COLM F. CONNOLLY, District Judge.
I have before me two identical motions for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) in these coordinated patent infringement actions. 14-cv-887, D.I. 30; 14-cv-888, D.I. 32.
The #373 patent is directed to the testing of semiconductor chips. The following description offered by Plaintiff fairly describes the invention claimed by the #373 patent:
D.I. 36 at 3-4, 5, 7 (citations omitted).
Three of the #373 patent's 20 claims are independent: I, 8, and 15. They read as follows:
According to Plaintiff, "[t]he three independent claims . . . each encompass the[] concepts and recite the devices and improvements in the semiconductor process" claimed by the patent. D.I. 36 at 7-8. In light of this statement by Plaintiff and the fact that Plaintiff quotes only from claim 1 in its brief filed in opposition to Defendants' motions, I will treat claim 1 as representative of all claims.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial." Regional circuit law governs the Court's review of motions for judgment on the pleadings in patent cases. Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Under Third Circuit law, in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the non-movant's pleadings and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2017). The Court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion only where "the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). Patent eligibility under§ 101 is a question of law suitable for resolution on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., buy SAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on pleadings for lack of patentable subject matter).
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter. It provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
There are three judicially-created limitations on the literal words of§ 101. The Supreme Court has long held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). These exceptions to patentable subject matter arise from the concern that the monopolization of "these basic tools of scientific and technological work" "might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"[A ]n invention is not rendered ineligible for patent [protection] simply because it involves an abstract concept[.]" Id. at 217. "[A]pplication[s] of such concepts to a new and useful end . . . remain eligible for patent protection." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But in order "to transform an unpatentable law of nature [or abstract idea] into a patent-eligible application of such law [or abstract idea], one must do more than simply state the law of nature [or abstract idea] while adding the words `apply it.'" Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
In Alice, the Supreme Court made clear that the framework laid out in Mayo for determining if a patent claims eligible subject matter involves two steps. The court must first determine whether the patent's claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible concept — i.e., are the claims directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea? 573 U.S. at 217. If the answer to this question is no, then the patent is not invalid for teaching ineligible subject matter. If the answer to this question is yes, then the court must proceed to step two, where it considers "the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination" to determine if there is an "inventive concept — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Applying the two-step framework outlined in Alice, I find that the claims of the #373 patent recite patent-ineligible subject matter and are invalid under§ 101.
I begin by determining whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. "[C]laims are considered in their entirety [at step one] to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "The Supreme Court has not established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an `abstract idea' sufficient to satisfy the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry." Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The Court has recognized, however, that fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activity, and mathematical formulae are abstract ideas. See Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("fundamental economic practice" of hedging is unpatentable abstract idea); Alice, 573 U.S. at 220-21 ("organizing human activity" of intermediated settlement falls "squarely within realm of `abstract ideas'"); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 71-72 (1972) (mathematical algorithm to convert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary code is unpatentable abstract idea); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978) (mathematical formula for computing "alarm limits" in a catalytic conversion process is unpatentable abstract idea).
To determine whether claims are directed to an abstract idea courts generally "compare the claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases." Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334. The Federal Circuit has also instructed district courts to consider as part of Alice's step one whether the claims "focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336).
Applying these standards, I find that the #373 patent is directed to the abstract ideas of generating, receiving, analyzing by means of statistics, and reporting data. Claim 1 of the patent essentially recites: (1) generating or receiving "test data"; (2) identifying "outliers" in the test data; and (3) generating an output report that identifies the outliers. These are the same type of functions the Federal Circuit held to be abstract ideas in Content Extraction:
776 F.3d at 1347. "Generating" and "receiving" data, as claimed by the #373 patent, is essentially "collecting" data. The #373 patent does not claim any unique method of generating or receiving data. I also see no material distinction between the "reporting" of data claimed by the #373 patent and the "storing" of data. The #373 patent does not claim any unique method of generating reports that identify or display outliers from a data set. On the contrary, according to the patent's written description, "[a]ny form, such as graphical, numerical, textual, printed, or electronic form, may be used to present the output report used for subsequent analysis." #373 patent at 18:2-4.
Identifying "outliers" in a data set of test results is, similarly, no different than "recognizing certain data within the collected data set." Indeed, identifying outliers from among the test results of the semiconductor components that fall within control limits as taught by the #373 patent is nothing more than employing statistical analysis to determine if a datum point within a data set varies (or "strays") sufficiently from the other datum points in the set. As Plaintiff notes in its opposition brief:
The [#]373 patent describes the use of the statistical analysis to determine whether the test results for a particular component indicate that it is an outlier or not. . . . [T]he term outlier is explicitly defined by the patent specification as a test result whose value strays from a set of test results having statistically similar values, but does not exceed control limits or otherwise fail to be detected.
D.I. 36 at 7. Thus — to use Plaintiffs own words — "the purpose of the enhanced analysis" claimed by the #373 patent "is to determine if any of the components that fell within the control limits have test results that deviate from the other components that were within the control limits." Id. at 5.
