ALLISON CLAIRE, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner is a California state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder by a Sacramento County jury in 2003, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 76 years to life. His federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on August 23, 2011. Respondent's answer was filed on October 10, 2012, and petitioner's traverse was filed on February 8, 2013. For all the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the petition be denied.
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his father's next door neighbor, 85-year old Alfred Augusta. The prosecution presented the following evidence at trial.
Petitioner had borrowed a wrench and socket from Augusta, saying that he needed them to fix his father's car. Petitioner and his father were not on speaking terms at the time. A day or two before the homicide, Augusta went to the home of the senior Mr. Fuentes to inquire about the status of the repairs. Augusta was upset to learn that there was nothing wrong with the car. He told Fuentes to tell his son to return the tools. Also a couple of days before his death, Augusta mentioned to one of his daughters that he was mad at petitioner for not returning a tool.
On the afternoon before the homicide, petitioner's friend Jesse Luna saw petitioner standing on the bottom step of Augusta's front porch. Augusta was inside the open front door yelling at petitioner. Petitioner said something like, "I'll get them back to you, I'll go get them right now." That night petitioner went to his father's house, and his father told him to return Augusta's tools. Petitioner was upset by the request.
On the morning of the homicide, a neighbor saw petitioner walking from Augusta's house toward his father's house.
That afternoon the Sheriff's Department received a report that a subject was down in the back yard of Augusta's house. Responding officers found Augusta lying on his back in the grass, dead. There was an indentation in the bloody grass near the victim's head, and blood stains on the nearby concrete patio and planter pots. There were no signs of a struggle inside the house, nor any signs of forced entry. A tool shed in the back yard was undisturbed.
The autopsy revealed that Augusta had been severely beaten, and was killed by blunt force trauma to the head. The victim had lacerations on the back of the head and behind his left ear, caused by multiple blows. He had major skull fractures,
The police questioned defendant several times, and videotapes of the interviews were played for the jury. Petitioner's story changed repeatedly in response to questioning, and petitioner repeatedly lied. In early questioning he claimed to have been at work all day, and then claimed to have seen a suspicious stranger at Augusta's house a few days earlier. He first denied having been at Augusta's house at all on the day of the homicide, then claimed that he had gone to see Augusta about the tools and left him alive and well. Eventually petitioner reported that he and Augusta had argued about the tools, a scuffle ensued, and Augusta fell and hit his head. The details of petitioner's story changed repeatedly as officers told him what they had learned from the coroner about Augusta's injuries. Eventually petitioner admitted to hitting Augusta on the head with a concrete foundation pier. Petitioner told police the pier weighed 40 or 50 pounds. Petitioner acknowledged that Augusta was lying on the ground when he hit him in the head with the pier.
Later that night, petitioner accompanied officers to the scene and re-enacted the incident. The re-enactment was videotaped, and played for the jury. Petitioner said that after hitting Augusta with the pier, he washed the blood off the pier and put it back where he had found it. He said that he did not mean to kill August, but only to knock him out. Petitioner acknowledged hitting Augusta with the pier twice. Both times he threw the pier at Augusta's head while Augusta lay on the ground. In another interview two days later, petitioner denied hitting or kicking Augusta. He said the victim's broken ribs might have been caused by the pier being thrown at his head and also hitting his body.
The defense presented no witnesses, but contested premeditation and deliberation. Counsel argued for a manslaughter verdict on grounds that the killing had resulted from an argument that escalated into a fight, in which any intent to kill was formed spontaneously in response to provocation. Counsel relied on petitioner's statements to police that during their argument Augusta had grabbed him and said, "Fuck you, Jerry, I hate you. You fucking Mexicans are all alike." The defense argued that petitioner had reacted in sudden rage but without deliberation to this verbal abuse.
The jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder and found a deadly weapon enhancement true.
Judgment was entered on October 21, 2003. Petitioner was sentenced to seventy-six years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on November 10, 2004. The California Supreme Court denied review on February 16, 2005.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on May 22, 2007. This petition included a bare-bones claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate mental health issues. The petition was denied on October 10, 2007.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Sacramento County Superior Court on June 17, 2008. This petition included a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate mental health defenses, supported by exhibits including a 2003 Report of Neuropsychological Testing and Evaluation by John Wicks, Ph.D. After issuing an Order to Show Cause on two issues (timeliness and the ineffective assistance claims) and appointing counsel, the court ultimately denied the petition as successive and untimely on July 22, 2009.
Petitioner submitted the same ineffective assistance claim to the California Court of Appeal on October 29, 2009, and that petition was denied on November 19, 2009. Petitioner submitted a petition containing the same claim to the California Supreme Court on February 8, 2011. This petition also presented a claim that petitioner was actually innocent of first degree murder. The state's highest court denied the petition on August 12, 2011, with citation to
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in pro per on August 23, 2011. On December 1, 2011, respondent moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. After petitioner sought an extension of time to oppose the motion, referencing his borderline mental retardation, the magistrate judge appointed counsel. Counsel subsequently opposed the motion to dismiss and sought equitable tolling based on petitioner's cognitive impairments and mental health issues, as well as on grounds of physical illness and denial of access to legal materials. Petitioner sought discovery and an evidentiary hearing related to equitable tolling. The magistrate judge granted the request for discovery, and vacated the motion to dismiss subject to re-noticing upon conclusion of discovery.
