STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Siders, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference January 7, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant moves to continue the status conference to February 4, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between January 7, 2014 and February 4, 2014 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request, and has agreed to file this stipulation on behalf of the parties due to the unavailability of defense counsel.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government represents that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and voluminous records in electronic form totaling approximately 1,700 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for defendant Siders has received a plea agreement from the government and desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Additionally, counsel for defendant Siders has scheduling conflicts due to medical issues affecting his law partners that make the previously set January 7, 2014 status conference unworkable.

d. Defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with his client, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of defense counsel, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on February 4, 2014, and that it find excludable time from January 7, 2014 through and including the February 4, 2014 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to February 4, 2014 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 7, 2014 to February 4, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.