Making that determination is essentially "doing math." It is akin to calculating standard deviations, and it is the type of mathematical computation that the Supreme Court has deemed an abstract idea. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594-95 (mathematical formula for computing "alarm limits" in a catalytic conversion process was patent-ineligible abstract idea); Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72 (algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form was patent ineligible). As the Court noted in Flook, "[i]f a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory [subject matter under§ 101]." 437 U.S. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)); see also DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that mathematical algorithms are abstract ideas); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Without additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.").
The fact that — again, to adopt Plaintiffs words — the purported invention uses "an additional computer to perform [the] statistical analysis on the test results generated by conventional test equipment" (D.I. 36 at 4) does not remove the purported invention from the realm of abstract ideas. While a computer indisputably makes it easier to identify outliers, the identification of outliers within a data set has long been performed by humans without the aid of computers. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's invalidity finding because the claim steps could be "performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper").
Citing Enfish, Plaintiff argues that the #373 patent claims "improvement in the functioning of a computer" and "specific improvements to semiconductor test equipment" and therefore is not directed to an abstract idea. D.I. 36 at 8, 9. Plaintiff is correct that in Enfish the Federal Circuit found "no reason to conclude that all claims directed to improvements in computer-related technology . . . are abstract and necessarily analyzed at the second step of Alice[.]" 822 F.3d at 1335. But, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestions (D.I. 36 at 9-10), the court did not hold in Enfish that the fact that a claim is directed to computer improvements necessarily means that the patent is not directed to an abstract idea.
In any event, the #373 patent is not directed to improvements in computer functionality or semiconductor test equipment. Plaintiff cites, and I see, no language in the claims (or written description) of the #373 patent that describes an improvement to either the tester or computers used to test semiconductors. Nowhere do the claims require a special-purpose tester or special-purpose computer hardware; nor does the patent anywhere recite specialized software for a computer or tester. On the contrary, the patent simply claims a conventional computer that (1) is connected to a conventional tester and (2) is "configured" to "receive the test data [from the tester], identify an outlier in the test data, and generate an output report including the identified outlier." #373 patent at claim 1 (19:26-29). As Plaintiff states in its opposition brief: "The patent specification describes using an additional computer to perform a statistical analysis on the test results generated by conventional test equipment." D.I. 36 at 4. The patent does not describe a method or apparatus to improve a computer's functionality to perform that statistical analysis.
Having found that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, I must next determine whether the claims contain an "`inventive concept' sufficient to `transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. A claim directed towards an abstract idea must include "`additional features' to ensure `that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). No such additional features exist here, and I find that, whether considered individually or as an ordered combination, the claim elements of the #373 patent do not "transform" the claimed abstract ideas into patent-eligible subject matter.
The claims simply recite generic statistical analysis and generic computer functionality to address the problem of identifying potentially defective semiconductor chips. See #373 patent at 3:59-4:4, 12:34-38. "Applying traditional statistical tools to data," however, "cannot possibly provide the inventive step necessary to become patent-eligible." eResearchTechnology, Inc. v. CRF, Inc., 186 F.Supp.3d 463, 475 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (citation omitted), aff'd, 681 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Nor can "the introduction of a computer" provide the required inventive concept when, as here, the process or analysis claimed by the patent "could be `carried out in existing computers long in use."' Alice, 573 U.S. at 22 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). Both the tester and computer claimed by the #373 patent perform nothing more than routine functions that conventional testers and conventional computers have long been used to execute. Claim 1, for example, recites the use of a "tester" that is "configured to test a component and generate test data[.]" #373 patent at claim 1 (19:24-25). According to the written description, the tester "may comprise a conventional automatic tester, such as a Teradyne tester." Id. at 3:36-37 (emphasis added). Claim 1 also recites the use of a "computer connected to the tester and configured to receive the test data[.]" Id. at claim 1 (19:26-27). According to the patent's written description, this computer system includes "any suitable processor, such as a conventional Intel, Motorola, or Advanced Micro Devices processor, operating in conjunction with any suitable operating system" and a memory "compris[ing] any appropriate memory accessible to the processor . . . for storing data." Id. at 3:59-67 (emphasis added). These functions and features are routine, conventional, and well-known in the semiconductor industry and do not provide the inventive concept necessary to transform the generation, receipt, analysis, and reporting of semiconductor test data into patent-eligible subject matter under Alice. See OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization claimed by patent was not transformed into patent-eligible subject matter where the "claims merely recite `well-understood, routine conventional activit[ies],' either by requiring conventional computer activities or routine data-gathering steps" (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225)); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[A]dding a computer to otherwise conventional steps does not make an invention patent-eligible." (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Neither "[a] simple instruction to apply an abstract idea on a computer" nor "claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer" satisfies the requirement of an "inventive concept.").
For the reasons set forth above, I will grant Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings for lack of patentable subject matter.
The Court will issue an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.