NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.

Plaintiffs and appellants Robert Mills III and Scott Schaller appeal the judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel defendants and respondents, City of Upland (City), its City Council, and its Police Department to set aside the City's decision to revoke plaintiffs' Conditional Use Permit (CUP) No. 97-07. We affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Mills and Schaller own property in the City, which they lease to C.C. Upland, LLC, d/b/a/ "Chronic Cantina" (Cantina). The Cantina is a restaurant and bar that opened in January 2008. The CUP, granted on or about November 19, 1997, was in effect for the premises. The CUP allowed live entertainment, dancing, and the service of alcohol. On or about December 18, 2008, Mills and Keith Sheinberg, chief executive officer of an affiliate of the Cantina, attended a meeting with the City's police, fire department, and community development department, wherein Mills and Sheinberg were advised the Cantina's operations required an "`excessive use of police resources,'" and that the City would revoke the CUP unless there was "`substantial compliance' with respect to the business'[s] `demand for Police services.'" The City and its police department indicated there had been 70 calls for service from January 2008 to December 2008. The City's fire department detailed problems with overcrowding, which had been resolved by May 2008. Mills and Sheinberg were also advised of other issues that needed to be addressed.

Following the meeting, the Cantina addressed most of the City's issues. Regarding its use of police resources, the Cantina hired a new security manager, required "security and bussers" to sweep and mop the parking lots after walking customers to their cars, required security personnel to wear bright yellow jackets, inspected patrons with a metal wand, inspected female patrons' purses, posted a security guard at 7:30 p.m. in front of local businesses to respond to issues raised about safe return to their cars, and hired a new manager as head bartender for the purpose of training bartenders to identify intoxicated patrons.

On March 25, 2009, the City's planning commission recommended that the City Council revoke the CUP on the grounds that the use for which approval was granted is not in compliance with the conditions set forth in approving it. Specifically, the CUP itself provided that it may be revoked "if the permittee has violated any rule, regulation or condition of approval or if the operation permitted under the conditional use permit is operated in a manner contrary to the peace, safety and general welfare of the public or which results in undesirable activities creating an increased demand for public services[.]" A public hearing on the proposed revocation of the CUP was held on April 13, 2009, and the CUP was revoked.

On May 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed an amended verified petition for writ of mandate/writ of administrative mandate, with a request for an immediate stay. Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs moved ex parte for an order staying operation of the City's revocation of the CUP. The order was granted and a stay was issued; however, the City also moved ex parte for an order dissolving the stay, which was granted. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the dissolution order. Thus, the CUP was revoked.

The City filed its answer to the writ petition. Following briefing by both parties and lodging of the administrative record, the court held its hearing on September 18, 2009. After hearing argument from counsel, the court denied the writ petition in its entirety, finding substantial evidence to support the City's decision. On October 5, 2009, the court issued an order denying the amended petition for writ of mandate and sustaining the City's objections to plaintiffs' evidence on the grounds that it was not presented at the time of the administrative hearing. Notice of entry of judgment was served on November 2, and filed November 4, 2009. The appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relying on Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519 (Goat Hill), plaintiffs argue the trial court should have applied the de novo standard of review because fundamental vested rights were involved, namely, the right to continue an established business, the right to a full, fair and impartial administrative hearing, and the right to free speech and association. We disagree.

To begin with, plaintiffs' reliance on Goat Hill is misplaced. Unlike the tavern in Goat Hill, the Cantina has not operated for over 35 years. (Goat Hill, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1529.) Rather, the Cantina's opening was January 2008. The tavern owner in Goat Hill sought a conditional use permit to add a game room, which was granted on a temporary basis; however, when it expired, Costa Mesa argued that the owner had lost all right to continue in business. (Ibid.) Here, plaintiffs have not been foreclosed from all right to continue in business. Instead, they may operate a restaurant. According to what plaintiffs had told the City's planning commission, they focused on marketing the Cantina as a restaurant, i.e.: "`[W]e also publish in the Clipper Magazine as well as different magazines and newspapers. It's all going for lunch, lunch, dinner, dinner. That's what we are promoting. . . . . We are a sports bar, food restaurant first.'"

Regarding the right to a full, fair and impartial administrative hearing, plaintiffs claim the City "used false and misleading `evidence' from its police." They argue that a review of the Computer-Aided Dispatches (CADs) show the fraud committed by the City,1 because most of the calls were not connected to the Cantina. However, as the trial court noted, plaintiffs failed to include such evidence in the administrative record, and thus, it was inadmissible in court. We agree. Even if we were to consider such evidence, we note plaintiffs have failed to provide specific record cites supporting their contention. Rather, they refer to CADs, and argue fraud. "[I]t is counsel's duty to point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal. The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own . . . . [A]ny point raised that lacks citation may, in this court's discretion, be deemed waived. [Citation.]" (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Plaintiffs ask this court to review the more than 200 pages of CADs for the purposes of finding support for their argument. That is not our job. Accordingly, we deem the point waived.

Finally, regarding the right to free speech and association, Plaintiffs claim the City is "attempting to censor the[ir] [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms . . . with respect to expressions in advertising and with respect to association." The City responds by arguing that plaintiffs failed to raise this issue in the administrative hearing and thus have waived it. (Takahashi v. Board of Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1481 [party may not withhold legal argument at an administrative hearing and then introduce the argument, thereby expanding the issues, in the reviewing court].) The City further contends there is no protected speech at issue regarding the revocation of the CUP. (SP Star Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 459, 470-471 (SP Star) [because owner already had a certificate to offer nude entertainment, "the matter in issue . . . is not the right to engage in protected activity, but the right to sell alcohol for onsite consumption"].) We agree with the City. Here, the issue is not the content of plaintiffs' advertisements or their customers' dress, but rather plaintiffs' violations of the CUP. As the trial court observed, "[T]he problem was all the temporary signs [plaintiffs] were putting up, which were in violation of the conditions. [Plaintiffs] needed a temporary sign permit. And they have pictures of these temporary signs everywhere. . . . . [The City] found that as a violation of [plaintiffs'] CUP."2

"The exclusive remedy for judicial review of administrative action affecting land use is a proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. [Citations.] A trial court's review of an administrative decision is subject to two possible standards depending on the nature of the right involved. [Citation.]

"If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a `fundamental vested right,' the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]

"Where no fundamental vested right is involved, the trial court's review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the agency's decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]

"Regardless of the nature of the right involved or the standard of judicial review applied in the trial court, an appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on administrative mandamus applies a substantial evidence standard. [Citation.] . . .

"Under the substantial evidence test, the agency's findings are presumed to be supported by the administrative record and the appellant challenging them has the burden to show they are not. [Citations.] `When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court.' [Citation.]" (SP Star, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 468-469.)

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, it is plaintiffs' burden to show that the City's decision to revoke the CUP is not supported by the administrative record. Plaintiffs maintain that the number of police calls associated with the Cantina was over inflated. However, we are unable to determine the merits of any of their contentions with respect to the evidence. In reviewing the City's decision to revoke the CUP, we are "obligated to confine [ourselves] to the record of the administrative proceeding . . . ." (Larson v. State Personnel Bd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 265, 273.) Here, plaintiffs have failed to cite to the record of the administrative proceeding in their briefs. While the City has cited to the administrative record and argued sufficient evidence, plaintiffs have failed to provide us with a copy of the administrative record as part of the record on appeal. Thus, we have nothing to review concerning any fact-based contentions.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

We concur:

McKINSTER, J.

RICHLI, J.