Filed: Mar. 20, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 20, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 22, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference to June 7, 2018, and to exclude time between March 22, 2018 and June 7, 2018 under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) Discovery associated wit
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 22, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference to June 7, 2018, and to exclude time between March 22, 2018 and June 7, 2018 under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) Discovery associated with..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 22, 2018.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference to June 7, 2018, and to exclude time between March 22, 2018 and June 7, 2018 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Discovery associated with this case includes 146 pages and multiple CD/DVDs, some of which include lengthy surveillance, video and audio. This discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Defense counsel desires additional time to review discovery, investigate, and to confer with his client concerning discovery, investigation, potential options for the defense and trial preparation.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 22, 2018 to June 7, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