On October 4, 2012, respondent filed an answer.
At no time following the appointment of counsel did petitioner seek to amend the petition or to expand the record with any additional evidence.
Although respondent has asserted both untimeliness and procedural default, he expressly invites the court to bypass the procedural defenses and reach the merits. Petitioner joins the request to bypass procedural default, and reasserts his entitlement to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on the basis of the previous briefing. Because the undersigned agrees that it is appropriate to proceed to the merits, only a brief discussion of the procedural defenses is necessary here.
A one-year statute of limitations applies to federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Absent circumstances not present here, the limitations period runs from the date that the state court judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time to seek direct review. § 2244(d)(1)(A);
Petitioner's conviction became final on May 17, 2005, when the time expired to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the California Supreme Court denied review on direct appeal.
A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations only if the petitioner shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely filing.
In order to constitute "extraordinary circumstances," the circumstances alleged in support of tolling must make it impossible to file a petition on time, and must be the cause of the petitioner's untimeliness.
In the case before the court, petitioner seeks equitable tolling on grounds of mental impairment, physical illness, and impaired access to his legal materials. He has submitted supporting evidence including but not limited to the declarations of petitioner, his appellate counsel and his present habeas counsel; the 2003 neuropsychological report that is the basis of his substantive claims, which identifies numerous cognitive impairments; documents showing that petitioner read at a fourth-to-sixth grade level from 2006 through 2010; and three pages of medical records that document prison psychiatric services provided to petitioner in 2004 and 2005, which are offered as examples.
If it is necessary to decide the equitable tolling issue presented in this case, an evidentiary hearing will be required.
The procedural default doctrine bars consideration in federal habeas of claims that were rejected by a state court on the basis of a state procedural rule that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.
Notwithstanding the holding in
A procedural default may also be overcome with proof of actual innocence.
Respondent invites the court to bypass procedural default in this case and proceed to the merits of petitioner's claims. Answer, ECF No. 29 at 15, 16. Petitioner concurs, requesting an opportunity for further briefing should the court choose to address procedural default. Traverse, ECF No. 40 at 7. In light of the potential complexity of the procedural default issue and the overlap of cause and prejudice analysis with the merits, the undersigned agrees that direct consideration of the merits is appropriate.
The petition alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present a mental health defense based on the pretrial report of neuropsychologist John Wicks, Ph.D. Because the petition was filed in pro se prior to the appointment of counsel, the court construes the allegations liberally,
Prior to trial, Dr. Wicks conducted a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation of petitioner at the request of defense counsel. Dr. Wicks found that petitioner was borderline mentally retarded and cognitively impaired in numerous ways. The report identified sources of neurological damage including a history of substance abuse, and suggested that petitioner's impaired executive functioning and impulsivity had an organic basis.
Fourteen years prior to the Wicks report, in 1989, petitioner had been evaluated by Shawn Johnston, Ph.D. in relation to his suitability for CYA placement. Dr. Johnston found indications that petitioner suffered from a psycho-neurological deficit, and concluded that he was not "capable of fully mobilizing either his intellectual or emotional resources in effective problem-solving." Dr. Johnston's testing strongly suggested a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder with narcissistic and antisocial features.
In 1990 petitioner was transferred from CYA to the California Medical Facility, where he was placed in the Department of Mental Health program. In 2000, presumably after his release from his first prison term and before the homicide that led to his present sentence, petitioner was involved in a car accident in which he sustained a head injury.
Despite this evidence of brain injury and impaired mental functioning, trial counsel did not pursue a mental state defense. Petitioner's mental impairments would have provided a defense to first degree murder.
Respondent assumes that petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is subject to the constraints on habeas relief imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").
Petitioner argues that the claim's merits should be reviewed de novo in this court, because the claim at issue was rejected by the California Supreme Court in 2011 on timeliness grounds. The court agrees. In
A bare-bones ineffective assistance claim had previously been presented in petitioner's 2007 petition to the California Supreme Court.
In any event, this is not a case in which the outcome is determined by the standard of review. For the reasons explained below, the claim fails even under the more lenient de novo standard.
To establish a constitutional violation based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Prejudice means that the error actually had an adverse effect on the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
There is no doubt that a criminal defense lawyer with a cognitively impaired or mentally ill client has a duty to investigate the possible legal implications of the defendant's mental defects, including potential mental state defenses.
Petitioner relies on the Wicks report, which cannot support a finding of prejudice because it simply did not address whether or how petitioner's identified impairments may have affected criminal intent. In his traverse, petitioner argues strenuously that Dr. Wicks' report "negated" premeditation and deliberation.
