STIPULATION AND [] ORDER

D. LOWELL JENSEN, District Judge.

WHEREAS, the parties were scheduled for a status hearing before this Court on May 23, 2013, which was then continued by the Court to May 30, 2013;

WHEREAS, defense counsel is continuing to review documents and data in connection with evaluating and analyzing this matter and government is in the process of responding to additional discovery issues raised by the defendant and have discussions regarding a resolution of this matter short of trial;

WHEREAS, in light of the foregoing, counsel for the parties jointly agree and stipulate that a continuance of this matter is appropriate in order to ensure effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), and that based on their respective calendars and the period needed for the aforementioned discovery matters, an appropriate date for a status hearing is Thursday, August 1, 2013;

THEREFORE, the parties mutually and jointly stipulate that the matter be continued until May 23, 2013, and further jointly stipulate and agree that time should be excluded from May 23, 2013, up to and including August 1, 2013. The parties agree that excluding time until August 1, 2013, is necessary, given the need to maintain continuity of counsel. The parties also agree that failing to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defense the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and continuity of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). Finally, the parties agree that the ends of justice served by excluding time from May 23, 2013, until August 1, 2013, outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. § 3161(h)(7).

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

For good cause shown, the Court enters this order excluding time from May 23, 2013, up to and including August 1, 2013. Specifically, the parties agree, and the Court finds and holds that such that time should be excluded until August 1, 2013, and furthermore that failing to grant a continuance and exclude time until August 1, 2013, would unreasonably deny the defendant effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

Finally, the parties agree, and the Court finds and holds, that the ends of justice served by excluding time from May 23, 2013, through August 1, 2013, outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. § 3161(h)(7).

IT IS SO ORDERED.