In real party in interest Alan D. Liker's action to recover his fees under his service contracts with petitioners, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for summary adjudication. Petitioners seek a writ directing the trial court to vacate the denial of summary adjudication and to enter a new order granting the motion. We grant the petition for writ of mandate.
There are no material disputes regarding the following facts: Liker is an attorney who specializes in taxation matters and complex business transactions. In December 2005, Liker entered into a service agreement with petitioners Dawn Arnall and Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest agreement). The agreement obliged Liker to provide advisory services aimed at minimizing "the adverse economic impact" arising from specified taxable income. Under the fee provisions, Liker was to receive a stipend of $20,000 per month for nine months, and a "[s]uccess [f]ee" amounting to 2 percent of specified reductions in "adverse economic impact" and other "economic savings." In January 2007, the parties modified the Ameriquest agreement. As modified, the agreement acknowledged that Liker had provided services after the original nine-month period; extended the agreement's effective period to December 31, 2009; and permitted Ameriquest and Arnall to end Liker's monthly stipend when he became entitled to a $2 million success fee.
In March 2007, Liker entered into a second service agreement with Arnall and petitioner RoDa Drilling, L.P. (RoDa agreement).
In June 2009, petitioners terminated Liker's services and averred that the service agreements were void under Business and Professions Code section 6147.
Petitioners sought summary adjudication on Liker's claims, with the exception of his claims for recovery in quantum meruit. They maintained that the agreements were void under section 6147 for want of a statutorily required statement, namely, that the success fees were "not set by law but [were] negotiable between attorney and client" (§ 6147, subd. (a)(4)). In denying summary adjudication, the trial court relied on Franklin v. Appel (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 875, 892 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 759] (Franklin), in which the appellate court concluded that the then effective version of section 6147 was inapplicable to "contingency fee agreements outside the litigation context." (8 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.) On June 23, 2010, petitioners filed their petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief. We issued an alternative writ of mandate and temporary stay on September 1, 2010.
Petitioners contend that the trial court erred in denying summary adjudication. We agree.
"An order denying a motion for summary adjudication may be reviewed by way of a petition for writ of mandate. [Citation.] Where the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment will result in trial on nonactionable claims, a writ of mandate will issue. [Citations.] Likewise, a writ of mandate may issue to prevent trial of nonactionable claims after the erroneous denial of a motion for summary adjudication, [¶] Since a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication `involves pure matters of law,' we review a ruling on the motion de novo to determine whether the moving and opposing papers show a triable issue of material fact. [Citations.] Thus, the appellate court need not defer to the trial court's decision. `"We are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the ruling, not its rationale."' [Citation.]" (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1450 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 54], fn. omitted.)
Section 6147 belongs to a trio of related statutes governing fee contracts between lawyers and their clients.
We begin by examining the trial court's ruling. In seeking summary adjudication, petitioners argued that both fee agreements were voidable at their option under section 6147, subdivision (b), because the agreements lacked the statement mandated in section 6147, subdivision (a)(4). The trial court denied summary adjudication on a ground neither raised nor briefed by the parties, reasoning that the fee agreements fell outside section 6147 because they "contemplate[] payment for savings from tax-related services."
The denial of summary adjudication cannot be affirmed on the basis of Franklin. As then effective, former section 6147 stated in subdivision (a) that it applied when "[a]n attorney who contracts to represent a plaintiff on a contingency fee basis" (italics added); in addition, section 6147 contained numerous references to the client as a "plaintiff."
