GONZALO P. CURIEL, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Ametek, Inc.'s motion to strike portions of the Plaintiffs' operative complaint. (ECF No. 184.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
On April 12, 2018, the Court granted in part Ametek's motion for summary judgment after concluding that Plaintiffs could not obtain the damages they request in this case. (ECF No. 180.) The Court noted that declaratory and/or injunctive relief may be available in this case, and therefore it permitted Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that adds requests for declaratory and/or injunctive relief. (Id. at 36-37.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that, upon a motion, "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." "The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)).
First, Ametek moves to strike Plaintiffs' jury trial demand. (ECF No. 184-1 at 6-9.) In their response, Plaintiffs indicate that they "do not oppose Ametek's motion to strike the jury demand." (ECF No. 192 at 3.) The jury trial demand is therefore stricken from the SAC.
Ametek asks the Court to strike the causes of action in the SAC that the Court previously dismissed in its November 18, 2015 ruling. (See ECF No. 34.) Again, Plaintiffs "do not oppose striking the previously dismissed causes of action at this juncture." (ECF No. 192 at 3.) Plaintiffs' claims that have been previously dismissed are hereby stricken from the SAC.
In its summary judgment ruling, the Court explained that the envisioned declaratory judgment in this case would find Ametek liable for the contamination on Plaintiffs' properties. (See ECF No. 180 at 33.) In response, Plaintiffs added to their complaint a request for a declaration from the Court stating that (1) "Ametek is responsible for the contamination that exists on Plaintiffs' properties," (2) "Ametek is liable to Plaintiffs for the contamination that exists on Plaintiffs' properties," and (3) "Ametek is responsible for reimbursing Plaintiffs for the full amount of any and all past, present and future costs that Plaintiffs have incurred or will incur to remediate and/or mitigate the contamination that Ametek has caused to exist on Plaintiffs' properties." (FAC at 37, 39.) Ametek moves to strike the third prong of Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief because it "goes beyond the scope of the Court's order on the [motion for summary judgment] and raises subject matter jurisdiction concerns." (ECF No. 184-1 at 10.) The Court agrees on the first ground, and therefore need not address the second ground.
In its summary judgment ruling, the Court explained that a declaratory judgment in this case would simply find "Ametek liable for the contamination of Plaintiffs' property," and explained that Plaintiffs could "use that judgment to bring successive actions against Ametek for recoupment of costs Plaintiffs incur as they remediate their own properties." (ECF No. 180 at 33.) The Court permitted Plaintiffs to amend their complaint only so as to add a request for such a declaratory judgment. The first two prongs of the request for declaratory relief—which seek a declaration that Ametek is "responsible for" the contamination and "liable to" Plaintiffs as a result—satisfy the amendment that was permitted by the Court. To the extent that the third prong goes beyond that permission, such amendment was not permitted and should be stricken. See, e.g., Hiramanek v. Clark, No. C-13-0228 EMC, 2013 WL 4734025, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013). To the extent that the third prong repeats what is requested in the first two prongs, the third prong is "redundant." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). As a result, the Court finds it appropriate to strike the third prong of Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief.
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike. In light of the Court's striking Plaintiffs' jury trial demand, the trial set for August 6, 2018, will be a bench trial.
The Court's earlier scheduling order (ECF No. 189) is VACATED. On or before
The parties shall also email a copy of these documents in Word format to efile_curiel@casd.uscourts.gov.