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KVASSAY v. KVASSAY, B227557. (2012)

Court: Court of Appeals of California Number: incaco20120203014 Visitors: 19
Filed: Feb. 03, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 03, 2012
Summary: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS CHAVEZ, J. Appellants Peter and Richard Kvassay (collectively, appellants) appeal from the trial court's order granting the petition of respondent Robert Kvassay (Robert or respondent) 1 to evict appellants from certain residential property held in a family trust. They contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the eviction because there was insufficient evidence to establish that respondent was the trustee of the trust. We affirm the tria
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CHAVEZ, J.

Appellants Peter and Richard Kvassay (collectively, appellants) appeal from the trial court's order granting the petition of respondent Robert Kvassay (Robert or respondent)1 to evict appellants from certain residential property held in a family trust. They contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the eviction because there was insufficient evidence to establish that respondent was the trustee of the trust. We affirm the trial court's order.

BACKGROUND

The parties are brothers who each have a one-third beneficial interest in property held by a family trust established by their parents, Emanuel and Maria Kvassay, as trustors. The trust corpus consists primarily of a 3.5 acre residential estate located at 1554 Hill Drive in Los Angeles, California (the Hill Drive property).

During their lifetimes, Emanuel and Maria were the designated cotrustees of the trust. The terms of the trust provide that upon the death of the last surviving trustor, Peter shall serve as trustee, and that if he should be unwilling or unable to serve as trustee, then Robert shall serve as trustee. Section 6.16 of the trust instrument states:

"On the death of the last Trustor to die, or should such Trustor, after the death of the other Trustor, resign or become unable, for any reason, to serve as Trustee of the Trust provided for in this Declaration, then Peter Kvassay shall serve as Trustee. If he should be unwilling or unable to serve as Trustee, then Robert Kvassay shall serve as Trustee. Any successor Trustee shall succeed to all title of the Trustee to the Trust Estate, and shall have all the powers, rights, discretion, and obligations conferred on such Trustee by this Declaration."

Pursuant to section 6.16 of the trust, Peter became trustee upon the death of Emanuel, the last surviving trustor, on October 11, 2006. On January 12, 2007, Peter signed a written resignation as trustee and Robert succeeded him as trustee. The written resignation signed by Peter provides in pertinent part as follows:

"As set forth in Section 6.16, Successor Trustee of the Last Trustor, as described in THE KVASSAY FAMILY TRUST DATED FEBRUARY 26, 1993, I, Peter Kvassay, decline my position to serve as Successor Trustee. I further understand and acknowledge that Robert Kvassay will now serve as Successor Trustee, and that he and only he shall be responsible to execute and fulfill all of the Trust provisions."

Richard and Peter have lived on the Hill Drive property continuously since the mid-1960s and early 1980s, respectively. The Hill Drive property includes a 5,400 square foot main house and two guest houses. Over time, debris accumulated on the property, and the structures fell into a state of disrepair and deterioration. In 2005, Robert began undertaking cleaning, renovation, and repair of the Hill Drive property but encountered resistance from Peter. In 2008, Robert had to call the police to gain access to the main house in order to clean it because Peter denied him access. Both Peter and Richard have threatened Robert, his wife, and their children.

The renovation and repair of the Hill Drive property is nearly complete. The only part of the property that has not been renovated is Peter's bedroom. Peter has denied Robert access to that room.

Robert expended approximately $400,000 of his personal funds in renovating and repairing the Hill Drive property. He also incurs monthly expenses of approximately $20,000 to maintain the Hill Drive property.

Robert attempted unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with Richard and Peter regarding completion of the renovation and repair of the Hill Drive property. He also attempted unsuccessfully to remove Peter and Richard from their rooms before filing the instant petition to evict them from the Hill Drive property.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court ordered Richard and Peter to vacate the Hill Drive property and accorded Robert the authority to remove Richard, Peter, and their personal belongings from the property and to complete the renovation and repair of the property within eight weeks from October 5, 2010. The court ordered Robert to file an accounting no later than October 13, 2010, and further ordered that the Hill Drive property be sold subject to court confirmation.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellants' challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction is premised on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that Robert is the trustee of the trust. That factual determination is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (See Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425-1426.)

The undisputed evidence presented at the hearing showed that Peter resigned as trustee by a written document executed by him on January 12, 2007. That document contains an express acknowledgment that Robert would serve as the successor trustee. Robert testified that all of the trust beneficiaries consented to Peter's resignation as trustee. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Peter resigned as trustee, and that Robert is the successor trustee of the trust.

Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that Peter's resignation was ineffective because it was not done in accordance with Probate Code section 15640, which provides that a trustee of an irrevocable trust may resign only with the consent of the beneficiaries or pursuant to a court order.2 There was evidence that all of the trust beneficiaries consented to Peter's resignation as trustee. His resignation was therefore effective under Probate Code section 15640.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.

BOREN, P. J. and ASHMANN-GERST, J., concurs.

FootNotes


1. We at times refer to the various family members, who share the same surname, by their first names in order to avoid confusion.
2. Probate Code section 15640 provides in relevant part as follows: "A trustee who has accepted the trust may resign only by one of the following methods: [¶] (a) As provided in the trust instrument. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) In the case of a trust that is not revocable, with the consent of all adult beneficiaries who are receiving or are entitled to receive income under the trust or to receive a distribution of principal if the trust were terminated at the time consent is sought . . . . [¶] (d) Pursuant to a court order obtained on petition by the trustee under Section 17200."
Source:  Leagle

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