JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
Developmental Technologies, LLC ("DTL"), a research and development company, developed and patented an irrigation system, Eco-Ag, which delivers "water and nutrients to plant life using a mix of patented and proprietary methods." (Dkt. 51 at ¶¶ 8, 11). Mitsui Chemicals, Inc. ("MCI"), a Japanese corporation, "develops chemical products and technologies." (Dkt. 37, p. 5).
In 2010, DTL and MCI began communicating about MCI's possible acquisition of DTL's irrigation product systems, including the Eco-Ag system. (Dkt. 51 at ¶¶ 15-16). After initial talks, MCI informed DTL that it would like to visit DTL's facilities to inspect the irrigation systems. (Id. at ¶ 21). Shortly thereafter, MCI "entered into a Non-Disclosure and Non-Use Agreement" ("NDA") with DTL, which "established guidelines for the use and disclosure of confidential and proprietary information that would be disclosed . . . ." (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). After executing the NDA, representatives from MCI visited DTL's facility in Bradenton, Florida. (Id. at ¶ 29). During and after this visit, DTL disclosed confidential information relating to the Eco-Ag product to MCI. (Id. at ¶ 33).
An agreement for MCI to purchase the Eco-Ag system never materialized and DTL alleges that MCI is currently marketing two crop irrigation products that "use the Confidential Information disclosed to [MCI] while under the NDA . . ." (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41, 44) and that MCI filed a foreign patent application "in direct violation of the NDA." (Id. at ¶¶ 46, 48).
In the remaining counts of the Second Amended Complaint, DTL brings this action against MCI for the misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Fla. Stat. § 688.001 et seq. ("FUTSA") (Count I); misappropriation of idea (Count III); and breach of contract (Count V). (Dkt. 51, pp. 12-19). MCI moves to dismiss Count III.
A complaint should contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This rule does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, conclusory accusation of harm. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must "plead all facts establishing an entitlement to relief with more than `labels and conclusions' or a `formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A court's scope of review on a motion to dismiss must be limited to the four corners of the complaint. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
Although it is axiomatic that a complaint's allegations must be accepted for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. And all reasonable inferences must be drawn in DTL's favor. St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
MCI moves to dismiss DTL's claim for misappropriation of idea (Count III), arguing that the alleged misappropriation of DTL's "Eco-Ag" irrigation technology is barred by Florida's statute of frauds, Fla. Stat. § 501.972. (Dkt. 82, p. 1).
Section 501.972(1) of the Florida Statutes provides:
Subsection (2) excepts "[a]ny cause of action based in copyright, trademark, patent, or trade secret," as well as any defenses to those claims. Fla. Stat. § 501.972(2). Accordingly, in the absence of a written contract, the only claims that can be brought for the use of ideas, concepts, and the like (that are not protected by copyright law) are those based in copyright, trademark, patent, or trade secret.
Based on this statute, MCI argues that DTL's "misappropriation of idea claim, as pleaded in the Second Amended Complaint and characterized by DTL in its Prior Opposition, does not allege a writing sufficient to indicate a contract governing the use of the allegedly misappropriated idea." (Dkt. 82, pp. 5-6). The "Prior Opposition" refers to DTL's response to MCA's previous motion to dismiss. See (Dkt. 61). Specifically, MCI contends that when DTL opposed that motion, it "represented to this Court that . . . the NDA `only applies to trade secret information,'" and because its misappropriation of idea claim involved non-trade secret information, the claim therefore depended on activities "that [were]
Upon review, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently identifies a writing, here the NDA, to indicate a contract was made between the parties governing the use of DTL's idea. In Count III, DTL alleges,
(Dkt. 51, Second Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 27-28). And within Count III, DTL alleges,
(Id. at ¶ 76). Based on these allegations, which at this stage are accepted as true, Count III is based on MCI's use of DTL's novel idea. Further, this idea, which is alleged to be comprised of the combination of trade secret and non-trade secret information, was disclosed to MCI in confidence "under the umbrella of the NDA." (Dkt. 94, p. 6). Such allegations therefore plausibly state a claim for misappropriation of idea.
Accordingly, MCI's Motion to Dismiss Count III (Dkt. 82) is
Notwithstanding, and as correctly noted in DTL's opposition, there is no allegation that the Prior Opposition was made under oath. See Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that one of the factors a district court must consider before applying judicial estoppel is "whether . . . the party took an inconsistent position under oath in a separate proceeding"). And although this factor is not "inflexible or exhaustive," MCI provides no authority in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applied to arguments raised in oppositions to motions to dismiss. Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., No. 17-14150, 2019 WL 5152143, at *5 n.4 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019).