MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Donna Crawford filed this action on August 21, 2014. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 10.) On March 25, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS") that addressed the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under submission without oral argument.

Having reviewed the entire file, the court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.

On July 26, 2011, Crawford filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging an onset date of April 26, 2011. Administrative Record ("AR") 10, 186-95. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 10, 77-78, 99-100. Crawford requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). AR 125-26. On October 30, 2012, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Crawford and a vocational expert testified. AR 25-58. On December 14, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. AR 10-20. On June 26, 2014, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. AR 1-4. This action followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court reviews the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

"Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance — it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523. In determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision, the court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner's decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Disability

A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003).

B. The ALJ's Findings

Following the five-step sequential analysis applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),1 the ALJ found that Crawford has the severe impairments of angina without ischemic heart disease, heart disease, asthma, obesity, depression, anxiety, a remote history of pulmonary embolism in 1999, and hypertension. AR 12-13. Crawford has the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except she can rarely climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds; can have occasional exposure to extreme cold and environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts and gases; can have occasional exposure to poorly ventilated areas; and can have no exposure to unprotected heights. AR 14. She is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks performed in a work environment free of fast paced production requirements involving only simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes with superficial and no direct interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with coworkers. AR 14-15. She is unable to perform any past relevant work, but there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform such as office helper, small parts assembler and mail clerk. AR 18-19.

C. Treating Physician

Crawford contends the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of Dr. Kim, a treating physician.

An opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than the opinion of non-treating physicians. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). To reject an uncontradicted opinion of a medically acceptable treating source, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). When a treating physician's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, "the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (citations and quotation marks omitted). "When there is conflicting medical evidence, the Secretary must determine credibility and resolve the conflict." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002).

The record contains a one-page letter dated December 14, 2011, from Dr. Kim of Riverside County Mental Health. AR 17, 410. In its entirety, the letter states:

AR 410. The record also contains treatment records from Dr. Kim and mental health providers at Riverside County Mental Health and other facilities. AR 17, 307-16, 320-46, 417-41, 504-17.

Crawford argues that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Kim's opinion. The ALJ found Dr. Kim's letter to have "little probative value." AR 17. Dr. Kim did not provide a description of Crawford's functional limitations in the letter. The criteria under GAIN is not binding or relevant to whether Crawford is disabled under the Social Security Act. The ALJ noted that the treating records refer to Crawford's functioning up to about September 2012, and reflect the opinion that Crawford was unable to maintain a sustained level of concentration, sustain repetitive tasks for an extended period, adapt to new or stressful situations, or interact appropriately with co-workers or supervisors. AR 17, 418, 516. The records also reflect the opinion that Crawford cannot complete a 40-hour work week without decompensating. AR 418. The ALJ found the functional assessments unsupported by clinical examinations. AR 17. The mental status examination on October 18, 2011 indicated Crawford had a neutral mood, a full range in affect, normal thought processes, no abnormalities in thought or perception, normal cognition, and normal judgment and insight. AR 17, 420. The ALJ noted similar findings at a January 24, 2012 mental status examination. AR 17, 428-29. Even during exacerbation of symptoms, Crawford was assessed with a moderate level of impairment. AR 18, 341, 358. The ALJ therefore gave the opinions in the Riverside County Mental Health records "partial weight."2 AR 17.

The ALJ may properly discount a treating physician's opinion that is not supported by treatment records. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (ALJ need not accept treating physician's opinion that is inadequately supported by clinical findings); Valentine v. Comm'r, 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (inconsistency between treating physician's opinion and his treatment notes constitutes specific and legitimate reason for rejecting treating physician's opinion). Crawford argues that other medical evidence in the record supports Dr. Kim's opinions. For example, a May 2011 treatment note from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health indicates she had soft and slow speech, impaired intellectual functioning, impaired immediate and recent memory, below average fund of knowledge, dysphoric mood, blunted affect, loose associations, thought blocking concentration, excessive and inappropriate guilt, and poor impulse control. AR 310. A May 2011 complex medication support service note indicates she was diagnosed with major depression and given a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 50.3 AR 312. However, in August 2011, Crawford was found to have clear speech and neutral mood, appropriate affect, goal-directed thought process, no suicidal or homicidal ideas, no delusions, good attention and concentration, and good memory, judgment, insight, and impulse control. AR 332-33. The ALJ could have reasonably concluded that the clinical findings did not support Dr. Kim's opinion.4 It is the ALJ's province to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner's decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523.

The ALJ properly found that a finding of disability under the GAIN5 program is not binding. A treating physician's opinion as to the ultimate determination of disability is not binding on an ALJ. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). The existence of disability "is an administrative determination of how an impairment, in relation to education, age, technological, economic, and social factors, affects ability to engage in gainful activity" and is reserved to the Commissioner. Id. Crawford does not argue that the test for excusal from the GAIN program is the same as the test for disability under the Social Security Act. Dr. Kim's opinion that Crawford needs to be excused from the GAIN program is not binding on the question of whether Crawford is disabled under the Social Security Act.

Crawford argues that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. Kim to obtain clarification. Rejection of a treating physician's opinion does not by itself trigger a duty to contact the physician for further explanation. McLeod, 640 F.3d at 885. The ALJ made no finding that the evidence was ambiguous or that the record was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) ("An ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence."). Moreover, the ALJ kept the record open for two weeks to allow Crawford and her counsel to submit additional evidence, which they did. AR 10, 57, 517; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ satisfies duty to develop record by continuing the hearing or keeping the record open to allow supplementation). Therefore, the ALJ did not have a duty to contact Dr. Kim.

Crawford argues that the ALJ did not order a psychological consultative examination. The ALJ "has broad latitude in ordering a consultative examination." Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The government is not required to bear the expense of an examination for every claimant." Id. A consultative examination may be ordered "[i]f we cannot get the information we need from your medical sources." 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a(a)-(b) (providing examples of circumstances under which ALJ may order consultative examination). Crawford has not shown that the record was inadequate to permit a full and proper evaluation of her mental impairment. AR 16-18.

The ALJ articulated specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for discounting Dr. Kim's opinion. The ALJ did not err.

IV.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on all parties or their counsel.