Dr. Wicks found in relevant part as follows, on the basis of behavioral observations and a comprehensive battery of neuropsychological tests: Petitioner's IQ scores placed him in the borderline retarded range. He demonstrated no signs of psychosis. He was significantly impaired in memory and other cognitive functions directly related to learning. Test scores reflected attentional problems related to ADHD, and a pattern of impulsivity. Overall cognitive functioning was rated as mildly to moderately impaired. Cognitive flexibility and executive functioning were impaired. Dr. Wicks ruled out malingering. He concluded that petitioner functioned overall at a borderline retarded level, almost certainly had ADHD during his school-age years, and may have suffered further organic brain damage as the result of substance abuse and his 2000 head injury. Petitioner's executive functioning impairments "indicate problems with such higher level functions as abstract thinking, impulse control, and judgment." Dr. Wicks noted in conclusion, "These individuals [with impaired executive functioning] tend to be highly impulsive, self-destructive, and generally demonstrate poor social judgment. Substance abuse, of course, exaggerates these problems considerably." Wicks Report, ECF No. 1 at 21-81.
Petitioner was charged with first degree murder, which required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was "willful, deliberate, and premeditated." Cal. Pen. Code § 189. The jury was instructed in relevant part as follows:
RT 371-72; CT 111.
At the time of petitioner's trial, the defense of diminished capacity — the inability to form the required intent — had long been abolished.
Petitioner has neither presented nor proffered any expert opinion that addresses petitioner's state of mind at the time of the homicide. The Wicks report identifies impairments that raise questions about intent, but it does not answer or even address those questions. At most, the Wicks report should have indicated to counsel that a more specific follow-up investigation into the viability of mental health defenses was warranted. Without a showing of the evidence that could have been developed by such an investigation, however, petitioner cannot establish prejudice under
Petitioner argues in essence that the deficits identified by Dr. Wicks are so inherently incompatible with premeditation and deliberation that the Wicks report, without more, creates the reasonable probability of a different trial outcome. The court is unpersuaded, for several reasons. First, the report does not indicate that Dr. Wicks (or any other expert) would have testified that petitioner's deficits are inherently incompatible with premeditation or deliberation. Second, any such general testimony regarding petitioner's incapacity to form the requisite intent would have been inadmissible.
To be sure, there was no evidence in this case that petitioner went to Augusta's house on the day of the homicide having planned to hurt him. As defense counsel argued, the murder weapon was an object grabbed at the scene, likely in the midst of a confrontation. This fact, and petitioner's statement that Augusta had used hateful and racist language, could together have supported a jury's conclusion that petitioner simply "snapped." Defense counsel made this argument. Although the Wicks report suggests the possibility that mental health evidence consistent with the defense theory could have been developed, the report by itself does not make that theory significantly stronger. The jury rejected the "rash impulse" defense,
Because petitioner's ineffective assistance claims fails under the de novo standard of review, it would also fail under AEDPA's heightened standard.
Again relying on the Wicks report, petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent of first degree murder because he did not deliberate or premeditate.
Plaintiff's claim of actual innocence was denied by the California Supreme Court as untimely, not on the merits. Lodg. Doc. 12. Because the claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court, the high hurdle of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) need not be satisfied. Respondent appears to seek application of AEDPA standards to the claim.
The Supreme Court has articulated the standards for an actual innocence showing that will permit merits review of otherwise defaulted or time-barred claims.
Respondent argues that petitioner does not really claim innocence, but merely contends that California is legally barred from punishing him. Answer, ECF No. 29 at 16. Respondent misapprehends both petitioner's theory and the law. Because the mental state of premeditation and deliberation is an essential element of first degree murder, affirmative evidence that petitioner did not premeditate and deliberate would indeed render him innocent of first degree murder (but would not preclude liability for a lesser degree of homicide).
In any case, petitioner's innocence claim fails because he has not established that no reasonably juror would find premeditation and deliberation in light of the Wicks report.
Even an expert report that affirmatively provides an alternative explanation for a homicide is insufficient to establish actual innocence of first degree murder.
Petitioner's showing is plainly insufficient under
The Traverse includes a request for an evidentiary hearing "to flesh out the mental health issues." ECF No. 40 at 17. Because the allegations of the petition and its supporting exhibits are insufficient to support relief, there is no basis for an evidentiary hearing. Even under pre-AEDPA standards, evidentiary hearings are appropriate only where the petitioner's allegations, if true, would entitle him to relief.
Petitioner's allegations of deficient performance by trial counsel are largely conclusory, and unsupported by declarations or other evidence regarding pretrial investigation and preparation. Petitioner establishes that counsel knew his client had cognitive deficits, and the state court record reflects that no mental state evidence was presented at trial. The petition is entirely silent, however, as to what counsel did and did not do after receiving the Wicks report and before trial. General allegations that counsel failed to investigate a potential defense, unsupported by a statement of specific facts, are insufficient.
As discussed at some length above, petitioner also has not pled facts sufficient to support prejudice. Specifically, neither the petition nor its attachments — including the Wicks report — specify what expert opinion could have been presented at trial regarding premeditation and deliberation.
An evidentiary hearing is not a tool for petitioners to discover their cases, is an opportunity for a properly pleaded case to be proved. Because the claims here are inadequate to support relief, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.
For the reasons explained above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Courts order.