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BARRCENA v. KING, CV 14-535-PJW. (2014)

Court: District Court, C.D. California Number: infdco20140709754 Visitors: 8
Filed: Jul. 08, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2014
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY PATRICK J. WALSH, Magistrate Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner filed this Habeas Corpus Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that he is being detained in state custody in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing that Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and that the Court should abstain from intervening in a pending state proceeding. For
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

PATRICK J. WALSH, Magistrate Judge.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner filed this Habeas Corpus Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that he is being detained in state custody in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing that Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and that the Court should abstain from intervening in a pending state proceeding. For the following reasons, the motion is granted and the Petition is dismissed.1

II.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is a civil detainee currently confined at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predator law. He is awaiting a probable cause determination and jury trial on whether he should be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator ("SVP"). He claims that he is a Mexican citizen subject to deportation due to his conviction for an aggravated felony. He asks the Court to dismiss the pending SVP proceedings and require the federal government to either deport him or allow him to voluntarily return to Mexico.

A. Background

In 2005, Petitioner pled guilty in Los Angeles County Superior Court to felony child molestation and was sentenced to three years in prison. (Lodged Document No. 1.) In 2007, the Los Angeles County District Attorney initiated civil commitment proceedings alleging that Petitioner was an SVP. (Lodged Document No. 2.) In October 2007, the Superior Court determined that there was probable cause to detain him as an SVP. (Lodged Document No. 3.) The court denied Petitioner's request to have the civil commitment petition dismissed and be released to federal immigration authorities. (Lodged Document No. 3.) Petitioner did not appeal that decision or seek review in the California Supreme Court. (See Lodged Document Nos. 4-5.) He is currently in state custody awaiting a renewed probable cause determination and, subsequent to that, a trial to determine whether he should continue to be civilly committed as an SVP. (See Lodged Document No. 3.)

B. Federal Claims

In February 2014, Petitioner filed the instant First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). In it, he claims that he is subject to mandatory deportation to Mexico in light of the fact that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony (i.e., child molestation). (Petition at 1.) He argues that his continued detention pursuant to California's SVP laws violates his due process and equal protection rights as well as the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. (Petition at 2-4.) He also contends that the SVP law is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and was never meant to be applied to aliens subject to mandatory deportation. (Petition at 3.) As such, he requests that he be transferred to federal custody for deportation to Mexico or be released from custody so that he can voluntarily return to Mexico. (Petition at 5.)

III.

ANALYSIS

As a matter of comity between state and federal courts, a federal court will generally not address the merits of a habeas corpus petition unless a petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-22 (1982). Indeed, the Court is not empowered to grant a habeas petition unless the claims have been exhausted or there is no available state remedy. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) ("As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241."). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must present his claims to the highest court of the state and that court must dispose of them on the merits. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 844-45 (1999).

Petitioner acknowledges that he did not present his claims to the California Supreme Court. (Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 5.) Thus, they are unexhausted and the Petition is subject to dismissal on that ground. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Once a district court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire further as to the petitioner's intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust."). Nevertheless, he argues that he is not required to exhaust his claims because they involve a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Response at 5.) There is no merit to this argument.

Where a state court concludes that a petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted, a federal court can look past the state court's ruling and reach the merits if it finds that there is cause and prejudice for Petitioner's delay or a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the court did not address the merits. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). But that is not the case, here. Petitioner has never presented his claims to the California Supreme Court and, thus, his claims are not procedurally defaulted.2 Instead, they are unexhausted and subject to dismissal for that reason. See, e.g., Samuels v. King, 2014 WL 585452, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (dismissing on exhaustion ground deportable alien's claim that he was not subject to SVP laws).3

IV.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Petition is denied and the action is dismissed without prejudice. Further, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right or that the court erred in its procedural ruling, he is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. The parties have consented to having the magistrate judge resolve the merits of this case. (Doc. Nos. 7 and 11.)
2. Nor is it clear that the California Supreme Court would find Petitioner's unexhausted claims procedurally defaulted under state law. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989) (finding petitioner may meet the exhaustion requirement when it is clear that the claims are defaulted under state law).
3. In light of this ruling, the Court need not and does not address Respondent's contention that the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Further, the Court notes that, though Respondent also argued that the Petition should be dismissed because it was unverified, (Motion to Dismiss ("MTD") at 5), Petitioner subsequently verified the Petition. (Petitioner's Re-Submitted Proposed First Amended Petition.) Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss on this ground is denied as moot.
Source:  Leagle

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