Filed: Jun. 17, 2016
Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant's herein, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulates as follows: By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 23, 2016. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 18, 2016 and to exclude time between June 23, 2016, and August 18, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant's herein, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulates as follows: By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 23, 2016. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 18, 2016 and to exclude time between June 23, 2016, and August 18, 2016 ..
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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant's herein, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulates as follows:
By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 23, 2016.
By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 18, 2016 and to exclude time between June 23, 2016, and August 18, 2016 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review documents and to consult with their clients in efforts to resolve this case.
The government does not object to the continuance.
Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 23, 2016 to August 18, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
