WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.
In this wage-and-hour class action, plaintiffs move for preliminary approval of a class settlement agreement. For the reasons stated below, the motion is
The background of this action has been set forth in a prior order and needs not be discussed in detail herein (see Dkt. No. 45). In brief, defendant Sprint/United Management Company sells mobile phone devices and services to retail customers. In February 2016, Sprint instituted a redesigned incentive compensation plan called the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program, which remained in effect until March 2017. This program allegedly made an unlawful factors outside the individual employees' control and unrelated to the individual employees' efforts regarding a particular sale or transaction.
Plaintiffs Joshua Caudle and Krystle White — a former store manager and former lead retail consultant, respectively — worked in various northern California Sprint retail store locations. They brought the instant action in November 2017, asserting various claims arising out of the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program for alleged unlawful deductions from employees' wages under California Labor Code Sections 221-23.
An order dated December 18, 2018, certified three classes relating to the deductions made under the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program (Dkt. No. 45 at 11-12). The first class was directly based on Sprint's policy at issue (i.e., the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program). The other two certified classes — the wage statement and waiting time classes — are derivative of the first class. Both Joshua Caudle and Krystle White were appointed as class representatives (id. at 12). Following class certification, the parties reached a settlement by ultimately accepting a mediator's proposal (Dkt. No. 63-1 ¶ 9).
Plaintiffs now move for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. This order follows a brief from plaintiffs, a statement of non-opposition from defendant, and oral argument.
"A settlement should be approved if `it is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.'" Torrisi v. Tuscon Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Preliminary approval is appropriate if "the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible approval." In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Chief Judge Vaughn Walker). Here, the proposed settlement agreement satisfies these requirements.
Under the proposed settlement, the key terms would be as follows:
Assuming all of the above deductions are finally approved in the amount specified, the average net allocation to each class member would be $1,177.73 (Dkt. No. 63 at 15).
According to plaintiffs and their expert, a total of $1,046,526.18 was deducted as a result of the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program, with an additional total of $237,266.73 relating to two-years' worth of interest on the deductions (Dkt. No. 63-1 ¶¶ 12-13). As for the waiting time penalties, plaintiffs multiplied the final rate of pay for each member of this derivative class by eight hours, then multiplied that amount by thirty days to find a total of $5,531,836.19 in waiting time penalties (id. ¶ 15). As for the wage statement penalties, plaintiffs calculated a maximum total of $541,050 in potential wage statement penalties (Dkt. Nos. 31-1, Exh B; 63 at 11). Additional penalties under PAGA could have resulted in a maximum amount of $653,000 (although that amount could be reduced at the district court's discretion), with 75% of the PAGA penalties allocated to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Dkt. No. 63 at 11). Thus, the total maximum recovery at trial is approximately $8,009,679.10, and the settlement of $4,000,000 represents roughly one half of the available recovery (id. at 12). Plaintiffs contend that this discount is warranted in light of the litigation risks and where each class member would receive full reimbursement plus interest of the underlying unpaid wages at issue (ibid.).
Plaintiffs' unlawful deduction claim turns on the theory that the Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment program unlawfully withheld 10% of each class members' incentive compensation based on a store-wide metric (id. at 7). Plaintiffs, however, are unaware of any controlling authority that addresses the specific facts at issue in the instant action. Moreover, defendant points to decisions that have held that variations in commissions resulting from contractual terms of an agreed-upon pay plan are generally lawful under California law. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 15-5239 JCS, 2016 WL 5390245, *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2016) (Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero). As such, there is significant uncertainty in the strength of plaintiffs' claim.
The strength in plaintiffs' derivative penalty claims carry even greater uncertainty. The waiting-time penalty claim faces a "good faith defense" against the failure to pay the underlying wages at issue where the state of the law is unclear (Dkt. No. 63 at 8). See, e.g., Kao v. Joy Holiday, 12 Cal. App. 5th 947, 963 (2017) ("A good faith dispute that any wages are due will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under Labor Code Section 203." (citation and alterations omitted)). The wage-statement penalties and PAGA civil penalties also carries significant uncertainty. There is a substantial risk that plaintiffs' wage-statement penalties would be denied because the wage statements contained an accurate accounting of wages actually paid to each employee, even assuming that the employees were unlawfully underpaid. See Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc., 22 Cal. App. 5th 1308, 1337 (2018) ("The purpose of section 226 is to `document the paid wages to ensure the employee is fully informed regarding the calculation of those wages.' . . . The purpose of requiring greater wage stub information is to insure that employees are adequately informed of compensation received and are not shortchanged by their employers" (quoting Soto v. Motel 6 Operating, L.P., 4 Cal. App. 5th 385, 392 (2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). And, there is the risk that the PAGA civil penalties will be reduced due to defendant's good faith defenses.
