CATHERINE C. BLAKE, District Judge.
In 2005, the plaintiffs in this case filed suit asserting constitutional challenges to strip-search policies at the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Facility ("Central Booking"), and to the alleged practice there of detaining individuals arrested without a warrant for more than 48 hours without presenting them to a judicial officer (a practice they call "overdetention"). The court certified a class of overdetained plaintiffs, and the defendants later moved to alter the class period so it corresponds only to the defendant Susan Murphy's tenure as Central Booking's warden from March 9, 2004, through June 22, 2005. The plaintiffs did not oppose that portion of the defendants' motion, and that portion of the motion will be granted.
Though several other motions are also before the court, the primary issue presented for resolution is Ms. Murphy's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' overdetention claim. Among other things, Ms. Murphy argues that a reasonable jury could not find that she was deliberately indifferent to delays in detainees' presentment or release. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and a motions hearing was held on July 27, 2012. For the reasons that follow, Ms. Murphy's motion for summary judgment will be granted. The remaining pending motions will be denied as moot.
Maryland's Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS"), one of the "principal departments of the Executive Branch of the State government," Md. Code, State Gov't § 8-201, "is charged with overseeing the Maryland correctional system," Glover v. State, 794 A.2d 735, 740 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). One of the units within DPSCS is the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services ("DPDS"). Md. Code, Corr. Servs. § 2-201(3). The State of Maryland created DPDS because, among other things, "[t]here [was] an important public need to centralize and coordinate the provision of services to individuals on a pretrial status in Baltimore City," and the city "d[id] not have the financial resources to fund a local correctional facility at a level sufficient to meet the needs of those incarcerated." Id. § 5-102(c)-(d). Consistent with the reasons for its founding, DPDS is required by statute to operate a "centralized booking facility" containing "pretrial release services," "District Court Commissioners," an "Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City," and "Baltimore City Police Services." Id. § 5-404(b)(1)-(4). That facility is Central Booking.
Before Central Booking opened in 1995, Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") "officers took arrestees directly to their districts for booking and processing." (DPDS Plan for Efficient and Timely Processing on the Booking Floor ("2005 DPDS Plan"), August 2005, Mot. Partial Summ. J. by William Jednorski Ex. 9, ECF No. 378-9, at 1.) Presentment of arrestees to court commissioners who "reviewed charges and determined bail or released the arrestee on personal recognizance" also occurred in the BPD's district offices. (Id.) Once Central Booking opened, however, it provided the location for "booking and processing all arrestees in Baltimore City." (Baltimore City Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Booking Process Presentation ("Booking Process Presentation"),
Central Booking is comprised of six floors, (Dep. of Mitchell Franks, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 72, ECF No. 392-4, at 85), extends for two city blocks, (Murphy Dep. at 36), and was designed to house between 800 and 900 detainees, (David M. Parrish, Analysis of Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center ("Parrish Analysis"), October 21, 2005, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 73, ECF No. 392-5, at 3; Booking Process Presentation at 3).
During the relevant time period,
If the state's attorney decided not to charge the arrestee, that arrestee would be released without charge, a result referred to throughout the record by its acronym, "RWOC." (See, e.g., Booking Process Presentation at 6.) If the state's attorney did decide to charge the arrestee, the charges were entered into the ABS. (Id.) The paperwork indicating the charge then made its way to a police liaison, who acknowledged receipt of the paperwork through the ABS. (Id. at 12.) A police liaison then delivered that paperwork to a "public safety officer," who entered into the ABS that the paperwork was received and delivered it to Pretrial Services. (Id.) Pretrial Services conducted a check of the arrestee's criminal record, and entered into the ABS that the check was completed. (Id.)
If Pretrial Services identified the arrestee as a "war room offender," i.e., a violent, repeat offender, the paperwork was sent to the "war room." (Id.; 2005 DPDS Plan at ii.) The war room, created in 2003, was a location at Central Booking staffed by the State's Attorney's office, the State Division of Parole and Probation, DPDS, and the BPD. (2005 DPDS Plan at ii.) Representatives of these agencies collaborated to identify individuals they deemed particularly dangerous, and subject them to "a more rigorous evaluation of court and supervision records" before clearing the arrestee to see a court commissioner. (Id.) If the arrestee was not identified as a war room offender, the paperwork returned to a public safety officer and then went to a court commissioner. (Booking Process Presentation at 12.)
