ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC. AND EQUIFAX, INC.'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE; VACATING HEARING

Re: Dkt. No. 35

Re: Dkt. No. 36

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Re: Dkt. No. 26

MAXINE M. CHESNEY, District Judge.

Before the Court is the "Motion to Consolidate," filed December 22, 2016, in each of the above-titled four cases, by defendants Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") and Equifax, Inc. ("Equifax"), by which filing said defendants seek to consolidate more than 170 lawsuits filed by plaintiffs' counsel and presently assigned to eighteen different judges in this district. Each of the four plaintiffs, as well as Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., one of the named defendants, have responded, to which Experian and Equifax have jointly filed a reply. The Court deems the matter suitable for determination on the parties' respective written submissions, VACATES the hearing scheduled for February 17, 2017, and hereby rules as follows.

Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may consolidate actions that "involve a common question of law or fact," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), and has "broad discretion" to decide whether consolidation is appropriate, see Investors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777 (1989).

This Court, having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, is in accord with a number of judges in this district who have denied similar motions. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-5703-TEH (N.D. Cal. January 31, 2017); Gonzalez v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-5678-HSG (N.D. Cal. January 4, 2017). In particular, although each of the actions asserts claims based on alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Court finds any potential efficiency attributable to having such actions heard by a single judge would be outweighed by the various procedural delays resulting from the reassignment of a large number of cases pending at varying stages of the proceedings, coupled with the considerable burden placed on such jurist in adjudicating not only any common issue raised therein but all individual issues as well.

Accordingly, the motion to consolidate is, in each of the above-titled cases, hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.