These risks sufficiently balance the benefit of a substantial cash payout of an average of $1,177.73 for the class (particularly given that each class member would fully recover the underlying unpaid wages plus interest), at least enough to warrant preliminary approval and an opportunity for comment from the class members.
As background, the certified claims included the following (Dkt. No. 67-1 ¶ 1.4):
The proposed scope of the release is as follows (Dkt. No. 67-1 ¶¶ 4.3-4.4):
In short, the settlement agreement only releases the certified claims for unpaid wages and derivative wage statement and PAGA penalties for the same violation (see also id. ¶¶ 1.4, 2.5). The derivative waiting time penalty claim, however, would be released "irrespective of the nature of the underlying unpaid wages, in recognition of the fact that California law generally provides for only one waiting time penalty per employee" (Dkt. No. 63 at 16). Plaintiffs explain the exception for the waiting time penalty claim release is proper because Section 203 of the California Labor Code provides a waiting time penalty where an employer "willfully fails to pay. . . any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits." Cal. Lab. Code § 203 (emphasis added); see also Reyes v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. C 14-00964 MJS, 2016 WL 3549260, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2016) (Judge Michael Seng) (noting that former employees "would not be entitled to additional waiting time penalties, as Labor Code section 203 provides penalties for the failure to pay any and all wages owed upon termination; multiple awards do not accrue for multiple violations"). The effectiveness of that release as to the waiting time penalties, however, would be "determined in any such case by the court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction in that case" (Dkt. No. 67-1 ¶ 4.3).
Additionally, named plaintiffs, solely on their own behalf and not on behalf of any other class member, would fully generally release all claims, known and unknown, that they have or may have against defendant as of the date they executed the settlement agreement in consideration for the incentive award (Dkt. No. 67-1 ¶ 4.7).
This order holds the proposed scope of the release for the absent class members is appropriately limited to the claims held appropriate for class treatment, with the addition of related claims for waiting time (to the foregoing extent), wage statement, and PAGA penalties.
The settlement agreement contemplates $1,000,000 in attorney's fees (representing 25% of the gross settlement fund) and $50,000 in costs, and a total incentive payment of $8,000. While the prospect of these forthcoming requests does not prevent preliminary approval at this stage, the parties are advised that the requested amounts are subject to close scrutiny and potential reduction at the final approval stage.
In particular, and as cautioned in the Court's Notice and Order Regarding Factors to be Evaluated for Any Proposed Class Settlement, the request for an incentive award to the lead plaintiff is a "red flag" (Dkt. No. 19 at 5). While helpful that the settlement agreement is not conditioned on a specific incentive award amount, it does not automatically eliminate the risk that the proposed award might make a flawed or inadequate settlement more "palatable" to the lead plaintiff (Dkt. No. 25). Nonetheless, because the proposed settlement agreement does not provide for an automatic incentive award, no request for such an award has been made yet, and the settlement agreement is not contingent on the outcome of any such request, preliminary approval remains appropriate.
Plaintiffs must file a separate motion for those awards at the final approval stage on the schedule detailed below and in comport with the companion order (Order re Attorney's Fees and Costs).
The parties have agreed to a revised proposed form of notice (see Dkt. No. 67-3), which would be sent to the 2,290 class members via first-class mail, and skip traces will be performed on any notices returned as undeliverable (Dkt. No. 67-1 ¶¶ 1.3, 6.3, 6.3(b)-(c)). The notice procedure and the distribution of class funds is to be administered by Simpluris, Inc., and shall not exceed $20,000 (id. ¶ 3.1(d)). The notice would state the formula used in calculating the individual payments and the share of the PAGA payment. Class members challenging their individual settlement or PAGA payment may produce documentary evidence to the settlement administrator (id. ¶ 6.3(e)). There will be no claim forms. Payments will be automatically mailed to class members upon final approval of the settlement (unless a class member affirmatively opts out) (see id. ¶ 6.4). The parties propose a sixty-day opt-out and objection period (id. ¶ 2.26).
The parties' proposed form of notice is hereby
Subject to final approval of the settlement and to the extent stated above, plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement agreement is