The physical processing of warrantless arrestees at Central Booking proceeded as follows. The arresting officer affixed an identification wristband, which contained a barcode, onto the arrestee. (Dep. of William Smith, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 76, ECF No. 392-8, at 145; Murphy Dep. at 269.) The officer put certain information into the barcode, including the time of arrest. (Smith Dep. at 145-47; Murphy Dep. at 269-272.) Officers then took the arrestee to Central Booking. Booking officers took the arrestee into the facility through its sally port.
Ms. Murphy began working at Central Booking as an assistant warden for security in 2001. (Murphy Dep. at 28.) At some point she transitioned into an assistant warden for booking, a position in which she served until she became acting warden on March 9, 2004. (Id. at 64; Decl. of Susan Murphy ¶ 1, Mot. Partial Summ. J. by William Jednorski Ex. 3, ECF No. 378-3.) She transitioned from acting warden to warden on June 23, 2004, and served in that capacity until June 22, 2005. (Id.; Mot. Summ. J. at 1.) From March 9, 2004, to June 22, 2005, 111,749 individuals were booked at Central Booking, an average of 238 per day. (Decl. of Kevin Nichols, Pls.' Resp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 252, at 2.)
Timely presentment of warrantless arrestees became an issue during Ms. Murphy's tenure as warden. Though officials were primarily concerned with Maryland's 24-hour limit, between one and two percent of individuals booked at Central Booking during that time were warrantless arrestees detained beyond the constitutional limit of 48 hours without presentment.
In light of these delays, Maryland's Office of the Public Defender ("OPD") began filing petitions for habeas corpus on behalf of individuals detained at Central Booking who were not presented to a court commissioner within 24 hours of their warrantless arrest, as required by Maryland law. (See Baltimore City Circuit Court Op. on Mot. Intervene, Rodney v. Murphy, Case No. 24-C-05-004405, Sept. 29, 2005, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 87, ECF No. 392-19, at 1 (recounting case history).) That led to the filing of a class action suit against Ms. Murphy in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Meanwhile, on May 12, 2005, former detainees at Central Booking filed a complaint in this court asserting claims of overdetention and unconstitutional strip searches. Count Four of the Fourth Amended Complaint asserts a claim of supervisory liability against Ms. Murphy in her individual capacity for overdetentions at Central Booking during her time as warden.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). Whether a fact is material depends upon the substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Id. at 247-48. "A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc). At the same time, the court must not yield its obligation "to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs raise a constitutional claim against Ms. Murphy, and seek to hold her liable for their overdetentions under a theory of supervisory liability. Supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "is not premised upon respondeat superior . . . ." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Rather, to succeed on a § 1983 claim based on supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show:
Id. at 799 (citations omitted). "As to the second element, a plaintiff `may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating a supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.'" Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).
Arrests must be supported by probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed (or was committing) an offense. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). "To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the [Supreme] Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible." Id. at 112. When a police officer arrests someone without a warrant, however, only the officer has determined that probable cause exists. Therefore, the government must "promptly" arrange for the arrestee's presentment before a judicial officer for a probable cause assessment. Id. at 125. Presentment within 48 hours is presumptively constitutional, and an arrested individual presented to a judicial officer within that time bears the burden of showing "that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably." Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). "Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, . . . the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57.
Ms. Murphy concedes that the plaintiffs have put forth evidence sufficient to establish the first element of pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury. She argues, however, that a reasonable jury could not find that she was deliberately indifferent to delays in presentment, or that there was an affirmative causal link between her alleged inaction and the delays. The court agrees that no genuine dispute of material fact exists to support the element of deliberate indifference, and therefore will not reach the question of causation.
The foundation of Ms. Murphy's argument is that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that delays in presentment of warrantless arrestees were due to problems largely out of her control, and that is why overdetentions persisted despite her efforts to prevent them. As Central Booking's warden, Ms. Murphy was an employee of DPDS, a state agency, see Md. Code, Corr. Servs. § 5-404, and her immediate supervisor was DPDS's Deputy Commissioner (though DPSCS's Commissioner "signed off" on Central Booking's policies). (Murphy Dep. at 256; Flanagan Dep. at 34). Within Central Booking, she supervised other DPDS employees, including a chief of security, assistant wardens, majors, captains, sergeants, and correctional officers. (Flanagan Dep. at 40-41.) But Ms. Murphy is correct that the timely presentment of warrantless arrestees also involved many outside her supervision, including BPD officers, state's attorneys, and court commissioners, each of whom could be (and were) responsible for delays.
