counsel for Plaintiffs filed "The Plaintiff Class' Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs." [Doc. No. 26]. On June 11, 2019, this matter was again transferred to the undersigned. The Court now issues its Ruling on the pending motions.

II.

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

By this motion, the Board argues the Court no longer retains jurisdiction over this suit, because the original Plaintiffs' claims have become moot and no class action was ever certified. Thus, the Board contends there is no longer a case or controversy before the Court, thereby depriving it of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs and the United States oppose the motion.

A. Standard of Review

"The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 507, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Rule 12(h) instructs, "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, in this matter, Plaintiffs "constantly bear[ ] the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Id. "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Id. "Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Id.

B. Arguments of the Parties

By its motion, the Board makes three arguments in support of its position that this case is moot, and therefore the Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the Board contends that because this suit was never explicitly certified as a class action it is not a class action, and because there is no named Plaintiff with a live claim, the case is moot.8 Second, the Board argues to the extent Fifth Circuit jurisprudence recognizes an "implied class" doctrine, such caselaw "is directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent [and] is not binding." [Doc. No. 17-1 at 11]. Finally, and in the alternative, the Board argues that if the Court determines that the implied class doctrine has not been overruled, the facts of this case do not give rise to that doctrine, because: (1) "other than the initial 1965 order and stipulation by the Board, this case has not been treated as a class action," Id. at 12; (2) neither the 1965 Decree nor the two superseding Decrees adequately defined the class; and (3) Plaintiffs have not sought to substitute new plaintiffs with live claims.9 Plaintiffs respond that the implied class doctrine has not been overruled, and that under the facts of this matter, an implied class exists.

C. Applicable Jurisprudence

The Board primarily relies upon three decisions in support of its argument: Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981); and Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1982).10 Each of those cases are discussed below.

In Spangler, several students attending the public schools of Pasadena, California, joined by their parents, brought a class action suit in federal court in 1968 seeking injunctive relief from allegedly unconstitutional segregation of Pasadena's public high schools. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 427, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976). The United States intervened pursuant to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Id. No class was ever formally certified by the court in accordance with Rule 23. On January 23, 1970, after a trial on the allegations, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, finding defendants' educational policies and procedures were violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court ordered defendants to submit a plan for desegregating the Pasadena schools and retained jurisdiction over the case "in order to continue to observe and evaluate the plans and the execution of the plans...." Id. at 428, 96 S.Ct. 2697. The following September, defendants' desegregation plan was approved and implemented. Id. In January 1974, defendants filed a motion seeking relief from the court's 1970 order, which the court denied. Id. at 428-29, 96 S.Ct. 2697.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address "the extent of a district court's authority in imposing a plan designed to achieve a unitary school system." Id. at 429, 96 S.Ct. 2697. However, before reaching the merits, the Court addressed defendants' argument — raised for the first time in the Supreme Court12 — that because the original student plaintiffs had graduated, and because the district court never certified the suit as a class action pursuant to Rule 23, the case was moot. Id. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 2697. On this issue, the Supreme Court stated as follows:

Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 2697 (citations omitted).13

Five years after Spangler, the Fifth Circuit decided Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981). There, the parents of black children attending school in the Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") brought suit in 1970, alleging the school district's student disciplinary policies and practices discriminated against black students and violated due process guarantees. Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1981). Litigation to desegregate DISD's school facilities had begun in the 1950s, and the actual desegregation process began in 1961. Id. A decade later, plaintiffs brought the Tasby suit "to purge the remaining traces of de jure racial segregation in the DISD." Id. In 1976, the court issued an order adopting a detailed student assignment plan, as well as additional remedial measures, including provisions addressing student disciplinary policies. Id. In March of 1979, plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Further Relief," alleging the DISD had failed to comply with the district court's desegregation order as it pertained to student discipline. Id. at 1105. After a hearing, the district court dismissed plaintiff's motion and plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first addressed DISD's contention that the controversy was moot "because the plaintiffs ha[d] not shown that any of the black students originally named in the complaint still attend[ed] school in the district and because the district court never certified this suit as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23." Id. at 1105. The Fifth Circuit found this argument to be without merit:

Id. at 1105-06 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit did not expound upon the district court's failure to certify the suit as a class action.14

The year after the Tasby decision, the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion in Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1982). The Graves suit was filed in 1968 as a class action on behalf of all black school children in Walton County, Georgia, and sought to force the desegregation of two school systems in that county. Id. at 1136. That same year, the district court entered a judgment desegregating the two school systems. The plan operated effectively for many years, but in 1979, disagreements arose as to whether the plan was being followed. Id. Around the same time, "a group of predominantly white parents, known as the Concerned Citizens of Walton County," were granted leave to intervene in the case. Id. The intervenors immediately filed a motion to vacate the 1968 decree and to dismiss the action for mootness, asserting "the graduation, or departure, from school of the original named plaintiffs and the failure of the district court to certify the case as a class action mooted the action." Id. In an effort "to quell the mootness claim," a motion was filed to add as plaintiffs two black students enrolled in the subject schools. Thereafter, the district court granted the motion to add the additional plaintiffs and vacated its prior order allowing the parents to intervene. Id. at 1137.

