Petitioners seek writ relief from a trial court order staying their construction defect litigation pursuant to Civil Code section 930.
We are therefore presented with a question of first impression: must homeowners serve notice of a construction defect claim under section 910, subdivision (a) for a builder to be obligated to respond to their request for documents under section 912, subdivision (a)?
Based on the language of the statute and the statutory scheme, as well as the statutory purpose and relevant legislative history, we conclude that a homeowner must serve notice of a construction defect claim under section 910, subdivision (a) to commence the statutory prelitigation procedure, and until such service the builder has no obligation to respond to a request for documents under section 912, subdivision (a). We will therefore deny the writ petition.
Petitioners are the owners of 86 single-family homes in Fairfield, California. All of the homes were first sold after January 1, 2003, and are therefore subject to division 2, part 2, title 7 of the Civil Code, section 895 et seq., commonly referred to as "SB 800" or the "Right to Repair Act" (Act).
The Act establishes a nonadversarial inspection and repair procedure that allows builders to attempt to resolve homeowners' construction defect claims in advance of litigation. (§ 910 et seq.) As discussed at greater length post, section 910 requires a homeowner to serve the builder with notice of a construction defect claim, section 912 requires the builder to produce copies of certain documents to the homeowner, and the builder has the opportunity to repair the purported defect within a given time period. If the homeowner files a lawsuit before the prelitigation procedure is completed, the builder may obtain a stay of the lawsuit. (§ 930, subd. (b).) But if a builder fails to comply with the requirements of the prelitigation procedure, the homeowner may proceed with a lawsuit without completing the prelitigation process. (§ 930, subd. (a); see §§ 912, subd. (i), 920.)
On February 24, 2011, petitioners served upon real parties in interest — Western Pacific Housing, Inc., and Schuler Homes of California, Inc. (Western Pacific) — a request for certain documents under section 912, subdivision (a).
On March 18, 2011, Western Pacific's counsel sent a letter to petitioners' counsel acknowledging "the substantive document requests as proper in scope and specificity in accordance with Civil Code section 912(a), (b), (c), and (d)." However, Western Pacific refused to comply with the document request on the ground it was "premature," contending that no response or production was required "until such time as the homeowner claimants initiate the `builder' obligations to produce documents under these particular `SB800 provisions.'" The letter continued: "The obligations and provisions of Chapter 4 of Title 7 of the Civil Code are not effective until such time as the identified claimants or you, as their legal representative, provide written notice to [Western Pacific] via certified mail, overnight mail, or personal delivery in accordance with Civil Code section 910(a)."
On December 14, 2011, Western Pacific filed a motion under section 930, subdivision (b) to stay the action, on the ground that petitioners had not completed the prelitigation procedure.
Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that Western Pacific had lost its right to seek a stay under section 930 because it failed to comply with its statutory requirement to respond to petitioners' document request under section 912, subdivision (a). Petitioners insisted their document request was not premature, because section 912 does not state that such requests may be served only after a notice of claim has been served, and other subdivisions in section 912 require builders to provide documents to homeowners before a notice of claim — in particular, when the property is originally sold.
The trial court granted Western Pacific's motion to stay the lawsuit until petitioners complete the prelitigation procedure set forth in the Act. The court ruled that the document production provision in section 912, subdivision (a), is part of the statutory prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure can be initiated only by service of a written notice of claim by the homeowners on the builder. Accordingly, the court decided, Western Pacific's refusal to produce documents did not release petitioners from their obligation to comply with the Act.
Petitioners filed their petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in June 2012. We issued an order to show cause, Western Pacific filed a return, and petitioners filed a reply.
There is no dispute that petitioners have not effectively served a notice of a claim and have not completed the prelitigation procedure generally required by the Act. Accordingly, the court properly stayed petitioners' lawsuit under section 930, unless petitioners established that Western Pacific could not avail
Our analysis begins with an overview of the Act.
