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U.S. v. PEREZ-ARREOLA, 2:12-CR-343-TLN. (2013)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20131120b53 Visitors: 5
Filed: Nov. 19, 2013
Latest Update: Nov. 19, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between plaintiff United States of America, on the one hand, and defendant Manuel Perez-Arreola, on the other hand, through their respective attorneys, that: (1) the presently set November 21, 2013, status conference hearing shall be continued to February 20, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.; and (2) time from the date of the parties' stip
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STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between plaintiff United States of America, on the one hand, and defendant Manuel Perez-Arreola, on the other hand, through their respective attorneys, that: (1) the presently set November 21, 2013, status conference hearing shall be continued to February 20, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.; and (2) time from the date of the parties' stipulation, November 18, 2013, through, and including, February 20, 2014, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4, to permit continuity of defense counsel and additional time for defense counsel to prepare his client's defense.

Defense counsel represents that: (1) he desires additional time to review discovery, conduct legal and factual research, and confer with his client to prepare his client's defense; and (2) he is currently unavailable in January 2014 due to his need to prepare for, and conduct, other trials.

Accordingly, the parties stipulate and agree that the Court shall find that: (1) the failure to grant the requested continuance in this case would deny defendant continuity of counsel and deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the ends of justice served by the granting of such a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defendant continuity of counsel and deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation on November 18, 2013, up to and including the February 20, 2014 status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4, to allow defendant continuity of counsel and defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

Source:  Leagle

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