JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs and Defendants now bring motions in limine to establish the evidence that may be offered at trial.
"Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials."
Importantly, motions in limine seeking the exclusion of broad categories of evidence are disfavored.
"[A] motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence,"
For example, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. To determine that evidence is relevant, the Court must find "(a) it has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Nevertheless, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The rulings on the motions in limine made below do not preclude either party from raising the admissibility of the evidence discussed herein, if the evidence adduced at trial demonstrate a change of circumstances that would make the evidence admissible, such as for impeachment or if the opponent opens the door to allow for its admissibility. However, if this occurs, the proponent of the evidence
At the hearing on the motions in limine, defense counsel requested a further opportunity to meet and confer on this topic. Thus, the Court
The parties agreed at the hearing on the motion, that they would supplemental briefing on the topic no later than Friday, October 11, 2019. Counsel SHALL address the standards for Fed.R.Evid. 608(b).
The plaintiff asserts that the defendants may refer to the arear where the incident occurred as a "high crime area" and will refer to "gangs, drugs, and other incidents that had nothing to do with Plaintiff." (Doc. 53) For the reasons stated above, to the extent the defendants considered the "high crime" nature of the area where the incident occurred or other incidents not involving the plaintiff in deciding how to address the situation with Ms. Hargrove, the evidence is admissible. High crime areas may pose unique safety challenges to law enforcement, the Court finds that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any minimal prejudicial effect.
The defendants seek to exclude statements made by Chief Martin immediately after the incident in which he purportedly admitted that the officers acted improperly during the contact with Ms. Hargrove. (Doc. 49 at 12-14) They argue the statements are irrelevant to the issues and their probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
The plaintiff argues the evidence is "strongly probative as to both liability and the municipal liability claims." (Doc. 67 at 5) However, Ms. Hargrove provides argument supporting only the municipal liability claim. The Court agrees that the evidence is admissible against the City and it may be admitted in the Monell phase of the trial. If Chief Martin testifies in the Monell phase about his statements, is permitted to testify as to his basis for knowledge at the time he made the statements and whether the investigation varied his initial beliefs. This means he is entitled to discuss every portion of the investigation that has convinced him that his initial impressions were not well-founded.
However, as noted, the plaintiff offers no support for her bare conclusion that the evidence bears on individual liability. Indeed, as both sides have noted, the propriety of the officers' conduct depends upon what was known to them at the time. Just as any statements by city officials exonerating the officers would not be admitted to bolster the officers' claims, evidence condemning them, likewise, does not advance the issues related to individual liability. Consequently, because the Court finds there is no probative value to the evidence as to individual liability (Fed.R.Evid. 403)
The defendants seek to exclude evidence that the conduct of the officers was investigated as to other incidents. (Doc. 49 at 14-19) The defendants argue this evidence details events that are factually different than those at issue, constitute character evidence for which there is no exception under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and does not bear on the questions presented.
In one incident, Officer Moore was disciplined for improperly questioning a suspect and for failing to report this conduct separate from his incident report in which he described the questioning.
The plaintiff argues this evidence should be admitted because it bears on the officers' credibility. (Doc. 67 at 8-9) However, though arguing that these incidents demonstrate the officers' "wrongful intent, motive, or pattern of relevant conduct" (Doc. 67 at 8), she doesn't explain how. The events are significantly different from those before the Court. They do not demonstrate the exceptions the plaintiff asserts and do not demonstrate that the City should have been on notice that the officers' conduct placed Ms. Hargrove at risk of the constitutional violation she alleges she suffered. From that perspective, therefore, the probative value of the evidence is quite low.
Moreover, the claims are not impeaching. There is no evidence that either officer lied about these claims having been made. There mere fact that the claims were made, does not impeach the officers' credibility. On the other hand, the claim that Officer Moore was dishonest presents a more difficult question. If the claim was determined to be true, the question would be easier. However, the evidence now shows only that Officer Moore may have been dishonest about the claimed incident, or he may not have been dishonest. Admitting this evidence does not shed light on the questions the jury must determine. Consequently, the Court finds that the scant probative value of this evidence is overwhelmingly outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect.
As noted above related to Ms. Hargrove's motion in limine number B.(1.), Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) prohibits extrinsic evidence to be admitted to prove specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking the witness's character for truthfulness." Thus, the motion is
The defendants seek to exclude evidence of the Internal Affair investigation. (Doc. 49 at 19-21) They argue that the investigation and the conclusions of the investigation are irrelevant.
The plaintiff argues that the statements of the officers given during the Internal Affair investigation are admissible. (Doc. 67 at 10) Ms. Hargrove asserts that she has no intention of informing the jurors that the statements were made in connection with the Internal Affairs Investigation. The Court agrees that with this clarification, the statements may be admitted.
Ms. Hargrove asserts also that the evidence is admissible as to the municipal ratification claim and the Court agrees with this as well. Thus, the motion is
The defense seeks to exclude any reference to settlements negotiations in this case or in other cases. (Doc. 49 at 14) The plaintiff seems to agree but contends that this should preclude the defense from calling Joseph Whittington as a witness. (Doc. 67 at 11) Mr. Whittington represented a plaintiff who sued the City of Bakersfield. Ms. Hargrove has listed Mr. Wilson as a witness in this case, presumably to demonstrate municipal liability.
Federal Rules of Evidence 408, in general, prohibits the introduction of evidence related to settlements when used to challenge the amount or validity of a claim. This evidence is admissible for other purposes. At this point, the Court has insufficient information to determine the purpose for introducing the email identified by the plaintiff in her opposition sent by Mr. Whittington. Thus, the motion is
The defense moves the Court to exclude the statistics "Year end reports." (Doc. 49 at 23-24) It is unclear to the Court exactly what these reports are or the information they contain or, even who prepares these reports and for what purpose. The title of the motion in limine identifies them as "Internal Affairs Division Year End Reports" so, presumably, they are internal documents maintained by the Bakersfield Police Department. In any event, the defense indicates that the report contains "various statistics pertaining to use of force including the number of total incidents, the type of force used."