On appeal, the intervenors sought to set aside the district court's order adding additional plaintiffs, asserting that "the lack of class certification of the action and the change in status of the original plaintiffs since the commencement of the suit rendered the action moot, thus depriving the district court of power to add additional plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21." Id. at 1137. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding intervenors' reliance on the Jacobs15 and Spangler line of cases unpersuasive, reasoning as follows:

Id. at 1138 (citations omitted). As to the intervenors' argument that the case was not a class action, and therefore, as in the Jacobs and Spangler line of cases, there was no "viable action in which the proposed party plaintiffs could be added," the Fifth Circuit found:

Id. at 1138-39 (citations and footnote omitted).

The Fifth Circuit further relied upon the fact that the district court "adopted as its injunctive order a proposed decree prepared and agreed upon by the defendant school boards," the decree provided relief "not for the individual plaintiffs but for the entire plaintiff class of (black) parents and students," and that "[t]hroughout this process there was never a suggestion by anyone that the question of whether the plaintiff class should be certified was an issue to be decided." Id. at 1139. After discussing a line of Fifth Circuit cases recognizing the viability of cases implicitly certified as class action suits16, the Court held that the matter was in fact a class action despite the lack of a formal certification order, concluding: "To state at this late date that this was not a class action, `would be to ignore the substance of the proceeding below in favor of an excessively formalistic adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'"17 Id. (quoting Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1976)).

D. Analysis

"Article III of the Constitution imposes a threshold requirement that those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy." Graves at 1137; see also U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). "The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that `federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.'" DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971)). "The inability of the federal judiciary `to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.'" Id. (quoting Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964)).

"In general a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."18 Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980)). As a rule, "[t]he mootness doctrine requires that the controversy posed by the plaintiff's complaint be `live' not only at the time the plaintiff files the complaint but also throughout the litigation process." Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1990). A notable exception to the mootness doctrine exists in class action suits, where the Article III mootness doctrine is more "flexible." Geraghty at 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202. Where a district court certifies a case as a class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquires a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named plaintiff. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). The named plaintiff must have a live case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court.19 Id. at 402, 95 S.Ct. 553.

The Board is correct here that no class was ever formally certified in this matter. When the suit was filed in 1965, there was no requirement that courts issue an order certifying whether a case could properly proceed as a class action. The following year, Rule 23 "was amended to include a mandatory requirement of class certification."20 Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 704 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983). The Order of the Supreme Court issued in conjunction with the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stated that the amendments "shall govern all proceedings in actions brought [after July 1, 1966] and also in all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies." Id. (citing 383 U.S. 1031 (1966) (emphasis added)). No order retroactively certifying the class after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 went into effect is found in the record; nor has the Court located any express determination that it "would not be feasible or would work injustice" to apply amended Rule 23. Thus, it appears unless the Court finds the implied class action doctrine has not been overruled, and further finds the facts of this matter give rise to that doctrine, the case is moot. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the implied class action doctrine has not been overruled, and further finds under the facts of this matter this suit constitutes an implied class action.

According to the Board, Spangler and Tasby dictate that the case is moot because the original Plaintiffs no longer have a live claim, this matter was never properly certified as a class action, and "there is no other factor which avoids mootness."21 [Doc. No. 17-1 at 9 (quoting Tasby at 1106; citing Spangler at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 2697)] The Court disagrees with the Board's position for several reasons. First, as Plaintiffs correctly argue, the statements in Spangler and Tasby upon which the Board relies are dicta. See e.g. In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (statements that can be deleted "without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding" are dicta).22 Additionally, several courts, including the Supreme Court, have distinguished Spangler as "a case in which there was an attempt to appeal the merits without first having obtained proper certification of a class." Geraghty at 400 n.7, 100 S.Ct. 1202 (further describing Jacobs and Spangler as cases "adopting a less flexible approach" to the Article III mootness doctrine than other cases decided by the Supreme Court); see also Graves at 1138; Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1335 (1991). Thus, Spangler is distinguishable, as the issue of class certification in this matter is being raised in the first instance not on appellate review, but in the trial court. Further distinguishing Spangler is that the defendants there did not stipulate to the propriety of handling the matter as a class action, see Navarro-Ayala, 951 F.2d at 1335, the suit was initiated after the amendments to Rule 23 were in effect, and no motion had been filed in the trial court seeking to substitute named plaintiffs with live claims.