Despite the statement's absence, the appellate court determined that the agreement was not voidable because it fell outside former section 6147. (Franklin, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 890-892.) Applying the canons of statutory interpretation, the court reasoned that the occurrence of the term "plaintiff" in former section 6147 limited the provision to contingency fee agreements "involving plaintiffs in litigation matters." (Franklin, at pp. 879, 890-892, italics omitted.) Nonetheless, recognizing that the provision's language might not reflect the Legislature's goal in enacting it, the court stated: "Should the Legislature intend section 6147 to apply to all contingency fee arrangements between attorneys and clients generally, irrespective of whether the representation contemplates litigation or transactional matters, a simple amendment to that effect will suffice; client or person may be substituted for
Liker suggests that the Ameriquest and RoDa fee agreements are not voidable under section 6147 because the Legislature, in amending the statute, did not uniformly replace "plaintiff" with "client." Noting that subdivision (b) of section 6147, in its current form, provides that a noncompliant agreement is "voidable at the option of the plaintiff" (italics added), Liker argues that subdivision (b) is inapplicable to the Ameriquest and RoDa agreements. We disagree. "`The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in light of the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole.'" (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334, fn. 7 [283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240], quoting Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845 [48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 409 P.2d 689].)
Here, the Legislature's intent in amending section 6147 is clearly established by the changes it made to subdivision (a) of the statute, especially those to the first sentence of the subdivision, which now begins, "An attorney who contracts to represent a client on a contingency fee basis shall . . . ." (Italics added.) As the Legislature subjected contingent fee agreements outside the litigation context to the requirements stated in subdivision (a), the Legislature cannot reasonably be viewed as having intended to exempt these agreements from subdivision (b), which functions as the enforcement provision of section 6147. Because the Legislature's failure to replace "plaintiff" with "client" in subdivision (b) appears to be an oversight or drafting error, we reject Liker's contention. (Bonner v. County of San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1346, fn. 9 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 116] [when drafting error in statute is clear and correction will best carry out the Legislature's intent, courts may disregard the error in interpreting statute].)
We turn to whether the denial of summary adjudication can be affirmed on another ground. In resolving this question, we may properly examine the merits of petitioners' motion, even though the trial court did not do so in ruling on the motion. (See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1450-1452.) As explained below, petitioners are entitled to summary adjudication.
Liker contends that section 6147 is inapplicable to the Ameriquest and RoDa agreements because they are not contingency fee contracts. His principal argument is that section 6147 does not apply to "hybrid" fee arrangements of the type established in the Ameriquest and RoDa agreements, which combine fixed monthly payments with a variable success fee. In addition, he argues that the percentage rates determining the success fees are too low to render them contingency fees.
We find additional guidance on Liker's contentions from Yates v. Law Offices of Samuel Shore (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 583, 591 [280 Cal.Rptr. 316] (Yates), which discussed whether the limits on contingency fee contracts in section 6146 apply to hybrid fee arrangements. There, the attorney's fee agreement entitled him to a share of his clients' recovery in a medical malpractice action, and otherwise provided that his fee did not include services he might render in an appeal. (Yates, at pp. 585-586.) After the attorney secured a monetary judgment in his clients' favor, he engaged a second attorney at an hourly rate to represent his clients on appeal. (Id. at pp. 586-587.) When the attorney asserted that the second attorney's fee was exempt from the limits in section 6146, his clients commenced an action against him. (Yates, at p. 587.) The trial court concluded that section 6146 prohibited charging such a fee in addition to the maximum contingent fee allowed under the statute. (Yates, at p. 591.)
In affirming, the appellate court stated: "The primary rationale of the trial court's holding was that section 6146 fixes the maximum allowable contingent fee for a medical malpractice action as a whole, including an appeal after judgment, and the limitation may not be avoided by charging separate fees for segments of the case or by charging both contingent and hourly fees. This construction is strongly supported by the statute's language . . . . It thus plainly appears that [the attorney] was limited to the section 6146 contingent fee for the entire case. He could not enhance that fee by truncating his contingent representation at the appellate threshold and charging additional, ostensibly noncontingent amounts for the appeal." (Yates, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 591, italics added.)