The Act consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides definitions. (§ 895.) Chapter 2 describes actionable construction defects by setting forth standards for residential construction. (§§ 896, 897.) Chapter 3 requires the builder to provide an express limited warranty covering the fit and finish of specified building components, and addresses the builder's obligations if it offers greater protection to the homeowner through an enhanced protection agreement. (§§ 900-907.) Chapter 4 — at issue here — sets forth a prelitigation procedure designed to give a builder the opportunity, before litigation commences, to repair defects brought to its attention by a homeowner's claim. (§§ 910-938.) Chapter 5 refers to litigation matters in case the prelitigation procedure does not resolve the claim, such as the deadline for filing a lawsuit, the burden of proof, damages that may be recovered, and defenses the builder may assert. (§§ 941-945.5.)
As mentioned, the heart of this dispute involves the prelitigation procedure set forth in chapter 4 of the Act (Chapter 4), aptly entitled "Prelitigation Procedure." We examine this procedure more closely, next.
Chapter 4 begins with section 910. Section 910 requires a homeowner to serve notice of a construction defect claim to commence the prelitigation process, before bringing a lawsuit. The statute provides in relevant part: "Prior to filing an action against any party alleged to have contributed to a violation of the standards set forth in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 896), the claimant shall initiate the following prelitigation procedures: [¶] (a) The claimant or his or her legal representative shall provide written notice via
Section 912 essentially requires the builder to provide certain documents and information to the homeowner at specified times. Section 912 reads: "A builder shall do all of the following" and then sets forth obligations under subdivisions (a) through (h).
Subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of section 912 require the builder to provide the homeowner with other types of documents within 30 days of the
Subdivisions (e), (f), and (g) of section 912 require the builder to disclose certain information to the purchaser in the original sales documentation: the name and address of an agent for notice to whom "claims and requests for information under this section may be mailed" (§ 912, subd. (e)) a notice of the existence of the procedures (which must also be recorded on title), and a written copy of the Act.
The requirements specified in section 912 are mandatory. Subdivision (i) provides: "Any builder who fails to comply with any of these requirements within the time specified is not entitled to the protection of this chapter, and the homeowner is released from the requirements of this chapter and may proceed with the filing of an action, in which case the remaining chapters of this part shall continue to apply to the action."
Section 912, subdivision (a) states that "[w]ithin 30 days of a written request by a homeowner ... the builder shall provide copies ..." of certain documents. (§ 912, subd. (a).) The statute is silent, however, as to whether the homeowner may make this request without serving notice of a claim: there is no express requirement that the homeowner precede his or her document
Because the language within section 912, subdivision (a) does not answer the question presented by the petition, we look to other indicia of intent. Petitioners suggest that, simply because there is no express limitation written into subdivision (a) itself, we must conclude the Legislature intended no limitation on a homeowner's ability to compel a builder to provide the documents; but such an approach ignores the reality that the Legislature would find no need to specify a limitation in subdivision (a) if, indeed, the limitation is obvious from its statutory context. Thus, to resolve ambiguity, or simply for the sake of a thorough and commonsense analysis, we turn for guidance to the statutory scheme of which section 912, subdivision (a) is a part.
Section 912 is part of Chapter 4. Its inclusion in that chapter, entitled "Prelitigation Procedure," indicates that section 912 is part of the statutory prelitigation procedure.
The prelitigation procedure does not commence, however, until the service of a notice of a claim. Section 910, addressing the notice of a claim, comes first in the chapter. It specifically states that the notice has the same force and effect as "a notice of commencement of a legal proceeding." (§ 910, subd. (a), italics added.) The fact that other statutes in Chapter 4, including the statute of limitations (§ 927) and provisions dealing with a builder's acknowledgement of receipt of a notice (§§ 913, 915) are based on the date of the service of the notice of claim buttresses the conclusion that the service of notice is necessary to commence the prelitigation period. Indeed, petitioners admit the prelitigation procedure commences with the notice of a claim: they concede the truth of Western Pacific's assertion that "`the legislative history evidences that the [L]egislature intended the Notice of Claim to be the first step in the prelitigation process'" and acknowledge that "[t]he prelitigation process commences with the service of a Notice of Claim."
Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim. Just as the document request provision of section 912, subdivision (a) comes after the notice of claim provision in section 910, the builder's production of documents must come after the homeowner's notice of a claim.
The fact that subdivisions (b) through (d) in section 912 require provision of documents within 30 days of the homeowner's request and at the time of the initial sale of the residence, and subdivisions (e) through (g) of the statute require disclosure of information in the "original sales documentation" (italics added), indicates that the Legislature felt it necessary to use that language in order to specify that the obligation to provide the particular material referenced in those subdivisions arises before the prelitigation procedure has begun. But the Legislature did not add such language to subdivision (a). The absence of such language, in a provision appearing in the chapter dealing with the prelitigation procedure, confirms that the obligation to produce the documents specified in subdivision (a) arises only in the course of the prelitigation procedure, commenced by the notice of a claim.
Consistent with our analysis is Baeza, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 1214. There, homeowners sued a developer for construction defects, and the developer sought an order compelling some of them to comply with the developer's contractual provisions for a nonadversarial prelitigation procedure, which the developer had lawfully adopted in lieu of the statutory prelitigation procedure. (Id. at p. 1219; see § 914, subd. (a).) The homeowners opposed the motion, arguing that the prelitigation procedures could not be enforced because the developer had not disclosed information required by section 912: the name and address of an agent to whom claims and information requests may be directed, in the original sales documentation (subd. (e)); a notice of the existence of the statutory procedures, in the record of title (subd. (f)); and a written copy of the Act, in the original sales documentation (subd. (g)). (Baeza, at pp. 1220, 1224-1225.) The trial court disagreed with the homeowners, stayed the litigation, and ordered compliance with the contractual prelitigation procedures. (Id. at p. 1220.) The appellate court denied the homeowners' petition for writ of mandate, ruling that a builder who opts out of the Chapter 4 prelitigation procedures in favor of its own contractual prelitigation procedures opts out of Chapter 4 entirely, including the disclosure provisions of section 912. (Baeza, at pp. 1225-1226.) That holding, based on the facts in Baeza, is not directly germane here, but the court's analysis in reaching its holding is.
As relevant to this case, therefore, Baeza emphasizes that Chapter 4 in its entirety — including section 912, subdivision (a) — pertains to the nonadversarial prelitigation procedure. We agree, and therefore the section 912, subdivision (a) obligation to produce documents cannot exist independent of the prelitigation procedure.
In sum, the language of section 912, subdivision (a), in the context of its statutory scheme, indicates that the builder's obligation to provide documents under section 912, subdivision (a) does not arise until the prelitigation procedure is commenced by service of the notice of a claim.
The purpose of the Act — or at least the purpose of what is now Chapter 4 — is to give a builder the opportunity to resolve a homeowner's construction defect claim in an expeditious and nonadversarial manner. (§ 914, subd. (a); Stats. 2002, ch. 722, § 1(b) & (c), p. 4247 [Chapter 4 was intended to provide for the "prompt and fair resolution of construction defect claims" and "procedures for early disposition of construction defects"].) More precisely, the point is to help resolve defect claims that the homeowner already has, not to open up the builder's document files to homeowners who have no claim and perhaps never will.
Requiring the homeowner to serve notice of a construction defect claim before obtaining documents from the builder under section 912, subdivision (a) is consistent with the statute's evident purpose. First the homeowner would serve the notice of claim, giving the builder an idea of the purported defects; then the homeowner would request and obtain the documents under section 912, subdivision (a); the builder would inspect the defects, make an offer to repair, and compensate the homeowner as set forth in the statutes; and the homeowner could use the documents and other information in evaluating and deciding whether to accept the repair.
