STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant by and through his counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 22, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Alejandro Ortiz-Salas, now moves to continue the status conference until January 29, 2016 and to exclude time between January 22, 2016 and January 29, 2016 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with discovery associated with this case, which includes law enforcement reports and audio recordings.

b. Counsels for the defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, to review the current charges, to finish the investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients. Mr. Ortiz-Salas has been moved to Colusa County and needs an interpreter. A new offer has been extended, and counsel needs time to review the offer with the client with the interpreter.

c. Based on the foregoing, defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on January 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from January 22, 2016 through and including the January 29, 2016 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to January 29, 2016 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 22, 2016 to January 29, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.