HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR., United States District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Dropbox, Inc.'s motion to dismiss. Defendant argues that United States Patent Nos. 6,671,757 ("the '757 Patent"), 7,587,446 ("the '446 Patent") and 6,757,696 ("the '696 Patent") are invalid because their claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. As a result, Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff Synchronoss Technologies, Inc.'s complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons explained below, the Court
Plaintiff filed this action on March 27, 2015 in the Northern District of New Jersey, alleging infringement of the '757, '446, and '696 Patents. Dkt. No. 1. On December 30, 2015, Defendant's motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California was granted. Dkt. Nos. 24, 35. On March 10, 2016, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 81.
The '757 Patent is titled "Data Transfer and Synchronization." '757 Patent. The specification describes a system and method for "efficiently, quickly, and easily synchronizing devices which can couple to the Internet, or any network." See '757 Patent at 3:23-25.
Independent claim 1 describes:
Id. at 46:57-47:7.
Fourteen claims depend from Claim 1 and add further limitations such as: (1) where the "first system and second system are coupled to the server via a private network," Claim 2; (2) where the apparatus of Claim 1 includes a "management server coupled to the network and in communication with the first sync engine, the second sync engine and the data store," Claim 8; and (3) where the "data on said first system comprises application data having a plurality of application specific formats, and said difference information is provided for each of said formats in a universal format to said data store," Claim 14. See id. at 47:8-54.
Additionally, the '757 Patent contains two other independent claims, Claims 16 and 24, which include similar limitations to Claim 1. Claim 16 describes:
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Id. at 48:1-24. Claim 16 has six dependent claims. See id. at 48:25-50.
Claim 24 describes:
The '446 Patent incorporates the '757 Patent in its entirety, and is titled "Acquisition and Synchronization of Digital Media to a Personal Information Space." The invention "comprises a method for acquiring and maintaining a digital music store in personal information space, comprising: maintaining a personal information space identified with a user including data capable of being used on a client device, and transferring at least a portion of the data from the personal information space to an Internet-coupled device in response to a user request." '446 Patent at 3:45-51.
'466 Patent at 13:46-14:2. There are nine dependent claims that add narrowing limitations such as (1) "including the step, prior to step (a), of receiving information into the personal information space," Claim 2; (2) using an automotive computer as the network coupled apparatus, Claim 4; and (3) including a directory of digital media files to comprise the media date, Claim 6. See id. at 14:3-34.
Additionally, Claim 11 is independent and describes:
Id. at 14:35-57. Claim 11 has three dependent claims. See id. at 14:58-64.
The '696 Patent is titled "Management Server for Synchronization System." '696 Patent. The specification describes an invention that "includes a system and method for transferring data between two devices which require information to be shared between them." Id. at 4:25-27. Independent claim 1 provides:
Id. at 45:11-18. Seven claims depend from Claim 1. See id. at 45:19-48.
Section 101 of the Patent Act describes the scope of patentable subject matter as encompassing "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101. It is well settled that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from the universe of patentable subject matter. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014). These categories are not patent-eligible because "they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work," which are "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012) (citations omitted). Allowing patent claims for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas would "tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws." Id. at 1293. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized the need to "tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle, lest it swallow all of patent law." Alice Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2354.
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have articulated a two-part test for determining whether a claim's subject matter is patent-eligible. First, a court "determine[s] whether a claim is `directed to' a patent-ineligible abstract idea." Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1296-97). If so, the Court then "consider[s] the elements of the claim — both individually and as an ordered combination — to assess whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea." Id. at 1347. "This is the search for an `inventive concept' — something sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to `significantly more' than the abstract idea itself." Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1294).
The issue of invalidity under Section 101 presents a question of law. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit has "repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent eligibility under 35
Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit elaborated on the application of the Mayo/Alice standard in two cases involving claimed improvements to computer-related technology. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Enfish held that it is "relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement in computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first step of the Alice analysis." 822 F.3d at 1335. "[T]he `directed to' inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether `their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.'" Id. at 1335 (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Enfish teaches that claims are not directed to an abstract idea if their "plain focus ... is on an improvement to computer functionality" or computer capabilities. Id. at 1336.