BPD officers caused delays in several ways. Hours often passed between when a BPD officer arrested someone and when the arrestee was brought to Central Booking. (Murphy Dep. at 273; Franks Dep. at 238; Smith Dep. at 150-51.) BPD officers often were slow to complete a statement of probable cause, (Murphy Dep. at 286-87; Moss Dep. at 29; Booking Process Presentation at 15), failed to "lock" the statement or hit "send" so it could enter the computer system, (Smith Dep. at 150-51; Booking Process Presentation at 15), or were unable to complete the statement process because of broken "signature pads," (Booking Process Presentation at 15). Though it was the responsibility of the police liaisons to contact the arresting officers for missing documents, (2005 DPDS Plan at 3-4), "the police liaisons initially did not feel that it was their responsibility to move quickly," (Franks Dep. at 239). When statements of probable cause arrived at Central Booking, the police liaisons, whose responsibilities also included printing the statements and giving them to a state's attorney, sometimes refused to do so. (Murphy Dep. at 290, 305.)
State's attorneys were also frequently responsible for delays once they received the arresting officer's statement. (Franks Dep. at 238-39; Flanagan Dep. at 52; Becketts Dep. at 96-97; see also OPD letter to Judge Glynn dated Oct. 31, 2005, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 78, ECF No. 392-10, at 1 ("Our office, in reviewing those circumstances where an individual is close to or past the 24th hour mark, has observed that the majority of these cases involve a delay in the completion of the paperwork by either the Police Department and/or the State's Attorney's Office.").) These delays were sometimes linked to the state's attorneys' activities in the war room. (Becketts Dep. at 85; Murphy Dep. at 308-09.)
Even when an arrestee (and his paperwork) had been fully and timely processed, presentment was further delayed when the number of available court commissioners was insufficient, (Franks Dep. at 238; Smith Dep. at 153; Booking Process Presentation at 19), causing the available commissioners to be overwhelmed by the volume of arrestees, (Flanagan Dep. at 48; Smith Dep. at 153).
The undisputed evidence also makes clear that Ms. Murphy took various actions to prevent and reduce overdetentions. First, she personally monitored the issue and sought to remedy potential delays as they arose: she used the ABS to monitor the lengths of arrestees' detentions in real time, (Murphy Dep. at 84), printed reports highlighting warrantless arrestees who had been detained for the longest periods of time to prioritize those individuals, (id. at 229), and when arrestees had been detained without presentment for more than 24 hours she went to the booking floor to "look[ ] for answers," (id. at 229-30; Dep. of James Shields, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 85, ECF No. 392-17, at 66). Second, she focused her staff on the problem by issuing "post orders" — documents describing the duties of a particular position, (Murphy Dep. at 125-26), — for the booking lieutenant, (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 82, ECF No. 392-14), the booking shift commander, (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 83, ECF No. 392-15), and the sergeant assigned to the position of "arrest booking lead," (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 84, ECF No. 392-16), that required these individuals to monitor the booking queue and potential delays. Third, she alerted her superiors to the issue of delays in presentment. She did this by writing a thorough memorandum to Deputy Commissioner Howard Ray, her immediate supervisor, (Murphy Dep. at 255), addressing the problem and its varied causes (Memo, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 79, ECF No. 392-11), and by raising the issue in Monday morning meetings with DPDS Commissioner William Smith, (Murphy Dep. at 265-66). Fourth, she worked with representatives of other agencies in Central Booking whose activities were linked to delays: she had meetings with representatives of all the agencies with operations in Central Booking to discuss the problem and work to resolve it, (Shields Dep. at 64-66), met and spoke regularly with BPD officers about the issue, (Murphy Dep. at 309-12), and had a long meeting about the issue with the then-commissioner of the BPD, (id. at 314).