The Court finds Graves is practically on all-fours with the case at bar. In Graves, the Fifth Circuit found that although the case was never explicitly certified as a class action, it was in fact filed as a class action, defendants knew of the class nature of the action and acquiesced in it, the case proceeded to trial as a class action, and the case was regarded as a class action at all times by the district court. Graves at 1138-39. Other courts have found such exceptions to the requirement of class certification post-Spangler under facts similar to Graves. See e.g. Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1979) (class action may exist in absence of formal certification order if litigation was conducted as a class action); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1334 (1st Cir. 1991) ("When the parties stipulate that the action is a class action and clearly define the members of the class, and the court enters judgment pursuant to the stipulated terms, this may sufficiently imply certification for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)") (citing Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1973)); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed. of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 463 F.2d 732, 743, 749-50 (6th Cir. 1972); Lockett v. Board of Educ., 976 F.2d 648, 649 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Doe, 1-13 ex rel. Doe Sr. 1-13 v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1049-52 (11th Cir. 2001); Wyatt By and Through Rawlins v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155, 159-60 (M.D. Ala. 1995); but see Brown v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 350 F.3d 338, 346 (3rd Cir. 2003) (finding the Supreme Court "summarily dismissed any doctrine of `implied class certification' in dicta"); Partington v. American Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2003).

In the matter before this Court, Plaintiffs brought "a class suit pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of [Plaintiffs] and on behalf of other Negro children and their parents in St. Mary Parish, similarly situated, all of whom are affected by the policy, practice, custom and usage complained of herein ...," namely, the operation of a "compulsory biracial school system." [Doc. No. 17-4 at 3, 5]. The Complaint described the named Plaintiffs (i.e., those to whom the class members are "similarly situated") as follows:

Id. at 4. The suit sought injunctive relief prohibiting the Board from, inter alia, "continuing to operate a compulsory biracial school system in St. Mary Parish, Louisiana," and from "assigning teachers, principals and other professional personnel to the public schools under their jurisdiction on the basis of race or color" Id. at 7. In its Answer, the Board admitted it had operated bi-racial schools for many years and voluntarily offered two resolutions to the case, both of which offered class-wide relief. Id. at 11-12. Two weeks after filing its Answer, the Board stipulated that Plaintiffs were "under the law entitled to bring this suit as a class action." Id. at 19. Six days after this admission, the Court issued its first Decree, which began by recognizing and relying upon the stipulation of the parties as to the class nature of the suit. Id. at 20. The Court then permanently enjoined the Board from discriminating against all black public school students of St. Mary Parish, thereby granting relief that was aimed at a class of people. Id. Likewise, the superseding Decree issued on May 2, 1967 (and the first filing after the amendments to Rule 23 went into effect) granted class-wide relief by permanently enjoining the Board "from discriminating on the basis of race or color in the operation of the St. Mary Parish public school system." Id. at 30-31. The third and final Decree issued in this matter also granted class-wide relief, permanently enjoining the Board "from discriminating on the basis of race or color in the operation of their parish school system." [Doc. 1-13 at 1]. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit implicitly treated this matter as a class action and made no mention of the amendments to Rule 23. Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801, 808-811 (5th Cir. 1969) (ordering revisions to parish-wide desegregation plans). The underlying record shows that all parties to this action not only knew of its class nature but stipulated to same. See e.g. Bing v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1973). Throughout the litigation, the Court believed the suit to be a class action and treated it as such.23 The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the "court implicitly determined that this suit would be maintained as a class action." Id. at 447. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds despite the lack of a formal certification order, this case is a class action filed on behalf of all black students attending public schools in St. Mary Parish.24

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion the class in this matter should be formally recertified and its parameters should be clarified. Accordingly, the Court will set a briefing schedule forthwith.25

III.

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE NAMED PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs, whereby they seek to substitute two parents, in a representative capacity, on behalf of their children who attend St. Mary Parish public schools. [Doc. No. 26]. The Board opposes the motion but makes no argument other than those presented in its Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court has made its best effort at applying the law to the facts of this case but is cognizant that much of the pertinent caselaw is from times past, and times (as well as jurisprudence) have changed. Further, the Court recognizes there are factors undercutting its decision — e.g., the failure of the parties and the Court to expeditiously move this case to resolution; the fact the United States has appeared only as amicus, rather than as an intervenor; certain dicta found in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit opinions; etc. Accordingly, the Court would look favorably upon a request to certify this matter for interlocutory appeal. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As foretold by Judge Higginbotham:

Jones v. Caddo Par. Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 938 (5th Cir.1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss as Moot for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [Doc. No. 17], filed by Defendant St. Mary Parish School Board ("Board"), is DENIED, and the Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs [Doc. No. 26], filed by counsel for "Private Plaintiffs" is GRANTED.

SIGNED this 18th day of September 2019.