M. HANNAH LAUCK, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on four motions:
The Court heard oral argument on the Markman Motion and the matter is ripe for disposition. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
On December 24, 2013, Columbia filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Symantec's Norton Antivirus software infringed on six patents
On February 27, 2014, the Court held a pretrial conference. On March 5, 2014, the Court issued a scheduling and pretrial order, which scheduled the Markman hearing
After that, both Columbia and Symantec timely filed their claim construction briefs with supporting documents. (ECF Nos. 106, 107.) The Parties each submitted their responses to the initial claim construction briefs. (ECF Nos. 109, 110.)
Approximately one week later, the Court held the Markman hearing. (ECF No. 121.) Following that hearing, the Court issued a Claim Construction Order (the "Claim Construction Order"), construing nine terms. (Claim Construction Order 1-2, ECF No. 123.) As to the 115 and 322 family of patents (still at issue in the litigation) the Court construed three terms: "anomalous," "emulator," and "application community."
Two days after the Court issued the Claim Construction Order, Columbia filed a Motion for Clarification of Claim Construction Order (the "Motion for Clarification"). (ECF No. 128.) In relevant part, Columbia asked that the Court clarify the meaning of the word "anomalous" as used in the 115 Patent and the 322 Patent.
Ten days later, based on the Court's 2014 Clarified Claim Construction Order, Columbia and Symantec jointly moved the Court to issue final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
Prior to entry of the Partial Final Judgment Order, neither Columbia nor Symantec asked the Court to define "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program." Symantec concedes that it knew of the Parties' dispute as to the proper definition of this term prior to the entry of the Partial Final Judgment Order, but claims that because the Partial Final Judgment Order seemingly ended the case in Symantec's favor, it would have been "ludicrous" for it to raise the issue in the days leading up to Court's entry of the Partial Final Judgment Order. (Reply 12, ECF No. 222.)
Approximately one week later, having seemingly lost its case in this Court, Columbia filed its Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit and appealed the Court's November 4, 2014 Partial Final Judgment Order, (ECF No. 150), the Court's original Claim Construction Order, (ECF No. 123), and the Court's 2014 Clarified Claim Construction Order, (ECF No. 146). (Notice Appeal 1, ECF No. 152.) In a 2016 opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part, the Court's grant of final judgment and claim construction orders. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1371. Specifically, the Federal Circuit upheld the judgment of non-infringement as to the 544, 907, 084, and 306 patents. Id. at 1366-67, 1369. With regard to the 115 and 322 patents, the Federal Circuit "reversed the district court's construction of `anomalous,'" and the Court's stipulated judgment as to the 115 and 322 patents. The Federal Circuit then remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 1370-71.
This part of the appellate process left only Columbia's causes of action as to the 115 and 322 patents pending in this district court. Columbia's seventh through eleventh claims for relief that concern Symantec's 643 Patent, stayed by the Court in 2014, also remain pending before the Court.
On December 5, 2014, after the Court issued its Partial Final Judgment Order and while the Federal Circuit considered Columbia's appeal from that order, Symantec, who prevailed below, filed petitions with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") requesting, in relevant part, inter partes review of the 115 and 322 patents at issue in the litigation. (Notice Pets. Inter Partes Review 1, ECF No. 158.) Thus, two avenues of additional proceedings—one started by each party—commenced in parallel actions at approximately the same time. The Federal Circuit's inter partes review decision, however, took two years longer than its order discussing this Court's 2014 Claim Construction Orders. Compare Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016), with Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 714 Fed. App'x 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
On July 1, 2015, PTAB construed the terms in the patent claims pursuant to their "broadest reasonable construction"
On August 5, 2016, Columbia and Symantec jointly requested a one-year stay in the case pending before this Court to allow the Parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit the PTAB's inter partes review decisions concerning the 115 and 322 patents. (ECF No. 167.) On appeal, in an assessment separate from its 2016 decision regarding this Court's Claim Construction Orders, the Federal Circuit, in 2018, affirmed PTAB's decisions as to the validity of the patent claims in the 115 and 322 patents in all respects. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 714 F. App'x 1021, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Following both the appeal from this Court's prior orders and the appeal from the PTAB's inter partes review decisions, only three patents remain at issue: the 115 Patent, the 322 Patent, and the 643 Patent.