Under these circumstances, where the undisputed evidence establishes both that delays in presentment were largely due to factors beyond Ms. Murphy's control, and Ms. Murphy took various actions in her attempt to eliminate overdetentions, no reasonable jury could find that she was deliberately indifferent to the problem. See West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claims of deliberate indifference to overdetention where delays were caused by issues outside the defendants' control and the defendants "undertook to address" the issues). This case is not one where the supervisor's response to "documented widespread abuses" was anything approaching "continued inaction." Wilkins, 751 F.3d at 226 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary fall into two main categories, the first of which is that Ms. Murphy should have done more to speed the release of warrantless arrestees. Specifically, they say she failed to take "a more pro-active approach," (Pls.' Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 14), "releas[e] minor offenders," (id. at 15), or seek "court permission to detain warrantless arrestees beyond 48 hours without presentment," (id. at 20). As to Ms. Murphy's supposed failure to take a more pro-active approach, "[d]eliberate indifference is a very high standard," Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999), and "[a] `showing of mere negligence' will not suffice," Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing id.). Even if Ms. Murphy's actions (or failures to act) could be characterized as negligent, they do not approach deliberate indifference.
The plaintiffs' second argument is that Ms. Murphy is automatically liable for overdetentions that occurred while she was warden, either because she was the arrestees' "custodian," (Pls.' Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 17-20), or because she was Central Booking's "final policymaker," (id. at 21). The "custodian" theory might reasonably be applied where the municipality itself may be fairly characterized as an arrestee's custodian. See Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The County is responsible for operating the jail and has custody over arrestees.") (emphasis added). The same may be true for a particular agency, such as a police department. See Wayland v. City of Springdale, 933 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1991) (where officials were sued in both their official and individual capacities, stating that "the police were under no obligation to continue to hold" an overdetained arrestee) (emphasis added). But it does not make sense to apply that theory where, as here, the plaintiffs seek money damages from a state official, sued in her individual capacity, in a context where processing of warrantless arrestees involved a mix of officials both state (e.g., Central Booking officers) and local (e.g., BPD officers). The plaintiffs' characterization of Ms. Murphy as Central Booking's custodian would evade the applicable standard of deliberate indifference. The "final policymaker" theory fails for similar reasons: though it fits within a municipal liability theory, its application here would turn supervisory liability into respondeat superior. And in any event, there is no evidence that a policy adopted by Ms. Murphy was responsible for Central Booking's overdetention issues. See Powell v. Sheriff, Fulton Cnty. Ga., 511 F. App'x 957, 962-63 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference to their overdetention because delays arose from "various factors outside [the sheriff's] control," not "any custom or policy" the sheriff had adopted),
In the alternative, Ms. Murphy also argues that she is protected by qualified immunity. At the summary judgment stage, qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff offers evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was `clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). "A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, `[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every `reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. at 2083 (citation omitted). "In the end, the lodestar for whether a right was clearly established is whether the law `gave the officials "fair warning" that their conduct was unconstitutional.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Ms. Murphy argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because, among other reasons, a reasonable official in her position would not have believed she was authorized to act unilaterally to release arrestees who had not been timely presented to a court commissioner. The plaintiffs' failure to address this argument suggests they have abandoned arguments to the contrary. See Mentch v. E. Sav. Bank, FSB, 949 F.Supp. 1236, 1247 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that failure to address the defendant's arguments for summary judgment in an opposition brief constituted abandonment of the claim). Regardless, however, Ms. Murphy is correct that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Even assuming that Ms. Murphy's conduct was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs have cited no authority from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, or the Court of Appeals of Maryland clearly establishing that a warden in Ms. Murphy's position would violate an arrestee's constitutional rights by not taking the remedial actions the plaintiffs suggest could have alleviated Central Booking's overdetention problem. "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). The issues facing Central Booking — with its mix of state and local agencies, several of which were responsible for delays in presentment of warrantless arrestees — constituted a gray area, and Ms. Murphy's failure to unilaterally release overdetained individuals or seek judicial permission to prolong their detention crossed no bright lines. She thus had no "fair warning" that her conduct was unconstitutional, and is entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the court will grant Ms. Murphy's motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to alter class periods will be granted to the extent it seeks to limit the overdetention class to Ms. Murphy's tenure as warden, and denied as moot in all other respects. Ms. Murphy's motion for summary judgment will be granted. The following motions will be denied as moot: the plaintiffs' motion for relief concerning the court's April 15, 2010 order, the plaintiffs' motion to strike a late document, the plaintiffs' motion to depose Glenn Marrow, and the plaintiffs' emergency motion to withdraw their combined opposition.
A separate order follows.