The defense argues that the data is hearsay and that the plaintiff's expert lacks the ability to lay a foundation for the documents. As a preliminary matter, experts are entitled to rely upon hearsay and they need not have personal knowledge of the documents before relying upon them. Also, as to the City, the hearsay objection may be overcome by offering these statements against the City as an admission.
On the other hand, the defense notes that the plaintiff's expert did not review the deposition of the witness who testified about these statistics at deposition, did not identify the reports as a basis for the expert's opinion or discuss the reports or their relevance in the expert report. (Doc. 49 at 23)
The plaintiff agrees that the evidence is admissible only during the
The defense moves to preclude the plaintiff from referencing other claims of police misconduct during the individual liability phase of the trial. (Doc. 49 at 25-37) The plaintiff reports that she has no intention of referencing other events. However, she does intend to testify that just before the officers used force on her, she said something, "to the effect that she did not want to be another black person who was the victim of excessive force." (Doc. 67 at 13) Due to this fear, she asserts that after saying this, she attempted to use her phone to video record the contact with the officers. She claims that her statement explains why she tried to take out her phone and that both of these actions together form the basis for her claim under the First Amendment.
When she was interviewed by Sergeant Calvin, she claimed to have been "scared" that the she "was going to get shot" due to the events that were "happening all around the world." (Doc. 67 at 13) She continued, "I thought maybe — cause I didn't do anything. . . . I thought, is it my time to die? . . . Because you see what's going on, officer."
The statement Ms. Hargrove made
The defense moves to exclude the testimony of Dr. Pangarkar who will opine that the plaintiff will need future medical treatment. Dr. Pangarkar's report indicates Ms. Hargrove needs the following treatments:
(Doc. 49 at 26-30) The defense asserts that Dr. Pangarkar failed, in essence, to provide information about the reasonable value of these treatments and also failed to express the costs Ms. Hargrove will actually pay. Likewise, he failed to express to a reasonable medical certainty the period over which Ms. Hargrove will require Gabapentin.
The plaintiff argues that Dr. Pangarkar provided the reasonable value of the treatments. (Doc. 67 at 14). However, though claiming this, the plaintiff provides no evidence that this is true.
In a § 1983 case, federal law provides no guidance as to the measure of damages. Thus, the Court is required to consider "principles derived from the common law of torts."
In California, under
The situation before the Court here, is different. The plaintiff is not seeking compensation for costs for past medical treatment and is not seeking to introduce evidence of those past costs to support the claim related to future medical costs. Rather, she seeks to introduce expert testimony as to the cost of future medical treatment, without regard for past costs. As noted above, there is no showing that the expert opinioned that the costs he estimated were reasonable or that he provided a foundation for his opinions related to these costs. Given this factual setting, the Court is not convinced that
The Court finds the factual situation here different than that of
According to the Ninth Circuit's Model Jury Instruction 5.1, a plaintiff make seek damages that "will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury . . . caused by the defendant." This instruction admonishes jurors not to rely upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture.
Dr. Pangarkar's report fails to detail whether he considered Ms. Hargrove's unique situation. For example, as the defense argues, Dr. Pangarkar opined that in Los Angeles, the cost of, "[c]ognitive behavior therapy, along with mindfulness-based stress reduction" costs about $500 per hour. Assuming there is evidence that the need for CBT and stress reduction therapies was caused by the incident, the Court lacks sufficient information to understand why the costs imposed in Los Angeles should apply. If Ms. Hargrove is intending to engage in this therapy in Los Angeles, that is her decision and the defense has no say in it. However, the defense is entitled to question whether Dr. Pangarkar's opinion that she would engage in therapy in Los Angeles is based upon any foundation, whether it is reasonably likely that she will travel to Los Angeles for this treatment and, in fact, whether Ms. Hargrove will engage in the treatment at all. As stated, however, the Court lacks information to know whether Dr. Pangarkar detailed a foundation for these cost estimates at his deposition or, indeed, whether he was asked about it. Thus, the ruling on this motion is
The defendants seek to exclude information not known to them at the time of the contact with Ms. Hargrove. (Doc. 49 at 31-32) The defendants argue that this includes information that the suspect was bald and had a goatee.
The parties agree that the officers were that the suspect was a black man
The plaintiff argues that it was known—though not to the individual defendants—that the suspect was bald and had a goatee and that they reasonably could have known this. Presumably, she asserts that the defendants could have contacted the officers on scene of the attack by the machete-wielding suspect, to obtain a more complete description of the suspect, and that their conduct should be judged based on the information not known to them. This argument is contrary to law. According to
The Court rejects the argument that
The defense seeks to exclude the incident report, the use of force report, selected police department policies and certain POST Learning Domains. (Doc. 49 at 32-34)
The plaintiff asserts, and the Court agrees, that the statements the defendant officers make in the these reports are not hearsay (Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)) though the document does contain hearsay. Thus, the motion is
The defense argues, and the Court agrees, that these documents are not admissible during the liability phase of this case. Whether the officers' conduct comported with the Constitution is the question, not whether the officers' conduct comported with the BPD policies or POST standards.
The Court agrees with the rationale in
Thus, as to the individual liability phase of the trial, the motion is
The defendant officers
As to the
At the hearing on the motions in limine, defense counsel requested a further opportunity to meet and confer on this topic. Thus, the Court