After the issuance of the Federal Circuit's 2018 mandate regarding the PTAB's inter partes review of the 115 and 322 patents, Columbia filed an unopposed Motion to Reopen Proceedings (the "Motion to Reopen"), (ECF No. 179), which the Court granted, (ECF No. 181). On October 4, 2018, both Parties attended a pretrial conference. Following that pretrial conference, Symantec filed the Markman Motion. Columbia responded in opposition, and Symantec replied.
The interpretation of words in a patent claim generally presents a question of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury. See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The Federal Circuit has concluded that "[w]hen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court's duty to resolve it." O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. This general rule does not, however, override a district court's ability to exercise its case-management authority. Rather, the Federal Circuit "generally support[s] a district court's case-management authority to set a schedule for claim construction that requires parties to take positions [by] various dates and holds the parties to these positions." Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit has affirmed the district court's refusal to allow a party to engage in claim construction arguments following the close of claim construction proceedings.
Relatedly, the Federal Circuit has recognized that a district court need not construe every word in a patent. See GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recognizing that to require the district court to construe all terms "could proceed ad infinitum, as every word—whether a claim term itself, or the words a court uses to construe a claim term—is susceptible to further definition, elucidation, and explanation." (quoting Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016))); O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360 (recognizing that "a district court is not obligated to construe terms with ordinary meanings, lest trial courts be inundated with requests to parse the meaning of every word in the asserted claims").
Mindful of the principles of claim construction, the Court turns to address the question before it: whether the Court need hold an additional Markman hearing. In the Markman Motion, Symantec requests that the Court allow an additional Markman hearing to determine the proper definition of "anomalous" and the phrase "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program." Because the Federal Circuit vacated this Court's decision as to the 115 Patent and 322 Patent and did not provide a crystal clear mandate
"Anomalous," a term appearing in all remaining claims in this case, constitutes a critical disputed term, the construction of which will likely have a drastic impact on the outcome of this litigation.
In the Court's initial Claim Construction Order, the Court defined "anomalous" in the 115 Patent and the 322 Patent as meaning "[d]eviation/deviating from a model of typical, attack-free computer system usage." (Claim Construction Order 2.) In its Clarified Claim Construction Order, the Court looked to claim 1 of the 084 Patent for guidance and concluded that the model to which anomalous referred "is generated with only attack-free data." (Clarified Claim Construction Order 2.) The Court then entered the Partial Final Judgment Order "to allow Columbia to take an immediate appeal of the Claim Construction Order and the Clarified Claim Construction Order. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Mot. 8, ECF No. 199.)
In considering the definition of "anomalous" the Federal Circuit noted that "there is no reason why the construction of claim terms in the []115 [Patent] and []322 [P]atent[] should be the same as the []084 [Patent]." Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1369. The Federal Circuit then looked to the language of the claims stating that "[t]he claims themselves show that the model can be built with both attack-free and attack data." Id. at 1370. The Federal Circuit also considered "[t]he prosecution histories of the []115 and []322 patents," concluding that they too "support Columbia's assertion that the model here can be built with attack-free and attack data." Id. The Federal Circuit "conclude[d] that the district court erred in limiting the term `anomalous' to mean that the model here must be built only using attack-free data." Id.
Although this analysis provides compelling guidance, the Federal Circuit stopped short of providing a legally binding definition of "anomalous" as using a model built on both attack-free and attack data. Specifically, the Federal Circuit's mandate to this Court stated: "we reverse the stipulated judgment of non-infringement of the asserted claims of the []115 and []322 patents because it was based on an incorrect claim construction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
While the Court sees that the Federal Circuit strongly suggested that the term "anomalous" includes a model built on both attack and attack-free data, it must find that the mandate does not expressly instruct this Court to use this definition. See id. at 1371. Given the importance of the term "anomalous" to these proceedings, as shown by the Parties' continued dispute concerning its proper meaning and its appearance "in all [r]emaining [c]laims in this case," (Reply 12), the Court declines to speculate as to the Federal Circuit's preferred construction of "anomalous" and instead interprets the Federal Circuit's mandate as merely vacating the Court's prior definition of "anomalous." Mindful of its duty to resolve a "fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term," O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362, the Court will allow the Parties to submit proper briefing as to the correct construction of "anomalous."