Published less than a week after Enfish, TLI emphasizes that claims are drawn to an abstract idea if they are directed to "the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by combining the two." 823 F.3d at 612. Thus, claims that describe "a new telephone, a new server, or a new physical combination of the two" are not abstract, but claims that describe a system and methods in "purely functional terms" without "any technical details for the tangible components" are abstract. Id.
Following the decisions in Enfish and TLI, the Federal Circuit has characterized the key inquiry as requiring a court to "look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (U.S.) Inc., 664 Fed.Appx. 968, 970-71, 2016 WL 6775967, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2016) ("For claims solely implemented on a computer, we have previously found it `relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea.'" (quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335)). In performing this analysis, the court "must focus on the language of the asserted claims themselves," and "complex details from the specification cannot save a claim directed to an abstract idea that recites generic computer parts." Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Post-Enfish/TLI, the Federal Circuit has applied the Mayo/Alice framework in a number of cases involving § 101 challenges to computer or software patents. In McRO, 837 F.3d at 1311-16, the court found that the challenged patent was not directed to an abstract idea and thus denied the motion to dismiss at Step One of
This Court agrees with those judges who have observed that even post-Enfish, the Mayo/Alice test provides limited practical guidance for distinguishing software and computer patents that are valid under § 101 from those that are not. See Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1294 ("[A] search for a single test or definition [of what an `abstract idea' encompasses] in the decided cases concerning § 101 from this court, and indeed from the Supreme Court, reveals that at present there is no such single, succinct, usable definition or test."); Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 838 F.3d at 1329 (describing the "semantic gymnastics" entailed in applying the Mayo/Alice test to software patents) (Mayer, J., concurring); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., 827 F.3d at 1352, 1354 ("I have come upon no guide to when a claim crosses the boundary between unacceptable abstractness and acceptable specificity.") (Newman, J., concurring); Device Enhancement LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 189 F.Supp.3d 392, 400 (D. Del. 2016) (discussing the "still difficult-to-discern requirements of the Alice analysis," and the resulting "difficult exercise" under § 101). Instead, the Court is directed "to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen — what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1294. While the Court is of the view that a more concrete standard for identifying abstract ideas would improve predictability and enable more efficient use of judicial and party resources, it will do its best to apply the current guidance.
The Court finds that Enfish compels the conclusion that the challenged claims, viewed in light of their respective specifications, are not directed to an abstract idea, and thus cover patentable subject matter. The claims, like those in Enfish and McRO, are directed on their face to an improvement to computer functionality: a more-efficient mechanism for synchronizing data between systems connected to a network by updating only changed data (or "difference information"), rather than recopying all information. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339 (structure recited in claims was "a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory"); McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313 (claims were "limited to rules with specific characteristics," and focused on "a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type"). By contrast, the BASCOM court identified patent-ineligible claims as those which "claim an abstract idea implemented on generic computer components, without providing a specific technical solution beyond simply using generic computer concepts in a conventional way." 827 F.3d at
The specifications bolster this conclusion. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 ("Moreover, our conclusion that the claims are directed to an improvement of an existing technology is bolstered by the specification's teachings that the claimed invention achieves other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements."). As the specifications explain, the claims are directed to improving the manner in which computers synchronize data between devices connected to a network, by making that process faster, reducing the amount of bandwidth and storage space used, enabling synchronization across different data formats, and enabling synchronization without requiring devices to be physically connected. For example, the specifications explain that:
The express focus in the claims on improvements to the process of data synchronization on devices connected to computer networks distinguishes them from post-Enfish software and computer-related claims found by the Federal Circuit to be directed to abstract ideas. Cf. TLI, 823 F.3d at 612 (claims were "not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality"); Tranxition, 664 Fed.Appx. at 971-72, 2016 WL 6775967, at *3 (claim was not directed to an improvement in computer functionality: "There is nothing in the claim to suggest that, once settings have been transitioned, the target computer will be any more efficient"); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095 (claims were "not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate": "[w]hile the claimed system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself"); Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1150 (on their face and under district court's unchallenged constructions, claims did not involve the use of a computer in any way, and thus "cannot be characterized as an improvement in computer technology"); Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 1315 (steps of asserted claims did not improve the functioning of the computer itself, and patent contained no "specific or limiting recitation of improved computer technology").
Whether the challenged claims satisfy the various requirements for patentability (for example, nonobviousness) is a question for another day. But the Court reads Enfish and the Federal Circuit cases applying it to require denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is