TREVOR N. McFADDEN, District Judge.
The Court granted summary judgment to Defendant Local Lodge 1759 ("Local Lodge"). Johnson v. Local Lodge 1759, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 2019 WL 2452991 (D.D.C. June 12, 2019). Now Plaintiff Edward Johnson moves to reopen this case. ECF No. 55. Because the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Court considers Mr. Johnson's motion as a Motion for Reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).
Rule 59(e) allows a party to file "[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). But relief under Rule 59(e) is "an extraordinary measure." Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Rule 59(e) "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-128 (2d ed.1995)). Nor is it "a vehicle to present a new legal theory that was available prior to judgment." Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012). A Rule 59(e) motion "is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted).
Even construing Mr. Johnson's filings liberally, he has shown none of those things. See generally ECF Nos. 54; 55. He points to no change in controlling law. He does not discuss the availability of new evidence. Nor does he allege any errors by the Court, legal or factual, in granting Local Lodge's Motion for Summary Judgment. Instead, he offers reasons for his failure to attend a mediation in November 2018, ECF No. 55, recounts the basic claims from his Complaint, see generally ECF Nos. 54; 55, and raises issues related to a different case, see ECF No. 54.
More, Mr. Johnson has not shown that reconsideration of the Court's prior decision is necessary to "prevent manifest injustice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The standard of proving manifest injustice is high. See Roane v. Gonzales, 832 F.Supp.2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2011). And Mr. Johnson has pointed to no injustice surrounding the Court's prior decision. True, the Court considered Local Lodge's Motion for Summary Judgment without opposition from Mr. Johnson, but he does not suggest that it was wrong for the Court to do so. See generally, ECF Nos. 54; 55. Indeed, the Court did so only after warning him at least twice about his obligation to respond. See Order, ECF No. 49; 2/11/19 Minute Order. Thus, it was Mr. Johnson's failure to heed repeated warnings that left his claims undefended.
Naturally, Mr. Johnson's request for relief also fails the more stringent Rule 60(b) standard. See Arabaitzis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F.Supp.3d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2018) ("Relief under Rule 60(b) is more restrictive than under Rule 59(e)."). He has not alleged "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" in failing to oppose Local Lodge's summary judgment motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
For these reasons, it is hereby
This is a final, appealable Order.