In addition to holding an additional Markman hearing to determine the proper scope of "anomalous," Symantec contends that the Court must allow it to raise arguments, for the first time, regarding the proper scope of the phrase "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program." (Markman Mot. 1.) Symantec asserts that the Court must construe this additional term because Symantec raised the dispute as soon as it was practicable to do so and it has not waived the argument by waiting to raise it until after appeal and after inter partes review. (Markman Mot. 7-11.) Columbia counters that Symantec waived this argument by failing to act diligently in raising it before the Court.
Although the Court has a duty to resolve "fundamental dispute[s] regarding the scope of a claim term," O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362, the Federal Circuit has upheld a district court's exercise of its case management authority to preclude a party from raising a claim construction argument after the deadline to do so has passed, see Wi-LAN USA, Inc., 830 F.3d at 1385. To that end, several courts
The procedural history of this case informs this outcome. Symantec asserts that it did not become aware of the dispute until Columbia "explained for the first time, its interpretation of this phrase in its opening expert report on October 17, 2014," over one month after the first Markman hearing. (Mem. Supp. Markman Mot 6-7.) Because Columbia reached out to Symantec days later about stipulating to final judgment of non-infringement so as to appeal the Court's claim construction rulings, Symantec maintains that it would have been "ludicrous" for Symantec to raise the dispute regarding the proper construction of "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program" at that time. (Reply 12.)
Symantec concedes that it knew of the dispute regarding this phrase prior to stipulating to final judgment. (See id.) Yet, Symantec agreed to stipulated final judgment to appeal the Court's Claim Construction Order and Clarified Claim Construction Order without raising this issue. Symantec did not even seek to preserve its argument by notifying the District Court of this dispute. Although the stipulated final judgment did end this aspect of the case in Symantec's favor, nothing precluded Symantec from raising the additional claim construction argument before agreeing to stipulated final judgment and nothing guaranteed that Symantec had "won" the case. Far from "ludicrous," (see id.), Symantec simply made a tactical decision.
The Court need not construe all terms in the patents at issue, GPNE Corp., 830 F.3d at 1372-73, and Symantec did not timely seek the proper definition for "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program." It is likely within the Court's case management authority to deny the request for additional claim construction and, frankly, the Court is inclined to do so.
But the Court pauses because several of the cases in which the district courts refused to construe additional claim terms had reached the summary judgment or trial phase. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 252045 at *3-4. The Court declines to determine how analogous the Partial Final Judgment Order would be to the finality of a jury verdict or a summary judgment denial. Symantec clearly made a strategic decision when deciding not to pursue a construction of "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program" prior to entry of the Partial Final Judgment Order. Parties—especially sophisticated parties—generally face the negative consequences for such strategic choices.
Because Symantec does not suffer ill effects from its earlier failure to raise this claim construction, the Court cautions Symantec and, indeed both Parties, that endless claim construction or requests for reconsideration of finally-decided issues will not be tolerated. This Court's previous scheduling order, and both Parties' desire to move toward trial, will preclude such motions from being entertained. It is largely because the Court feels constrained to grant a Markman hearing on "anomalous," in its effort to resolve "fundamental dispute[s] regarding the scope of a claim term," O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362, that the Court will also allow a Markman hearing on the term "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program."
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Markman Motion as to "anomalous" and as to "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program." (ECF No. 204.) The Court also will grant Symantec's Motion to Seal, (ECF No. 206), and Columbia's Motion to Seal, (ECF No. 214).
No later than July 16, 2019, Columbia shall serve on Symantec an updated claim chart, to be comprised of the original information as defined in paragraph 3 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order while eliminating only the now-excluded claims. (See ECF No. 56.) By that same date, Symantec shall serve on Columbia an updated list of the prior art on which it relies, to be comprised of that prior art originally asserted under paragraph 5 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order while eliminating only the now-excluded prior art. (See id.)
No later than July 30, 2019, Symantec shall serve on Columbia a similarly updated claim chart as defined in paragraph 4 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order. (See id.) This updated claim chart shall include the original information exchanged minus the now-excluded information. Also, no later than July 30, 2019, Columbia shall serve on Symantec a similarly updated prior art statement as defined in paragraph 6 of the Court's March 17, 2014. (See id.) This updated prior art statement shall include the information originally exchanged minus responses to the now-excluded prior art. (See id.)
No later than July 31, 2019, the Parties shall file a joint statement with the Court confirming their compliance with the specified deadlines.
An appropriate order shall issue.