Petitioners' arguments, on the other hand, are based on assumptions that the Act was created to do something else — namely, empower homeowners to get documents from builders whether they have a defect claim or not. Petitioners argue, for instance, that homeowners should be allowed to request the documents specified in section 912, subdivision (a) without giving notice of a claim, so they can investigate what they believe to be defects and for use in putting a notice together. But according to the statute, the notice of claim need only "describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the nature and location, to the extent known, of the claimed violation." (§ 910, subd. (a), italics added.) There is no evidence or other indication in the record that any of the documents obtainable under section 912, subdivision (a) would be of any necessity in determining whether there was a defect or assembling the claim notice. Just as likely, the documents would be relevant to evaluating the builder's offer to repair (§ 918), and for this purpose obtaining the documents "[w]ithin 30 days of a written request by a homeowner" (§ 912, subd. (a)), after service of the notice of the claim, would suffice.
Indeed, the record in this case makes it clear that petitioners saw no need to obtain the documents before making a claim. Instead, according to petitioners' representation to the trial court, they tried to serve a notice of claim on the same date as their request for documents (albeit in a separate
Next, petitioners argue that homeowners may want to use the documents in order to take action to prevent defects in their homes from causing damage. However, there is no evidence or other indication that the Legislature intended the Act, let alone section 912, subdivision (a), to provide a means for homeowners to prevent damage from construction defects, except by expediting the repair of those defects by the process the Legislature expressly set forth in the Act.
Given the statutory language, the statutory scheme, and the statute's evident purpose, petitioners fail to establish that a builder is obligated to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) before service of a notice of claim under section 910.
The parties do not point us to any legislative history expressly describing a request for documents under section 912, subdivision (a). Of possible assistance, however, is a passage from an August 29, 2002 Senate Floor Analysis of Senate Bill No. 800 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), which states: "In a significant departure from existing law, the bill imposes a procedure that a homeowner must follow before bringing suit against a builder. In summary, the homeowner must send a written notice to the builder setting out the nature of the claim. The builder must acknowledge the claim in writing. The builder may then elect to conduct inspection and testing of the alleged defect within a specified period, and must provide certain documentation to the homeowner on request regarding building plans and specifications. Most importantly, the builder may then offer to repair the alleged violation within a prescribed period." (Id. at p. 4, italics added.) This passage contemplates the builder providing documents to the homeowner after the homeowner has served notice of a claim, not before.
Petitioners argue that this legislative history refers to section 917, which sets forth the required contents of the builder's written offer to repair and then states: "[u]pon written request by the homeowner or his or her legal representative, and within the timeframes set forth in this chapter, the builder shall also provide any available technical documentation, including, without
Petitioners miss the point, however, in two respects. First, whether or not this passage in the legislative history supports Western Pacific's position or refers only to the provision of documents under section 917, the fact remains that nothing in the legislative history supports petitioners' argument that a builder must produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) before a homeowner gives notice of a claim. Petitioners' argument therefore remains unsupported.
Second, the language in section 917 may have greater significance than petitioners let on. Section 917 requires the builder to provide certain documents "pertaining to the claimed violation" "within the timeframes set forth in this chapter." The phrase, "within the timeframes set forth in this chapter" is not altogether clear, but with respect to document production seems to fit best with the timeframe in section 912, subdivision (a) — "[w]ithin 30 days of a written request by a homeowner." If so, the fact that the Legislature in section 917 gave a builder 30 days after the homeowner's request to give documents regarding the "claimed violation" — past tense — suggests that "within 30 days of a written request by a homeowner" refers to a time period after the violation has been claimed by service of notice. A reasonable inference is that "within 30 days of a written request by a homeowner" in section 912, subdivision (a) also presupposes that notice of the claim has already been served.
The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition is denied. The parties shall bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
Jones, P. J., and Bruiniers, J., concurred.