Filed: Jul. 25, 2013
Latest Update: Jul. 25, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 30, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status confere
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 30, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conferen..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 30, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 10, 2013 at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between July 30, 2013 and September 10, 2013 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 12,000 pages of discovery.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 30, 2013 to September 10, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