Specifically, no later than July 16, 2019, Columbia shall serve on Symantec an updated claim chart, to be comprised of the original information as defined in paragraph 3 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order minus the now-excluded claims. (See ECF No. 56.) By that same date, Symantec shall serve on Columbia an updated list of the prior art on which it relies, to be comprised of that prior art originally asserted under paragraph 5 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order minus the now-excluded prior art. (See id.)
No later than July 30, 2019, Symantec shall serve on Columbia a similarly updated claim chart as defined in paragraph 4 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order. (See id.) This updated claim chart shall include the original information exchanged minus the now-excluded information. Also, no later than July 30, 2019, Columbia shall serve on Symantec a similarly updated prior art statement as defined in paragraph 6 of the Court's March 17, 2014 Order. (See id.) This updated prior art statement shall include the information originally exchanged minus responses to the now-excluded prior art. (See id.)
No later than July 31, 2019, the Parties shall file a joint statement with the Court confirming their compliance with the specified deadlines.
Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Of these six patents, only the 115 Patent and the 322 Patent remain before the Court.
In its Final Written Decision regarding the 115 Patent, PTAB stated that "[i]n [the] Decision to Institute, we determined the broadest reasonable construction of anomalous is: `deviation/deviating from a model of typical computer system usage.'" Symantec Corp. v. The Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York, No. IPR2015-00375, 6 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2016) (the 115 Patent decision) (ECF No. 180-1). Further, PTAB stated "[w]e specifically recognized that the [s]pecification contemplates that `attack data' may be used to build the model used as a baseline for comparison to identify anomalous behavior." Id. In its Final Written Decision regarding the 322 Patent, PTAB provided the same definition. Symantec Corp. v. The Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York, No. IPR2015-00377, 5 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2016) (the 322 Patent decision) (ECF No. 180-2).
In the Inter Partes Review Opinion, the Court concludes that because Symantec knew of these additional grounds of invalidity, and chose not to assert them in its inter partes review petitions, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estops Symantec from supporting its invalidity affirmative defense with them. The Court assumes familiarity with the Inter Partes Review Opinion.
Similarly, in their filings pertaining to the present Markman Motion, the Parties vigorously dispute whether the Federal Circuit vacated this Court's definition of "anomalous" or simply vacated the Court's reliance on claim 1 of the 084 Patent to determine that "the model is generated with only attack-free data." (Clarified Claim Construction Order 2.) Although the Parties disagree about whether the Court must hold an additional Markman hearing, they agree that "anomalous" requires some type of construction by the Court and disagree only as to how the Court should proceed to do so.
In Epcon Gas, the district court construed several patent terms and granted summary judgment of non-infringement. Epcon Gas, 90 Fed. App'x at 540-41. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's construction of "substantially below," but reversed the district court's construction of other terms and remanded the case. Id. at 541. On remand, the district court "revised its claim construction of `substantially below' and again granted summary judgment of non-infringement." Id. During the second appeal, the Federal Circuit found that "[t]he district court's `clarification' of its prior claim construction that we previously affirmed on appeal violated law of the case." Id. at 542.
This case differs from Epcon Gas. Here, the Federal Circuit did not clearly mandate a specific definition of "anomalous." Rather, the Federal Circuit found that it was error for the Court to define "anomalous" with reference to claim 1 of the 084 Patent and to constrain the definition to only "attack-free data." Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1370. The Federal Circuit did not affirm the Court's original definition, which included the phrase "typical, attack-free computer system usage." (Claim Construction Order 2.) For these reasons, the law of the case doctrine does not preclude the Court from holding an additional Markman hearing to determine the proper construction of "anomalous."
Columbia contends that inter partes review "decisions tend to cement this construction as the appropriate `law of the case.'" (Resp. 15.) When a court must construe a term that has previously been construed by PTAB, "PTAB's construction ... is entitled to `reasoned deference.'" Contentguard Holdings, Inc., 2015 WL 8073722 at *11 (citing Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., No 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006)). The PTAB applies a different standard of claim construction than that standard which the district court must apply, so the Court may construe a term differently than the PTAB. See id. at *3-4. Because Columbia's argument goes to the proper construction of "anomalous," an argument best presented in a claim construction brief, it does not persuade with regard to the Markman Motion. Columbia and Symantec remain free to argue the proper scope of "anomalous" in their claim construction briefs submitted for the additional Markman hearing.
The Court need not consider that argument at length because it will invoke its case management authority to address Symantec's request for a Markman hearing on the phrase "model of function calls for the at least a [part/portion] of the program."