Filed: Apr. 12, 2013
Latest Update: Apr. 12, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order by Judge Brennan, this matter was set for a status conference on 2. By this stipulation, defendant and plaintiff now jointly move to continue the status hearing until Ju
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order by Judge Brennan, this matter was set for a status conference on 2. By this stipulation, defendant and plaintiff now jointly move to continue the status hearing until Jun..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order by Judge Brennan, this matter was set for a status conference on
2. By this stipulation, defendant and plaintiff now jointly move to continue the status hearing until June 6, 2013, and to exclude time between April 11, 2013, and June 6, 2013 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided approximately 123 pages of discovery.
b. The defendant was arraigned on April 8, 2013, and undersigned defense counsel was assigned to the case on April 9, 2013 and is beginning to review the materials in this case.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 20, 2013, to March 13, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
g. The defendant is aware of and consents to the continuance.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
The status hearing will be moved to June 6, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
