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U.S. v. Alvarez-Muniz, 1:17CR00155 LJO-SKO. (2017)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20170818b34
Filed: Aug. 17, 2017
Latest Update: Aug. 17, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER SHEILA K. OBERTO , Magistrate Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill set this matter for a status conference on October 16, 2017, at 1 p.m. and time was ordered excluded in the interest of
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STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill set this matter for a status conference on October 16, 2017, at 1 p.m. and time was ordered excluded in the interest of justice.

2. By this stipulation, due to the unavailability of the Court, the parties move to continue the matter to October 30, 2017, at 1:00 p.m.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The Court is unavailable on October 16.

b. Counsel for the parties believe that additional time is warranted to review discovery, respond to pretrial motions, and to consider the government's plea offer.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 16, 2017, to October 30, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), for the purpose of trial preparation and plea negotiations. The parties further agree that the ends of justice served by excluding time to and through October 30 outweigh the best interest of the public in a speedy trail

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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