ORDER

KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.

On August 22, 2012, defendant-petitioner Jose Serrano-Villalobos pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement to five charges: Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1)); Count 2 (distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); Count 4 (possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); Count 5 (possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); and Count 6 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1)). ECF Nos. 18, 82.

The court held a sentencing hearing on December 5, 2012. ECF No. 97 (minutes). After applying a two-level increase for firearm possession under the sentencing guidelines, the court sentenced petitioner to 150 months in prison. Id.; see also ECF No. 205 at 3 (explaining sentence in order denying motion for reduction of sentence: "Defendant received a two-level increase for possession of a firearm.").

Petitioner now moves to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), rendered the two-level enhancement unconstitutional. Mot., ECF No. 207. For reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED.

I. DISCUSSION

Johnson held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which subjected individuals to a minimum 15 year sentence for three or more prior convictions for a "violent felony," was unconstitutionally vague and violated due process. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-60. The "residual clause" defined "violent felony" to include a felony that "involves conduct that presents a serious potential physical risk of physical injury to another." See id. The Supreme Court has made Johnson retroactively applicable. Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).

Here, the court applied the two-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and not the ACCA. See ECF No. 205 at 3 (applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)). Although the Ninth Circuit has not resolved the question, district courts have agreed Johnson does not affect the two-level enhancement for the offense characteristic of possessing a firearm provided for by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). See Barajas v. United States, No. 13-0026, 2016 WL 4721481, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2016) (rejecting claim that Johnson invalidates a two-level enhancement under Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm); Rubino-Zamora v. United States, No. 11-223, 2016 WL 4505750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016) (same; reviewing cases); United States v. Johnson, No. 15-006, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64137, *7-8 (D. Mont. May 16, 2016) (finding Johnson had nothing to do with the case when, inter alia, Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) was applied in calculating a sentence).

Moreover, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) does not contain a residual clause that raises questions about unconstitutional vagueness; instead, the guidelines provision clearly lays out an offense characteristic that triggers eligibility for the two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, in the context of calculating the guidelines range for offenses involving drugs as applicable here. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) ("If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels."). Here, the facts do not warrant relief; petitioner pled guilty to drug-related charges, he agreed with the factual information contained in his presentence report, and his sentence was increased due to his undisputed possession of a firearm in execution of the conduct underlying the drug-related charges to which he pled. See ECF Nos. 99 (sentencing memo), 97 & 206 at 8, 10-1, 12-13 (sealed presentence investigation report).

There are no grounds to reduce petitioner's sentence here.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's motion is DENIED.

This order resolves ECF No. 207.

IT IS SO ORDERED.