Filed: Jan. 28, 2020
Latest Update: Jan. 28, 2020
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 30, 2020. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to supersede ECF No. 37 and continue the status conference until May 28, 2020, and to exclude time between January 30, 2020, and May 28, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 30, 2020. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to supersede ECF No. 37 and continue the status conference until May 28, 2020, and to exclude time between January 30, 2020, and May 28, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 30, 2020.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to supersede ECF No. 37 and continue the status conference until May 28, 2020, and to exclude time between January 30, 2020, and May 28, 2020, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over a hundred thousand of pages of documents, electronically imaged devices, and video and audio files. That discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to continue reviewing the large volume of discovery, consult with his clients, review the current charges and research related defenses, to discuss pretrial motions and immigration consequences, research potential sentencing exposure for each defendant, including conducting a further analysis of the Guidelines, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel also has other significant in and out of court commitments, which will affect his time available for effective preparation.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and prevent continuity of counsel for defendants.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 30, 2020 to May 28, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: January 24, 2020 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
/s/ ROSANNE L. RUST
ROSANNE L. RUST
MICHAEL D. ANDERSON
Assistant United States Attorneys
Dated: January 24, 2020 /s/ PATRICK K. HANLY
Patrick K. Hanly
Counsel for Defendants
Rahman Lakhani, N. Ali Enterprises,
Inc., and 21 Century Distribution, Inc.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