In an effort to show that the term "contingency fee contract" applies only to agreements in which the fee hinges exclusively on success, Liker directs us to the definition of "contingent fee" in Black's Law Dictionary, namely, "[a] fee charged for a lawyer's services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court." (Black's Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 338, col. 2.) However, the entry for "contingent fee" in Black's Law Dictionary expressly recognizes a "reverse" contingent fee, which is described as "[a] fee in which a defense lawyer's compensation depends in whole or in part on how much money the lawyer saves the client, given the client's potential liability." (Ibid., italics added.) Accordingly, the entry does not limit the term "contingent fee" to fees predicated exclusively on favorable outcomes.
Liker's reliance on Estate of Stevenson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1074 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 573] (Stevenson) and several other cases is misplaced. In Stevenson, the administrator of a decedent's estate hired an attorney to represent the estate in the probate proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1078-1079.) Under the fee contract, the attorney was to receive twice his ordinary hourly rate unless the estate's assets were insufficient to pay this fee, in which case the attorney was to receive the greater of (1) the estate's assets or (2) a fee calculated at the attorney's ordinary hourly rate. (Id. at p. 1080.) After the probate proceedings ended, the attorney's fee request exceeded the estate's net worth. (Id. at p. 1081.)
Liker contends that these remarks establish that a contingency fee agreement invariably predicates the fee solely on the client's outcome or recovery. We disagree. The Stevenson court held only that the fee contract before it was not a contingency fee agreement, as it guaranteed the attorney a fee based on the estate's assets and the attorney's hourly rate, "regardless of the [action's] outcome." (Stevenson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) Although the court noted that contingency fee agreements "typically" predicate the fee on a successful outcome or recovery, the court did not define them in these terms; on the contrary, the court expressly declined to decide whether hybrid agreements "that use[] both hourly rates and percentages" are contingency fee agreements. (Id. at p. 1086, fn. 2.) The court thus did not resolve the question presented here.
The other cases upon which Liker relies are also inapposite, as none examined whether the term "contingency fee contract," as used in section 6147, encompasses hybrid agreements involving both (1) a fee based on a fixed rate of payment and (2) a fee based on a stated percentage of a favorable outcome. The California cases that Liker cites do not address such agreements. (Fletcher v. Davis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 61, 64, 70, fn. 3 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 58, 90 P.3d 1216] [agreement based on hourly rate, but providing for possibility of a "`bonus'" consisting of unspecified percentage of judgment if recovery was "`large,'" is not a contingency fee contract]; In re County of Orange (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1999) 241 B.R. 212, 215, 221 [agreement
Liker suggests that under the principles of statutory interpretation, we are obliged to construe section 6147 in a manner that avoids the nonpayment of his success fees, which he characterizes as a forfeiture. We disagree. Under subdivision (b) of section 6147, Liker may collect "a reasonable fee," notwithstanding petitioners' decision to render the success fee provisions void. Furthermore, when a statute protects the public by denying compensation to parties who fail to meet regulatory demands, the statute constitutes a legislative determination that the need for compliance outweighs any resulting harshness, unless Legislature's intent in enacting the statute is uncertain. (See Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995 [277 Cal.Rptr. 517, 803 P.2d 370].) As explained above, section 6147 clearly encompasses hybrid fee agreements of the type before us.
Finally, Liker maintains there are triable issues precluding summary adjudication. He suggests that the Ameriquest and RoDa agreements involved nonlegal professional services; in addition, he argues that certain equitable doctrines, including estoppel and laches, bar petitioners from seeking the protection of section 6147.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing that respondent trial court vacate its order denying petitioners' motion for summary adjudication, and enter a new order granting summary adjudication. The alternative writ, having served its purpose, is discharged, and the temporary stay is vacated effective upon the issuance of remittitur. Petitioners are awarded their costs.
Epstein, P. J., and Suzukawa, J., concurred.
Subdivision (c) of section 6148 provides: "Failure to comply with any provision of this section renders the agreement voidable at the option of the client, and the attorney shall, upon the agreement being voided, be entitled to collect a reasonable fee."