ORDER

(ECF No. 33)

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.

Defendant, County of Sacramento, brings this motion seeking to compel plaintiff to provide an authorization for court records, answers to requests for admission, and answers to interrogatories. (ECF No. 33.) Having considered the parties' joint statement, arguments at the hearing on this matter, and the relevant law, the court GRANTS defendant's motion, but with the clarifications and modifications mentioned below.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying dispute concerns plaintiff being prevented from purchasing a firearm in 2017 due to her being committed to a mental health institution in 2000. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 17.) A central issue in plaintiff's complaint, and most of the disputed discovery, is whether plaintiff was committed voluntarily or involuntarily. Plaintiff also alleges that while she was admitted to a mental health institution, she never received the procedural safeguards—notice and a certification review hearing—while at the institution. Plaintiff asserts this failure amounted to a deprivation of due process and her institutionalization, therefore cannot be a used as a predicate to deprive her of her Second Amendment Rights.

Plaintiff filed the present suit on October 17, 2018. After the court granted several state defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27), the action proceeded solely against defendant Sacramento County. Defendant now seeks to compel several discovery responses related to plaintiff's mental health, her providers, and her allegations. (See ECF Nos. 33, 34.)

II. RELEVANT STATUTORY SCHEME AND LEGAL STANDARD

The California Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, California Welfare & Institution Code §§ 5000 et seq., established a statutory scheme providing for the involuntary civil commitment of individuals with mental health disorders. See id. § 5001. Section 5150 provides for a person, upon a finding of probable cause, to be placed in an involuntary seventy-two-hour hold in a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment when that person is determined to be a danger to herself or others, or is gravely disabled, due to a mental health disorder. Id. § 5150. Under section 5250(a), a person detained for seventy-two hours under Section 5150 may be detained for up to fourteen additional days if the staff of the facility evaluates the person's condition and finds the person "is, as a result of a mental disorder . . ., a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled." Section 5150(i)(1) requires the treating facility to notify the committed person of the right to an attorney and a hearing before a judge if the facility decides to hold the committed person longer than seventy-two hours.

California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 8103(g)(1) bars a person certified for intensive treatment under Section 5250 from owning, possessing, controlling, receiving or purchasing, or attempting to own, possess, control, receive or purchase, any firearm for five years after the person's release from a mental health facility. A person committed under Section 5250, however, may request a hearing to lift the prohibition, and may own, possess, control, receive, or purchase any firearm if a court finds the State of California has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner. Id. § 8103(g)(1), (4). Although Section 8103 on its face provides for only a five-year firearm prohibition on persons subject to a Section 5250 hold, it creates in effect a lifetime firearm prohibition under federal law because of Section 5250's procedural safeguards and DOJ reporting requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (imposing a lifetime firearm ban on any person "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective" or "committed to a mental institution").1 California law directs the State Department of Hospitals to make records of Section 5250 determinations available to the DOJ. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8104.

Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). Such "motion may be made if . . . (iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). An "evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). "District courts have `broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.'" Hunt v. Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT RECORDS

Defendant first argues that plaintiff should be compelled to sign an authorization permitting defendant to obtain potential court records regarding plaintiff's September 2000 treatment. Plaintiff responds that the authorization defendant provided would require her to admit that there was in fact a court hearing on her mental competency in September 2000, an issue she vehemently disputes in this litigation. While the court is skeptical that plaintiff signing defendant's authorization would be equivalent to a judicial admission, defendant is instructed to modify paragraph three of the authorization defendant provided plaintiff to include the bolded language: "While it is my understanding that the Sacramento County Superior Court files for one or more Sacramento County Superior Court proceedings involving me, if any, in or around the year 2000 may have been purged. . . ."

The court finds that the documents that would potentially be released from this authorization are relevant and discoverable, and therefore orders plaintiff to sign and notarize the authorization plaintiff previously received from defendant, as modified above, by February 21, 2020.

Additionally, as discussed at the hearing on this matter, plaintiff is to submit a records request to the Family Relations Courthouse defendant names in the parties' joint statement, with the authorization mentioned above. The parties are also instructed to go to the courthouse together and retrieve the records if necessary.

Plaintiff takes issue with the term "memory problems" in request 13. At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff agreed to admit that her doctor stated she was dealing with a memory problem. Accordingly, plaintiff is instructed to respond to this request with that stipulation. Regarding requests 10, 11, and 12, plaintiff is ordered to respond within the time allowed below.

Plaintiff agrees to respond with the provision of including Section 5250 "et seq." Plaintiff is to respond to these requests with that clarification within the time allowed below.

Plaintiff's rationale of protecting third-parties' privacy rights is directly contradicted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which requires initial disclosure of "the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information." Fed R. Civ. P 26(a)(1)(A)(i). The generic information outlined in Rule 26 is all that defendant is requesting in the present case. Additionally, cases involving third-party privacy rights generally deal with much more intimate information. See Lakes v. Bath & Body Works LLC, No. 2:16-CV-2989 MCE GGH, 2018 WL 1071335, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018) (requiring a protective order before personal information such as Social Security number, medical records, financial records are disclosed); see also Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164, 167 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (production of medical records and workers' compensation files under protective order adequately safeguarded privacy concerns). The concern of disclosing intimate personal information is not present with these interrogatories.

Plaintiff's argument that these requests are irrelevant is unavailing. Plaintiff's claim is, at least in part, premised on her mental health treatment being voluntary, not involuntary. These interrogatories are sufficiently tailored to seek information germane to that inquiry. Accordingly, plaintiff is ordered to respond to these interrogatories within the time allowed below.

3. Interrogatories 14 and 15

Plaintiff is ordered to respond to these interrogatories. If plaintiff believes that her prior response has effectively responded to these interrogatories, she is free to assert the same.

4. Interrogatories 16 and 17

The parties informed the court that they have reached an agreement regarding these interrogatories, and therefore the court does not address them here.

As discussed in section III(C)(1) above, this information is relevant to plaintiff's claim, and is therefore discoverable. Plaintiff is ordered to respond to this interrogatory within the time allowed below.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is HEREBEY ORDERED that defendant's motion to compel is GRANTED with the conditions and clarifications mentioned above. Consistent with this order, plaintiff shall respond to defendant's request for admissions, interrogatories, and provide defendant a signed and notarized authorization by February 21, 2020. The parties are additionally ordered to jointly seek plaintiff's records, via the authorization, as outlined above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.