NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERREN, J.

Olive Oil and Gas, L.P. (Olive) appeals from a judgment quieting title by adverse possession in favor of adjoining property owners, respondents John and Sandy Wallace (the Wallaces) to a narrow strip of land along the boundary of the parties' adjoining lots. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Wallaces satisfied the requirement for adverse possession by paying the taxes assessed against the disputed property during the period of possession. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Wallaces purchased property located at 115 Olive Mill Road in Santa Barbara in April 2006. The property contains a single family residence and a detached garage. Olive owns the adjoining property located at 1298 Coast Village Road. It is used, as it has been since the 1930's, as a gas station.

The garage on the Wallaces' property was built approximately 40 years ago and is located approximately two inches from a concrete block wall that runs the length of the property. At the time they purchased the property, the Wallaces, as did their predecessors-in-interest, assumed that the concrete block wall was the boundary line between their property and Olive's property. Sometime after they purchased their property, the parties discovered that the wall was not on the true boundary line between the two properties, and that a small portion of the Wallaces' garage encroached on Olive's property.

In July 2009, Olive filed a complaint against the Wallaces seeking to quiet title to the disputed strip of land in itself and have the encroachment removed. The Wallaces filed a cross-complaint against Olive seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title by adverse possession. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. After a combined hearing of both motions, the trial court granted the Wallaces' motion and entered an order quieting title to the disputed strip of land in the Wallaces. The trial court found that the Wallaces had demonstrated by undisputed evidence that they had met all the elements necessary to establish adverse possession, including payment of taxes on the disputed strip of land.

On appeal, Olive contends the trial court erred because the undisputed evidence shows that both properties were assessed for tax purposes by assessor's parcel number and the metes and bounds description contained in the grant deeds for the property.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

"'"Appellate review of a ruling on a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion is de novo."'" (Food Pro Intern., Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 976, 993.) "The party moving for summary judgment bears the `burden of persuasion' that there are no triable issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at pp. 993-994.) "'There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.'" (Id. at p. 994.)

On appeal, we conduct a de novo review of the record to "determine with respect to each cause of action whether the defendant seeking summary judgment has conclusively negated a necessary element of the plaintiff's case, or has demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial, such that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) We apply the same procedure used by the trial court: We examine the pleadings to ascertain the elements of the plaintiff's claim; the moving papers to determine whether the defendant has established facts justifying judgment in its favor; and, if the defendant did meet this burden, plaintiff's opposition to decide whether he or she has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 84-85.)

Adverse Possession

A judgment of adverse possession requires proof of five elements: (1) actual possession with reasonable notice to the owner, (2) hostile to the owner's title, (3) with a claim of right or title, (4) for five years without interruption, and (5) payment of taxes levied and assessed upon the property during that period. (Dimmick v. Dimmick (1962) 58 Cal.2d 417, 421.) There is no dispute on this appeal that the Wallaces have proved the first four elements.

Payment of Taxes

"Ordinarily, when adjoining lots are assessed by lot number, the claimant to the disputed portion cannot establish adverse possession because he cannot establish payment of taxes." (Gilardi v. Hallam (1981) 30 Cal.3d 317, 326.) There are two exceptions to this rule. First, a claimant may show that there was an error in the description on the assessment roll, and that the claimant paid taxes on the disputed portion. (Ibid.) Second, "where the claimant by construction of buildings or other valuable improvements or by the building of fences has visibly shown occupation of a disputed strip of land adjoining the boundary, several cases have reasoned that the `natural inference' is that the assessor did not base the assessment on the record boundary but valued the land and improvements visibly possessed by the parties. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 327.)

Undisputed Evidence Supports Application of the Natural Inference Doctrine and the Wallaces' Payment of Taxes on the Disputed Property

The Wallaces provided the following evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment: (1) The declaration and deposition testimony of Raul Baez, an assessment supervisor for the County of Santa Barbara Assessor's Office, and (2) records maintained by the assessor's office for the Wallaces' property showing multiple visual inspections of the property, including a 1975 tax reassessment after visual inspection which resulted in an increased value for the garage.

The residential appraisal record maintained by the assessor's office for the Wallaces' property contains the following remarks: "Reappraisal — No gar[age] doors considered in gar factor 1-8-68 . . . 3-31-75 — Not home — Looked around — Neat. . . . 6-24-81. Res[idence] in fair cond[ition] . . . 4-23-80 D. o/D as per current tenant `Mareva Intl.' heirs painted inside only but tenants have done other def. maint corrections i.e. have re-painted inside laid new wwcpt in living rm and painted exterior. Kitchen remains as it was w/refrig & stove provided by owners. Still 2 beds & 1 bath. Exterior inspection & brief living rm view only. . . . 6/24/81. . . . Field visit — left card — from exterior condition seems average. Very close to commercial." The records also contain the dimensions of the residence and garage and a drawing of the property showing the residence and the garage next to and slightly behind the residence, closer to the property line.

This undisputed evidence is sufficient to give rise to the natural inference presumption stated in Gilardi v. Hallam, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 327. Official records maintained by the assessor's office show that the county visually inspected the property on several occasions, and that the existence of the garage, and its location with respect to the residence, was noted since at least 1968. Thus, the natural inference is that the assessor did not compute the assessment on the record boundary but valued the land and improvements visibly possessed by the parties. (Ibid.)

Olive contends that this evidence does not establish that a visual inspection of the property occurred and, if visual inspection did occur, it was only to determine the size and character of the structures and not their location on the property. They rely upon the testimony of Mr. Baez, and the Wallaces' tax bill, to show that the Wallaces' property was assessed by parcel number and the metes and bounds description contained in grant deeds. Olive also points out that none of the official records shows the location of the garage with respect to the property line. Thus, Olive argues, the assessor could not have known that the garage encroached on Olive's property and it must be presumed that the taxes assessed did not include the disputed strip of land.

The flaw in Olive's argument is that the natural inference presumption was created to deal with the very circumstances present here—the true property line is disregarded when valuable improvements have been constructed and give the appearance, upon visual inspection, that the improvements are part of the assessed property. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.

The judgment is affirmed. The Wallaces shall recover costs on appeal.

YEGAN, Acting P.J. and COFFEE, J., concurs.